Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies

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Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds

Abstract

This article examines the rise of maritime security in concept and practice. We argue that developments in the maritime arena have flown beneath the radar of much mainstream international relations and security studies scholarship, and that a new agenda for maritime security studies is required. In this article we outline the contours of such an agenda, with the intention of providing orientation and direction for future research. Our discussion is structured into three main sections, each of which outlines a core dimension of the maritime security problem space. We begin with a discussion of the issues and themes that comprise the maritime security agenda, including how it has been theorized in security studies to date. Our argument is that the marine environment needs to be understood as part of an interlinked security complex, which also incorporates strong connections between land and sea. Second, we examine the ways in which maritime security actors have responded to these challenges in practice, focusing on issues of maritime domain awareness, coordination of action, and operations in the field. Third, we turn to the mechanisms through which the new maritime security agenda is being disseminated to local actors through a processof devolved security governance. We focus particularly on efforts to distribute knowledge and skills to local actors through capacity building and security sector reform. In the conclusion, we outline the future challenges for maritime security studies that follow from these observations.

Keywords: Maritime Security, Marine Environment Safety, Piracy, Maritime Blindness.

Maritime security is one of the latest additions to the vocabulary of international security. Initially coined in the 1990s, the concept has received growing attention due to the intensification of concerns over maritime terrorism since 2000, the rise of modern piracy off the coast of Somalia and elsewhere, maritime crimes such as human trafficking, and the increasing significance in recent years of the so-called ‘blue economy’ and issues relating to maritime environmental protection and resource management.

Introduction

A significant number of states and other international actors place maritime security high on their security agendas. This priority is reflected in several governmental and intergovernmental strategies for maritime security published in the past decade—including those of the United States, United Kingdom, France, India, NATO, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU)—as well as in multilateral statements such as the G7 declaration on maritime security, and in the work of the annual international Our Ocean conference on the theme.

If maritime security has become a core concern among major global security actors, the same cannot be said of International Relations (IR) and security studies more widely, where its study is scattered at best. Existing literature tends to consider such issues in terms of particular geographic hot spots and the management of specific threats, such as maritime piracy in east Africa, strategic rivalry in the South China Sea or the Arctic, organized crime in west Africa or human trafficking in the Mediterranean1. Issues such as port security, illegal fishing or environmental crime have received less attention, and the connections between all these themes remain underexplored.

Other literatures subordinate developments at sea to wider themes in IR, such as Great Power politics, geostrategy or international regime- building2. The rise of the maritime security agenda has been reflected in a renewed interest among maritime scholars in the question of order at sea in an age of globalization3, and in its increasing significance in national strategic, policy and doctrinal publications. Less attention has been paid to the maritime arena as a crucible of international change and innovation in and of itself. This is an important oversight, and one that risks obscuring specific and novel patterns of international interaction, governance and political order at sea.

This article argues that the maritime security initiatives and activities that have been observable throughout the past decade call for a more substantial treatment of the matter in the academic discussion. It is time for the discipline to pay more attention to the maritime arena and move beyond seablindness. The objective of this article is accordingly to summarize some of the core observations that can be made with regard to these developments and activities at sea, and outline the ways in which these require more focused research.

Our goal is twofold: first, to give some order to current developments so as to provide direction and foundations for further maritime security studies; second, to explore the fascinating challenges raised by maritime security phenomena in wider discussions within IR and security studies.

Our discussion is structured in three main sections, each of which outlines a core dimension of maritime security. We begin with a consideration of the issues and themes that comprise the maritime security agenda. These include the manner in which it has been theorized in security studies to date, as well as its growing prominence in security policy thinking and documentation. Second, we examine the ways in which maritime security actors have responded to these challenges in practice, focusing on issues of maritime domain awareness, coordination of action and operations in the field. While we aim at providing a broad overview, many of our examples stem from the western Indian Ocean, in relation to which paradigmatic observations can be made. Third, we turn to the mechanisms through which the new maritime security agenda is being disseminated to local actors through a process of devolved security governance. We focus particularly on efforts to distribute knowledge and skills to local actors through capacity-building and security sector reform (SSR).

In the conclusion, we outline the future challenges for maritime security studies that follow from these observations. We argue that in addition to the traditional concerns of studies of sea power and the legal structures governing the sea, maritime security studies need to pay greater attention to the interconnectivity of different threats and issues, to novel forms of governance and order at sea, and to the dissemination of the new maritime security agenda through capacity-building.

The Rise of Maritime Security

Throughout human history the sea has been viewed as a zone of danger and insecurity. As the historian John Mack argues, the seas have recurrently been presented as an ‘unwelcome and unwelcoming wilderness where the land is a reassuring point of reference’4. Mack suggests that human history can be read as an attempt to master the sea. Yet, in reviewing the literature, he finds that the vast majority of historical and political analyses portray the seas ‘either as the backdrop to the stage on which the real action is seen to take place—that is, land— or … simply as means of connection between activities taking place at coasts and in their interiors’5. His diagnosis also appears accurate for much of the existing discussion in IR and security studies. The sea tends to be understood as the stage for geopolitical power projection, interstate warfare or militarized disputes, as a source of specific threats such as piracy, or as a connector between states that enables various phenomena from colonialism to globalization6.

Theorizing Security at Sea

In the main, security at sea has been theorized and interpreted from rather conservative viewpoints based in traditional realist or liberalist theory. More recent theoretical developments, such as constructivist thinking or critical security studies, have hardly influenced the debate.

In the realist interpretation, the seas are the plain on which superpower or regional power rivalry takes place. Recent discussions have focused on the rise of China as a naval power and the US Asian ‘pivot’, the investments in naval capabilities of emerging powers, or resource competition in the Arctic7. This research has been driven forward primarily by scholars of sea power. Generally understood as a sub-branch of strategic studies, this field has long been concerned with questions of international interaction, influence and order at sea8. Such work has been located primarily in classical realist and geopolitical frameworks of IR, with an emphasis on historical analysis, the distribution of hard naval power and military competition9. In consequence, this scholarship has tended to prioritize what Bekkevold and Till call ‘top-down’ or structural influences on international order at sea, including ‘global power shifts, changing threat perceptions, naval modernization, and changes in naval capabilities and enforcement of the Law of the Sea’10. It has paid less attention to the ‘bottom-up’ influence of maritime disorder on international order at sea, and the forms of interaction, cooperation and conflict that emerge from such disorder.

Liberal interpretations of security at sea foreground the rise of various international regimes governing activities at sea, and suggest that the marine environment is increasingly subject to a form of collective public order and legal regulation. Liberal perspectives have been advanced in particular in the work of maritime legal scholars11. Kraska and Pedrozzo, for instance, suggest that in recent years international law has ‘evolved from a set of rules designed to avoid naval warfare by keeping maritime powers apart, toward a new global framework designed to facilitate maritime security cooperation by bringing countries together to reach common goals’12. Even so, such work has tended to focus on issues of technical regulation and formal international law, rather than maritime security governance more widely defined.

Indeed, we concur with Ian Speller that ‘the maintenance of good order at sea has not traditionally been subject to theoretical analysis in the same way as wartime activity or even diplomatic roles’13. Certainly, newer security theorizing as it has been developed by constructivists since the 1990s and in critical security studies, for example in the form of securitization theory or the security as practice approach, has, with few exceptions, hardly influenced the debate on security at sea14. As we shall elaborate further below, understanding the contemporary maritime security agenda requires that such considerations be incorporated in the analysis.

The concept of maritime security as a distinct subset of security thinking—including but not confined to existing themes of sea power and maritime law—is a relatively recent creation. In many ways, the study of the seas has lagged considerably behind developments in mainstream security studies. The latter discipline’s traditional focus on states, armed forces and war has been commonly ‘broadened’ and ‘deepened’ to incorporate a much wider set of security issues, domains and activities, since the early 1990s at least. These have included so- called ‘new’ security issues such as terrorism, transnational organized crime or environmental degradation, affecting a diverse range of actors including but not limited to the state, and have been characterized by multisectoral responses such as the increasing tendency to link security with development15.

The Path to Maritime Security

A short reconstruction of the rise of maritime security emphasizes how important these additional dimensions are. Expanded notions of security began to gain substantive intellectual and policy traction in the maritime sphere around the turn of the millennium. Of particular significance was the 1998 report of the Independent World Commission on the Oceans (IWCO). Published to coincide with the UN’s International Year of the Oceans, this considered a range of military and non-military threats to international order at sea, as well as the manner in which maritime security governance should be reconfigured to address them16.

This process gathered further momentum in the wake of the attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden by an extremist group in 2000 and the attacks of 11 September 2001, after which the United States began to focus significant attention on the maritime dimension of national and homeland security. The US government published a National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) in 2005, accompanied by eight supporting plans to address ‘the specific threats and challenges of the maritime environment’17. The NSMS was one of the first documents of its kind to explicitly conceive of the maritime sphere as a differentiated security complex in its own right. The strategy placed considerable emphasis on maritime vulnerabilities to terrorism, including the prospect of terrorist attack either at or from sea, and the challenges of securing ports and coastal areas from the incursion of terrorist materials, including potentially weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, like the IWCO report, it also identified a series of wider maritime security challenges. These included the threat of piracy, the illegal exploitation of maritime resources, smuggling and criminality, and other threats to the free movement of seaborne trade18.

The NSMS was followed by a series of developments in US strategy that placed good order at sea at the heart of the country’s naval thinking. For example, the ‘1000 Ship Navy’ concept of 2005–2006 began with a recognition that the challenges of maritime security were too complex and diffuse for the United States to handle on its own. Instead, it envisaged what Peter Haynes has called ‘a self-organizing, self- governing, come-as-you-are cooperative global maritime security network that coordinate[s] the activities of volunteer nations’ navies, coastguards and constabulary units’19. This notion was controversial at the time, and ultimately stymied by suspicion of US motives on the part of some potential partner states and controversy within the US Navy itself. However, it did point to several important future trends, including the difficulties faced by a single state—no matter how powerful—in managing a diffuse and complex maritime security environment, and the need for cooperative relations with others in areas of shared interest. It was also indicative of a broader and more expansive understanding of sea power on the part of the United States. As Admiral Michael Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations for the US Navy, noted in 2006: ‘It is time to elevate the discussion of sea power. For far too long and in far too many ways, it has been about big-ship battles and high tech weapons systems. Life is just not that simple anymore … we face entirely new challenges20.

In the wake of US efforts, a number of similar strategies have been adopted by other nations and international organizations. Of these, the most notable are NATO’s Alliance Maritime Strategy (2011), the UK National Strategy for Maritime Security (2014), the EU Maritime Security Strategy (also 2014), the French National Strategy for the Security of Maritime Areas (2015) and the G7 Declaration on Maritime Security (also 2015). The AU concluded the negotiations on its 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy in 2014, following up with a Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development in 2016.

In common with the US strategy, these approaches are distinguished by their breadth and ambition. They endeavour to connect different maritime threats and risks, and aim to offer a comprehensive or holistic account of the challenges to be faced at sea. Thus the EU Maritime Security Strategy conceptualizes maritime security as ‘a state of affairs of the global maritime domain, in which international law and national law are enforced, freedom of navigation is guaranteed and citizens, infrastructure, transport, the environment and marine resources are protected’21. Similarly, the UK National Strategy for Maritime Security is concerned with ‘the advancement and protection of the UK’s national interests, at home and abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the UK’s prosperity, security and resilience and to help shape a stable world’.22 Each of these maritime security strategies includes a different mix of emphases, inclusions and exclusions. The NATO strategy, for example, prioritizes deterrence and collective defence, alongside issues such as crisis management and cooperative security, and thus continues to emphasize ‘hard’ naval power alongside more diffuse maritime security tasks.23 The UK strategy, in contrast, explicitly does not consider ‘defence of the realm’, military campaigns or maritime safety as part of its remit. The AU’s 2050 AIM Strategy emphasizes the importance of maritime resources and trade to economic security and development in the continent, with a focus on capacity-building in areas including coastguard capabilities and port facilities.24

Even so, the overall thrust of each of these approaches is essentially holistic, representing an attempt to understand and engage with the maritime arena as an interlinked security complex, rather than as a series of separate threats or challenges. They also recognize maritime security as a collective problem of political order, over which no one actor can exercise determinative control.

The Core Dimensions of Maritime Security

Seen in this way, the new strategic documents provide important considerations for security studies scholars concerning the nature of maritime security. Accordingly, the contemporary maritime security complex consists of four domains, each of which incorporates a series of variously cross-cutting security concerns.

The first of these domains comprises what are best thought of as national security issues, corresponding largely to long-established traditions of naval strategy and sea power. The national security component of maritime security involves the development and application of naval power, incorporating military power projection and homeland defence at sea, as well as the use of warships to protect maritime trade routes and commerce through functions including deterrence, surveillance and interdiction.25Such concerns remain of latent or extant importance in many parts of the world, most notably in regions of current geopolitical rivalry, such as the South China Sea.

A second domain addresses the marine environment. This incorporates a diverse range of issues such as marine pollution, vessel safety and regulation, maritime search and rescue, the state of ocean health, pollution and the impacts of climate change. The marine environment is a similarly long-established concern in the maritime sphere, with its genesis in international efforts to regulate shipping and other activities at sea through intergovernmental organizations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or coordination bodies such as UN Oceans. Marine environment issues relate to maritime security in a number of ways. They represent a manifestation of wider environmental security concerns at sea and in coastal areas. They also concern the position of commercial shipping as a potential target for criminals, terrorists or pirates, and as a medium for trafficking in persons, illicit goods or weapons.26 Environmental degradation caused through fishery crimes or other environmental crimes, moreover, has the potential to increase the grievances of coastal populations and leads to maritime instability.

Marine environment issues are closely linked to a third domain of economic development. So-called ‘blue economy’ concerns underpin much of the maritime security agenda. Around 90 per cent of global trade travels by sea, and marine resources such as fisheries or offshore oil are key economic assets.27 Global commerce can be threatened by piracy, criminality or other forms of maritime disruption, while marine resource protection and development are often central priorities for coastal states. Indeed, it is notable in this regard that the AU’s 2050 AIM Strategy places ‘blue growth’ at the heart of its narrative, while the EU produced its own specific ‘blue growth’ strategy in 2012.28

A final domain addresses issues of human security, in the sense of the insecurities experienced by individuals and local communities as well as those affecting states.29Human security issues penetrate much of the maritime security agenda. The protection and sustainability of fisheries, for example, underpin the livelihoods of millions of people living in coastal regions, while these same groups are often the most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change or maritime pollution. Such concerns relate not only to the security of the individuals and coastal communities themselves, but also to the role of human insecurity in facilitating the emergence of activities such as piracy or criminality as alternative sources of employment in regions of significant economic deprivation or breakdown.

Conceived of in this way, the maritime security agenda has four distinguishing characteristics. The first of these is the interconnected, sometimes interdependent, nature of the security challenges maritime security presents.30 For example, the collapse of the Somali state in the 1990s justify coastal regions open to predation from illegal, unregulated or unreported fishing by richer states, as well as to other activities such as the unregulated disposal of toxic waste. Such activities exacerbated the already significant degradation of legitimate local fishing economies as a result of the war, and created a substantial body of socially and economically dislocated young men, whose primary ‘saleable’ skills were linked to seamanship through fishing or violence through conflict.31 Piracy also appears to have been tolerated by local communities, owing to a strong defensive or moral narrative that portrayed it as a legitimate response to international predation.32 As a problematic of security, Somali piracy thus includes themes of national security (international naval patrols and engagements), maritime safety (safety and duty of care to hijacked ships’ crews), economic development (fisheries protection and development) and human security (among vulnerable coastal communities). It is emblematic of the way in which many maritime security issues engender elements of both hard and soft power in relation to managing the consequences of insecurity and aspiring to address its root causes.

A second characteristic of maritime security is its liminality. Most maritime security issues are not simply to be—indeed, cannot simply be—understood and addressed as problems of the marine environment alone. Instead, they are invariably interlinked with challenges on land as well, as the case of Somali piracy discussed above illustrates. Land, costal zones, ports and other infrastructures are integral to maritime security in other ways too. The effective governance and security of port facilities are often key to managing such challenges as smuggling, robbery and corruption. Similarly, the ‘back end’ of piracy or terrorism—that is, the manner in which such activities are organized, sustained and funded, and the mechanisms through which profits are laundered and spent— primarily takes place on land.33

Third, maritime security issues often transcend clear boundaries of governmental responsibility or state competence. The high seas are, by definition, a transnationalenvironment, over which sovereignty is shared, and where the state is but one actor among many. In this context, the management of maritime insecurity must inevitably incorporate a range of different actors and agendas, including those of the littoral states concerned, local communities and fishermen, flag states, multinational shipping or fishing interests, resource extraction and tourism industries, and sometimes private security companies.34 So, for example, inter-national efforts to combat illegal, unregulated or unreported fishing or waste dumping at sea necessarily involve policing and enforcement actions by the navies or coastguards of individual states, regional cooperation and regulation of various sorts—including through international organizations such as the EU or UN—as well as engagement with the activities and practices of internationally diverse private actors or companies at sea. In this respect, as Till has observed, the ‘battle for maritime security’ is often a ‘quintessentially cooperative’ one.35

Finally, and by extension, maritime security is inherently cross- jurisdictional, or at least jurisdictionally complex.36 At an international level, piracy on the high seas has been tackled primarily as a problem of naval (law) enforcement, governed by international maritime law. Yet this raises a range of practical questions, such as how captured pirate suspects should be dealt with, including where they should be tried and potentially incarcerated.37 Even within territorial waters, there may be significant overlap or tensions between law enforcement, naval and development-driven security imperatives. Indeed, it is instructive in this regard to consider that the US NSMS replaced what had previously been a series of separate departmental-level strategies, including for example those of the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.38 The UK NSMS is even more jurisdictionally eclectic, making reference to at least 21 different government departments or agencies, including the Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Home Office, Department for Transport and Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, among others.39

The maritime sphere is thus increasingly understood as a complex and holistic problematic of security, requiring extensive national, jurisdictional and public–private coordination if the challenges it presents are to be effectively addressed. In practice, these challenges of maritime insecurity are generating novel forms of association, integration and cooperation between actors. It is to these practices that this article now turns.

Many of our examples are drawn from the western Indian Ocean. This region incorporates a wide range of contemporary maritime security challenges, from piracy to geopolitical competition. It is of major global significance as a principal artery of maritime trade, and has also been a crucible of innovation in relation to the collective management of disorder. We do not suggest it presents a direct facsimile of practice and experience elsewhere. In other parts of the world—notably the South China Sea—different patterns may predominate. However, we do think that it is paradigmatic of changes and innovations that are of wider geographical relevance.

Organizing Maritime Security and Managing Complexity

When drafting its maritime security strategy, the EU conducted a mapping exercise of relevant agencies within the organization itself and its members. This exercise identified 383 groups or organizations that dealt with the issue in one way or another, reflecting the complexity of the maritime security environment at the European level alone.40 Similarly, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) faces the challenge of bringing together and coordinating the activity of over 80 states and 25 international organizations in order to address piracy in the western Indian Ocean.41 The organizational and international diversity of such initiatives illustrates the challenge of producing coherent and holistic responses to the maritime security problematic.

In the western Indian Ocean region this challenge has led to a range of experiments in coordination and novel forms of association and practice within, among and between the various different actors involved in the maritime security complex. These innovations can be observed at three levels: first, an epistemic level centred on joint knowledge production; second, a coordination level focused on devising common scripts for action; and finally, an operational level incorporating joint maritime security activities in the field.

Maritime Domain Awareness and New Epistemic Infra-structures

At the epistemic level, innovation in the maritime security complex can be seen in a range of new mechanisms for knowledge production about the maritime security environment, and in particular the development of what are often called maritime domain awareness (MDA) or maritime situational awareness (MSA) initiatives. Such activities originate in efforts to improve mariners’ awareness of current and impending weather conditions but, as Jeff Kline notes, increasingly provide ‘an inspirational template for countering human-made threats to the maritime domain’.42 In order to do this, they draw on a wide range of data, including the (voluntary) tracking of ship movements through information-gathering systems such as the Automated Identification System (AIS); active surveillance through naval patrols, aerial reconnaissance, satellite imaging and radar systems;43 and the collection and analysis of data from national and international agencies with a role in maritime security, including port authorities, customs and law enforcement. MDA aims to provide a rich database of information, often in real time, against which maritime security activities—including interceptions and inspections of vessels at sea—can be planned and targeted, through centralized data-mining techniques.

The ambitions of MDA are considerable, and go well beyond marine surveillance as conventionally understood.44 Indeed, the US approach to MDA aims at nothing less than ‘the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States’.45 Such aspirations require significant transnational cooperation, as well as engagement with a wide range of substate and private actors. Other initiatives exploit the opportunities presented by communication and information technologies to open up new channels of knowledge exchange between civil and military actors, and between the navies or vessels of nations that might normally be reluctant to cooperate with each other. For example, international action against piracy off the coast of Somalia has been facilitated by the information-sharing platform Mercury, which allows various stakeholders—including national navies, international missions, and civil information-sharing centres—to communicate with each other through synchronous text-based chat, with a live feed on naval operations and piracy incidents providing real-time data to all participating actors.46

Coordination and Maritime Security Governance

Similar innovations are taking place at the level of coordination and maritime security governance. Here, the maritime security agenda is giving rise to a number of new organizational mechanisms, the aim of which is to coordinate action in the face of shared challenges. Governance mechanisms such as the CGPCS are process-driven, informal organizations that work on principles of inclusivity rather than representation. They bring together a heterogeneous set of actors, including states, international organizations, industry associations, think-tanks, and civil and military representatives of implementing bodies in order to coordinate shared responses to maritime security challenges. Although the decisions of such organizations tend to be non- binding in nature, they exert a substantial orchestrating effect and increasingly engender new forms of transnational coordination. The CGPCS, for example, has facilitated the development of a legal system on the basis of memorandums of understanding by which piracy suspects can be arrested, transferred, prosecuted and jailed across different jurisdictions.47

In contrast to traditional regimes focused on rule enforcement, these organizations emphasize problem-solving and policy learning, and aim to develop new communities of inquiry among novel associations of actors, including many whose relations may under other circumstances be distant or even antagonistic. For instance, the Djibouti Code of Conduct brings together Arab states with partners from eastern and southern Africa to coordinate maritime security responses to piracy.48 A similar spirit is observable in many of the recent maritime security strategies discussed above. The EU strategy, for example, is not centred on creating new organizations and hierarchies to centralize the coordination of responses, but instead emphasizes a flexible and problem-orientated approach to shared challenges of maritime security governance.49

Operational Coordination

These forms of association also find expression at the operational level, where, to date at least, they have been most prominent in anti- terrorist and counter-piracy activities. Examples include NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), located in the Mediterranean, and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), focusing on the western Indian Ocean. These operations were initially tasked with preventing the proliferation of WMD and terrorist activities. However, since starting operations in 2002 they have considerably expanded their mandates and range of operations, which now include broader patrolling tasks, surveillance and interdiction. Both missions are characterized by a flexible participation structure. A range of non-NATO members have participated in OAE, for example, including Georgia, Russia and Ukraine.50 The CMF framework is even more inclusive, including a range of different non-NATO navies, some of which—including those of Pakistan, Japan and South Korea—have taken command responsibility for joint operations.

Another example is the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Mechanism (SHADE), established in 2008 to conduct informal discussion among, and remove conflict from the activities of, the diverse nations and organizations involved in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Since 2012, 14 international organizations and 33 countries have participated in SHADE meetings.51 The novelty of the SHADE arrangement, and the opportunities it offers for addressing common problems, have been recognized by the US State Department, which described the organization as not … a coalition [which] implies [centralized] command and control. Instead [there are] three organized missions and a wide variety of national independent deployers who have simply chosen to collaborate. No one is in charge. No one has command. They deconflict and operate constructively, and that’s a new model of operation […] many countries are voluntarily collaborating to secure the maritime space. That’s a remarkable phenomenon.52

The shared challenges of the maritime security agenda are thus leading to practices that link information, actors and actions in ways that transcend established national or regional boundaries. They also bridge traditional civil–military and public–private distinctions, incorporating actors ranging from naval forces to shipping interests and private military security companies, who may be from otherwise antagonistic nations such as the United States, Iran, China and Russia. Such associations are circumstantially bounded, in the sense that they derive from specific coalitions of interest in the face of disorder at sea; in this case, the threat of piracy. However—in the western Indian Ocean region at least—it is striking that they have not dissolved with the decline of the piracy problem in the region since 2013. Indeed, there has been a gathering effort to institutionalize the priorities, infrastructures and practices of the maritime security agenda to the states of the region themselves through a process of capacity-building and devolved security governance.

Maritime security responses in the western Indian Ocean are reflected in analogues or emulations of core practices from the region in other parts of the world. For example, the G8++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Group is a security coordination mechanism modelled on the CGPCS. In the same region, the Djibouti Code of Conduct finds a parallel in the Yaounde Code of Conduct, adopted in 2013. The SHADE model has also been adopted elsewhere, for example in the creation of the so-called SHADE Med arrangement in 2015 to coordinate the actions of different actors and organizations in meeting the migration crisis in the Mediterranean. The Information Fusion Centre in Singapore hosts ‘shared awareness meetings’ which discuss maritime security issues and coordination in the south-east Asian region. MDA architectures are also increasingly common, including the US National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, the EU’s Common Information Security Environment initiative and projects to develop MDA capacities in the Arctic. While not all such initiatives are as developed or successful as their counterparts in the western Indian Ocean, they are indicative of the increasing significance of such practices in maritime security governance more widely.

Governing Maritime Security Abroad: Capacity-Building and SSR

Another major type of international practice concerns attempts to distribute knowledge and skills for the management of maritime insecurity through initiatives in capacity-building and the reform of the maritime security sector. In the western Indian Ocean region there has been a significant growth in external initiatives since 2012. These were initially a response to Somali piracy, but since have taken a much wider

focus, with activities aiming to address the root causes of maritime insecurity in the region, and to enable littoral states to take over key security governance tasks from the international community. SSR and capacity-building efforts in the maritime sphere are led by a number of core security actors. The key active states include the US and UK, alongside international and regional organizations such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the EU and the IMO.

Examples of US and EU Initiatives

In December 2010 the US published a cross-departmental report on maritime security sector reform (MSSR), with the involvement of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security and Transportation, and USAID.53 The report became an influential intellectual source and guidance document for how to organize a maritime security sector, and continues to be widely used in planning and implementation. The document adopts a holistic understanding of the maritime security concept, incorporating the challenges and institutions of maritime governance, maritime civil and criminal authority, maritime defence, maritime safety, maritime response and recovery, and maritime economy.54 It provides a comprehensive and systematic guide to MSSR in practice, with a range of technical assessment criteria, strategic guidelines and planning tools aimed at structuring and prioritizing MSSR activities across various actors and dimensions of maritime security governance. The activities themselves are likewise wide-ranging and comprehensive, ranging from initiatives aimed at strengthening maritime law enforcement, through training and capacity-building with local partners, to the development of country- specific maritime law and policy, and the institutions of mechanisms for accountability and transparency in the maritime security sector.55

For its part, the EU has invested significant resources in maritime capacity-building initiatives, in what it self-consciously refers to as a ‘comprehensive approach’.56 The EUCAP Nestor (from 2016, EUCAP Somalia) mission, for example, was established under the auspices of the EU’s Common Defence and Security Policy, with the aim of enhancing the maritime capacities of Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles and Somalia.57 It has focused particularly on strengthening the rule of law in target countries and developing coastguard capacities through training and technical/material assistance.58 Other EU capacity-building initiatives include the Critical Maritime Routes programme, which develops regionally specific projects aimed at training, education and knowledge exchange in key areas of maritime insecurity;59 and the Maritime Security Programme (MASE), which incorporates social and development, legal, investigative, capacity-building, and regional coordination and information exchange components.60

These US and EU programmes, as well as similar initiatives by other actors,61 share a number of characteristics. They draw on an understanding of maritime security that is multifaceted, involving capacity-building on land as well as enforcement at sea. A holistic approach is seen to be necessary because it encourages a focus on the commonalities of the problem or problems at hand, rather than on specific—and sometimes rather notional—institutional distinctions between, say, coastguard, navy and port police. It also recognizes the importance of wider governance issues in addressing the root causes of maritime insecurity. These activities thus make an explicit link between security, security institutions and the wider political and socio-economic environments in which they sit. They recognize that security responses do not exist in isolation from the wider polity in which they take place; they are nested within it, influenced by it, and themselves exert influence on it.62

Understanding Capacity-Building

In one sense, this holistic approach is a straightforward instrumental reflection of and response to the institutional complexities and linkages inherent in the maritime security problematic. It represents an attempt to approach the building of maritime security in a joined-up way: to make connections where they exist and to avoid actions in one area that may be counterproductive in others. However, maritime capacity- building—like similar efforts on land63—also needs to be recognized as an explicitly normative endeavour. It is about how local actors can be supported and encouraged in managing their maritime security sectors in a particular manner and within a preferred model of political organization.

In application, it tends to give preference to the formal institutions of the state—the navy, police, coastguard and so on—as well as the legal frameworks within which they operate, and the bureaucratic and institutional mechanisms through which they are organized and administered. Where such institutions are weak or non-existent, it focuses on strengthening or rebuilding them through activities including training, resourcing and sometimes equipment or infrastructure provision.64 It is generally bound up with rationalist notions of organizational effectiveness, efficiency and planning. Thus, organizational reform often focuses on issues of professionalization in security institutions, including the definition of clear organizational roles and responsibilities, the development of appropriate structures, training and human resources to fulfil these tasks, the establishment of formal organizational planning models, and the implementation of common standards of best practice in their day-to-day operation.65 It is also often distinguished by a focus on issues of good governance, accountability and transparency in the maritime security sphere—all of which are derived from notions of democratic politics.

Capacity-building thus aims to institutionalize externally derived notions of best practice in security governance, and to encourage local actors to share responsibility for the maritime insecurities in their own regions. However, it does face challenges. The normative nature of such activities may put them in tension with local priorities, interests or ways of doing things.66 For example, reforms aimed at strengthening and enforcing the fishing permit system in Somalia may run counter to the interests of those elites who benefit financially from its currently dysfunctional state.67 Efforts to eliminate petty corruption in the port police or coastguard may stumble in a fiscal environment in which serving personnel are rarely or inadequately paid.68

In order to address these tensions—and to increase the likelihood that reforms will become institutionalized and self-sustaining once external actors leave—capacity-builders often emphasize what is called ‘local ownership’ in their activities. Thus, for example, the EU’s strategic framework for supporting SSR emphasizes ‘the participation of all stakeholders’ and the importance of ‘inclusive consultation processes’ as baseline principles for its SSR initiatives.69 The same document notes that, to be ‘applicable and effective’, programmes should be ‘developed on the basis of nationally owned processes’, and that ‘reform efforts will be effective and sustainable only if they are rooted in a country’s institutions … owned by national security and justice actors, and considered legitimate by society as a whole’.70 Similar aspirations are visible in the approaches of other actors, including the US government’s MSSR framework.

In practice, the extent to which local ownership is taken seriously by external actors varies considerably. Often, it can be applied in a limited and even paradoxical manner, meaning the extent to which locals come to accept the (externally driven) security-building agenda on its own terms.71 At other times, it can be more nuanced and include the substantive engagement of local elites in the formulation, planning and evaluation of projects. Even so, notions of local ownership can expose important differences of priority between external donors and local actors. In Somalia, for example, local actors have tended to attach more importance to those aspects of the maritime capacity-building agenda associated with blue growth and human security, in contrast to many donors who stress anti-piracy or counter-terrorism activities.72Either way, the prevalence of local ownership discourse in these activities is indicative of the extent to which the maritime security agenda goes beyond a series of merely technical or instrumental responses to new security challenges. It also seeks to install and embed these responses in target regions, and to do so through mechanisms that strive to refashion and indigenize specific practices of governance in the recipient states concerned.

The Future of Maritime Security Studies

In 2017, around 80 per cent of the global population live within 160 kilometres of a sea coast, and many of the world’s major cities— including, among many others, Lagos, London, Mumbai, New York, Shanghai and Tokyo—are situated in coastal locations.73 Rapid urbanization, particularly in the developing world, means that these numbers will rise significantly in the coming decades. The oceans also remain at the heart of global trade, with 90 per cent of all goods transported by sea, and the transport of maritime cargo expected to double between 2014 and 2020.74 The sea and its littoral are thus heavily implicated in the full range of contemporary security concerns, in ways and to an extent that are unlikely to diminish any time soon. In some parts of the world—the South China Sea, for example—such concerns may be obscured or overshadowed by geopolitical competition and naval confrontation.75However, even under these circumstances, the challenges of the maritime security agenda remain present, as do significant areas of shared interest in relation to, for example, environmental protection or the free passage of commercial vessels.76

In contrast to some observers, who argue that we are entering a new period of danger, even anarchy,77 we suggest that the maritime security agenda is in fact leading to new forms of international order at sea. This process is pragmatic and incremental in nature, driven by innovation and change in the maritime arena itself rather than by wider structural shifts in geopolitics or international regulation. International actors are developing practical responses to the specific challenges of maritime security. These reflect the requirement to coordinate and integrate the four domains of maritime security—namely sea power, the marine environment, economic development and human security. Such responses have occurred at the epistemic, coordination and operational levels, and have been exported through capacity-building projects.

The Future Agenda of Maritime Security Studies

Understanding maritime security and the structural and practical challenges it poses for how the sea is governed will require ongoing in- depth studies of the activities and initiatives that international actors undertake to cope with the key elements of maritime security. This implies expanding the view beyond the perspective of traditional realist and liberal theorizing and using the more fine-grained lenses provided by new security studies in considering normative structures, practices and knowledge. It is necessary, while retaining the insights of studies of sea power and maritime law, to take them further by connecting them to more sociological and more empirical interdisciplinary observations.

Five areas in particular require further attention. First, we need to understand the changing character of sea power and the way it is being transformed through connections with concerns over the marine environment, the blue economy and human security, the new emphasis placed on maritime crime and law enforcement at sea, and the full range of practical innovations in use, including technology and informal practices. Second, we need to revisit the role of formal and informal rules for maritime security governance and examine how these are enforced through operations at sea, new (informal) legal coordination mechanisms and capacity-building, considering the creativity required to manage the complexity and increasing fragmentation of maritime law. Third, we need to analyse the ways in which established patterns of international security cooperation—alliances, multinational operations and so on—have become more diffuse, complex and associational, involving a range of (often otherwise antagonistic) national partners, but also private and other non-state actors, including shipping companies, private military and security companies, fishing communities and other sub-state groups. These activities expand and challenge many traditional notions of state action and cooperation, and suggest a range of novel mechanisms and networks through which security can—and is—being practised. Fourth, we need to pay more attention to the connections between land and sea, the different forms of maritime crime and other threats, and how these reinforce each other. If these issues are to be understood and ameliorated, maritime security studies needs to incorporate a more sustained engagement with their causes and interactions on land, as well as their manifestations at sea. Fifth, we need to revisit the political functions and structural effects of capacity- building in the maritime sphere. At present, these initiatives remain relatively immature compared to their more established counterparts on land, and there is much that may be gained from a more systematic sharing of experience. This is particularly so with regard to the manner in which such efforts are received in the target communities in which they take place, including the question of local ownership, and has implications for their efficacy and sustainability over the long term.

In short, we believe that it is time for security studies to move beyond seablindness and recognize the maritime arena as a crucible for change and innovation in global politics as a whole. Doing so will lead to a more interconnected and broadly relevant understanding of the maritime security complex, and will open up an important area of international interaction to the discipline more widely.

References

1 Felix K. Chang, “China’s naval rise and the South China Sea: an operational assessment”, Orbis, 56, no. 2, (2012): 19-38.

2 Jack S. Levy, and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on land and at sea: do states ally against the leading global power?”, International Security, 35, no. 1, (2010): 7-43.

3 Jo Inge Bekkevold and Geoffrey Till, International order at sea: how it is challenged, how it is maintained, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

4 John, M., The sea: a cultural history. (London: Reaktion, 2011).

5 Ibid

6 Philip, E. Steinberg, The social construction of the ocean. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

7 Margaret Blunden, “The new problem of Arctic stability,” Survival, 25, no. 5, (2009): 121-142.

8 Ken Booth, Navies and foreign policy, (London: Croom Helm, 1977).

9 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century,(Florida, USA: CRC Press, 2018).

10 Jo Inge and Geoffrey, International order at sea: how it is challenged, how it is maintained, 2018.

11 Robin Geib and Anna Petrig, Piracy and robbery at sea:the legal framework for counterpiracy operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

12 James, Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, International maritime security law, (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2014)

13 Ian Speller, Understanding naval warfare,(London: CRC Press, 2014).

14 Barry J. Ryan, “Security spheres: a phenomenology of maritime spatial practices,” Security Dialogue, 46, no. 6, (2015): 568-584.

15 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

16 IWCO, The ocean our future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 17.

17 US Government, The National Strategy for Maritime Security. (2005), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456414.

18 Ibid

19 Peter De Haynes, Toward a new maritime strategy: American naval thinking in the postCold War era, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2015)

20 Hayne, Toward a new maritime strategy, 201.

21 Council of the EU, European Union Maritime Security Strategy , (Brussels, 2014): 3. https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INI T,

22 HM Government, The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security, (London, 2014): 15, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32 2813/20140623-40221_national-maritime-strat-Cm_8829_accessible.pdf, p. 15

23 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, (Brussels, 2011): 1, http://www.nato.int/cps/on/natohq/official_texts_75615.html

24 AU, 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy , (2015): 8–10, http://cggrps.org/wp-content/uploads/2050-AIM-Strategy_EN.pdf,

25 Christian Beuger, “What is maritime security?”, Marine Policy, 53, (2015): 4

26 Ibid. Bueger, (2015)

27 Opcit.HM Government (2014)

28 European Commissionm Blue growth: opportunities for marine and maritime sustainable growth, (Brussels, 2012), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0494&from=EN.

29 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf

30 Speller, Understanding Naval Warfare.

31 Abdi Ismail Samatar, Mark Lindberg, and Basil Mahayani, “The dialectics of piracy in Somalia: the rich versus the poor,” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 8, (2010): 1377–94.

32 Ibid. Samatar, 2010.

33 Justin Hastings, “Geographies of state failure and sophistication in maritime piracy hijackings”, Political Geography, 28, no. 4, (2008): 215–16.

34 Patrick Cullen, “Private security companies in the Malacca Straits: mapping new patterns of security governance”, in Mercenaries, pirates, bandits and empires: private violence in historical context, ed. Alejandro Colas and Bryan Mabee, (London: Hurst, 2010): 187–212.

35 Geoffrey Till, (2016), “The Changing Dynamics of Seapower and Concepts of Battle”, in International order at Sea: How it is challenged. How it is maintained, ed. Bekkevold and Till, (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016)” p. 177.

36 James, K., & Raul, P. (2014).

37 Douglas Guilfoyle, “Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59, no.1, (2010): 141–69.

38 US Government, The National Strategy, ii.

39 HM Government, The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security, 21.

40 Marcus Houben “The evolution of the EU’s maritime security strategy”, talk given at workshop on ‘Building Trust to Enhance Maritime Security’, (Coventry University, and the Small Arms Survey, Geneva, Switzerland, November 10 and 11, 2014).

41 Theirry Tardy, “Fighting piracy off the coast of Somalia: lessons learned from the Contact Group” in Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, (2014).

42 Jeff Kline, “Maritime security”, in Securing freedom in the global common, ed., Scott Jasper (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010): 69

43 Laurent Etienne, Pelot Hjelmfet, Ronald Allen, and Melanie Fournier, “Global maritime situational awareness”, in Global maritime security: new horizons, ed., Joseph S. Syliowicz and Ozlen Celebi, (Istanbul: Turkish Maritime Forces, 2014), 69–87

44 Chris Rahman, ‘’Maritime domain awareness: the key to maritime security’’, in Maritime security: international law and policy perspectives from Australia and New Zealand, ed., Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and David R. Rothwell, (Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 202.

45 US Government (2013), Nationalmaritime domain awareness plan (Washington DC, 2013): 1, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=747691.

46 RowanWatt-Pringle, ‘How to catch a pirate: technology is key’, naval-technology.com, (2011), http://www.naval-technology.com/features/ featurehow-to-catch-a-piratecooperation-is-key/.

47 Bueger, Christian ‘’Experimenting with global governance: learning lessons in the Contact Group on Piracy’’, in Knowing governance: the epistemic construction of political order, ed,. Jan-Peter Voss and Richard Freeman, eds, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 87–104.

48 Christian Bueger, and Mohanvir Singh Saran, ‘’Finding a regional solution to piracy: is the Djibouti Process the answer?’’, Piracy-Studies.org, (August, 2012), http://piracystudies.org/2012/finding-a-regional-solution-to-piracy-is-the-djibouti-process-theanswer/

49 Council of the EU, The European Union Maritime Security Strategy, 4–6

50 NATO, Operation Active Endeavour (archived) (Brussels, 2016), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm

51 Jon Huggins and Jens Vestergaard Madsen, ‘‘The CGPCS: the evolution of multilateralism to multi-stakeholder collaboration’’, in Fighting piracy, p. 27; Oceans Beyond Piracy, Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), ed., Thierry Tardy, p– 27, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/shared-awareness-and-deconflictionshade.

52 ‘Maritime TV panel discussion with Donna Hopkins, US State Department Coordinator on Counter Piracy and Maritime Security’, Piracy Daily, (June 26, 2013).

53 US Government, Maritime security sector reform (Washington DC, 2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/154082.pdf.

54 Ibid 55 Ibid.

56 “Regional maritime security capacity building mission in the Horn of Africa and the western Indian Ocean”, European Union External Action, (EEAS, Brussels, 2014): 2,

57 Ibid

58 EEAS(2012), European Union mission on regional maritime capacity building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR), Council decision 2012/389/CFSP, retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= CELEX:02012D0389- 20151207&qid=1473075547345&from=EN.

59 EU, Critical Maritime Routes Programme, https://criticalmaritime routes.eu/

60 European Commission, Programme to promote regional maritime security (MASE, 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/programme-promote-regional-maritimesecurity-mase_en.

61 Timothy Edmunds, “Maritime capacity building in the Horn of Africa: states of Somalia”, EU-CIVCAP working paper, (2017): 3–5, https://eucivcap. files.wordpress.com/2017/06/eucivcap-workingpaper-01-17-edmunds.pdf.

62 Heiner Hänggi, (2004), ‘‘Conceptualising security sector reform and reconstruction’’, in Reform and reconstruction of the security, , eds., Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi sector (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction), pp. 4–8

63 Mary Venner, (2015), ‘The concept of “capacity” in development assistance: new paradigm or more of the same?’, Global Change, Peace and Security 27, no. 1, (2015): 93–5.

64 Mark Sedra (2010), ‘Introduction: the future of security sector reform’, The future of security sector reform, ed., Mark Sedra (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010), 7–23

65 Timothy Edmunds, Security sector reform in transforming societies: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 38–9

66 Timothy Edmunds, ‘Illiberal resilience in Serbia’, Journal of Democracy, 20 no. 1, (2009). 67 Phillipe Leymarie, Philippe Rekacewicz, and Agnes Stienne, UNOSAT global report on maritime piracy: a geospatial analysis, 1995–2013 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2013), 21. 68 Mark Downs, & Robert Muggah, ‘Breathing room: interim stabilization and security sector reform in the post-war period’, in The future of security sector reform, Mark Sedra, ed., (2001), 140–44.

69 European Commission , Elements for anEU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform (2016), 5 , https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ sites/devco/files/joint-communication-ssr-20160705-p1-854572_en.pdf,

70 Ibid

71 Filip Ejdus, “Here is your mission: now please have some ownership”: the rhetoric and practice of local ownership in CSDP operations’, European Security, 26, no. 4, (2017).

72 Edmunds, Maritime capacity building, 7.

73 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, para.II.4.

74 HM Government, The UK National Strategy, 39.

75 Zhou Fangyin, “Between assertiveness and self-restraint: understanding China’s South China Sea policy,” International Affairs, 92, no. 4, (2016).

76 Patalano, Alessio, ‘‘Maritime strategy and the South China Sea’’, in Maritime strategy and Global Order: Market, Resource, Security, eds., Daniel Moran, James A. Russell, (Georgetown University Press, 2016), 121, 143.

77 Dave Sloggett, The anarchic sea: maritime security in the twenty-first century (London: Hurst, 2013).

Necessity of Maritime Security in Gwadar Port Complex

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Faiza Farid

Abstract

In the changing global scenario of international politics, the growing attention following the end of the Cold War, has been directed towards oceans. Indian Ocean and its region has gained immense attention in the past few years. Due to the presence of strategic Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) and choke points-Indian Ocean has crucial importance to drive international politics. The level of competition in the region has increased. With China’s rise as a global economic power, the hegemonic status of USis beingchallenged. In this regard, China’s String of Pearls strategy comes to light with special reference to the One Belt, One Road (BRI). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the most potent part of the Belt-Road Initiative. Thesurmounting attention owes to the geostrategic location of Gwadar. Connecting Gwadar with Xinjiang-it would provide China with an alternate route to reach the Middle Eastern and North African markets, ending its Malacca Dilemma. CPEC in this regard, requires a diverse map for maritime security which sees the interplay of four major navies in the region-US, PLA Navy, Pakistan and the Indian Navy.

Keywords: Indian Ocean, BRI, CPEC, PLA Navy, Maritime Security, Gwadar, US, Heartland Theory

Introduction

The changing international scenario of world politics has put the Indian Ocean at the forefront of discussion. The nature of politics in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is characterized to be of political, economic and strategic in nature. As politics and economics go hand in hand, IOR is touted to be one of the fundamental areas where the contestation of twenty-first century will be based. As Robert Kaplan emphasizes in his book, Monsoon: The Indian Oceanand the Future of American Power

“It is my contentionthatthe Greater Indian Ocean, stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa pastthe Arabia Peninsula, the Iranian plateau, and the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, maycompriseamapas iconic to the new century as Europe was to the lastone.”

(Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, Robert D Kaplan)1

In this context, the Indian Ocean faces its primary contestation in the form of alliances and rivalries. The most basic form of alliance exists between China and Pakistan, and US and India. The rivalry and US’s apprehension of a dominant China has put it in a position of countering and containing it in the Indo-Pacific region.

China’s rise has been significant in the past decade. As twenty-first century is dubbed to be the Asian Century, the nature of competition has changed drastically due to the economic concerns. The international trade is dependent on the sea routes which have to be secured for a state’s vital interests. Indian Ocean in this regard is considered to be of crucial importance as it holds the most important choke points in the world.

The need for the preservation of oceans, water bodies and the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) arises primarily, due to the increased competition between the nation states of the world. The ever-increasing and potent role of seas in the 21st century is important because of the rationale that sets a state’s dominance. Indian Ocean in this regard holds an important position in the international arena.

Indian Ocean has always been a different water body than other oceans. Historically, all the major powers have used it to cross and reach the land areas. To its north are Pakistan, India and Iran, to its east are Australia, Malay Peninsula and Indonesia, to its west lie Arabian Peninsula and Africa. It is considered distinct from the other oceans since it lies at the junction of Pacific and Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Due to its status as the main line of communication, its relevance in today’s politics is due to its coastal ports. Its primary importance lies in the way it is connected and surrounded by land and the oceanic body.2 The waters of its coastal ports operate the all year and thus its waters are deep, which ensures smooth trade.3 Furthermore, in historical perspective, the focus of the major powers has always been a source of contestation in the Indian Ocean region. The eastern and western sides of the ocean saw developments separately4, which meant a strong history of competition and colonial rule in the Subcontinent.

Strategic Importance of Indian Ocean

According to David Michel and Russell Sticklor of the Stimson Centre, Indian Ocean under the current competition, would account for an increased approach in maritime security, governance and inter-state alliances and competitions.5

Hence, its importance is further accentuated by the presence of vital Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) also known as Choke points. Out of these, the most crucial choke points located in the IOR, are Bab-el- Mandeb (connecting Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea and then with the Suez Canal), Suez Canal (connects Europe and Asia), Strait of Hormuz (connects Persian Gulf, to Gulf of Oman and then the Arabian Sea) and the Strait of Malacca (connects Indian Ocean to South China Sea and Pacific Ocean).6

As described by Sugata Bose, it is an “inter-regional arena”7. Provided in the prophecies of the naval historian and strategist Sir Halford Mackinder in his much cited Heartland theory presented in ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ in 1904-the control of the world(or world island) rests on the control of Eurasia. This in turn is also seen in the writings of Sir Alfred Mahan who emphasized on the control of the seas. The ocean sees intense conflict with US-China vying for its dominance, with India, Pakistan and Iran as subsidiary actors.

3. China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

In the light of Mackinder’s Heartland Theory-China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy lies at the very core of it. With many security analysts considering it as a setup for establishing its naval bases, CPEC on the other hand is a major component of Maritime Silk Route concept. The crucial regard of this aspect has increased the relevance of the Indian Ocean along with its coastal regions.

Out of these is China’s flagship project the ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ (CPEC) which is part of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. CPEC tends to be the transformative project for South Asia. The nature of this aspect holds true because of its strategic location.

CPEC aims to connect the western province of Xinjiang with Gwadar, located in the volatile province of Balochistan. According to Munir Akram’s article in Dawntitled The New Great Game

“It (CPEC) will transform China from a one- to a two-ocean power; enable a part of its $4000 billion annual trade to circumvent the Malacca Straits and other potential chokepoints in the Indian Ocean and shorten China’s supply lines to the Gulf, West Asia and Africa. For these reasons, if no other, China has a vital stake in Pakistan’s strategic stability and socioeconomic development. The Chinese commitment of$46bn for CPEC projects is but the first installment of the massive capital which China is prepared to deploy in Pakistan. The power contest in Asia is now mainly between China and America, and, to a lesserextent, between America and Russia — with India, Pakistan, Iranand others in subsidiary roles.” 8

CPEC is being given primordial attention primarily because of the strategic location. Gwadar lies in close proximity with the Strait of Hormuz. Its natural geostrategic environment enables it to resolve China’s Malacca Dilemma.

Gwadar requires a complete structure of the maritime security primarily due to the nature of threats and challenges presented to it both in the form of internal and external components. CPEC which is located at Gwadar lies at the heart of China’s BRI. BRI wants to connect mainland China with the Middle East, North Africa and then Europe through a network of railway lines, roads and other infrastructure programmes. China is part of six of these corridors. Laying a ground network of these corridors connecting states together, China plans to project its economy and trade through the 21st Century Maritime Silk Route.

Thus, it ultimately makes the contestation in the Indian Ocean a huge concern for both the international and regional players. It in this regard holds primary importance for China. Currently, China’s rise and its emergence in the international politics is hugely dependent on its trade passing through the Strait of Malacca.

The strait connects the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. With the rising level of threat in the form of piracy, trafficking and extremism, the Strait of Malaccais the only sea route presently available to China.

Once CPEC is fully functional it would address this problem of China by reducing the cost of freight and the duration of the cargo. Gwadar -the largest deep sea port in the world constitutes to be one of the primary regions in South Asia that holds the power to determine the great power struggle in the region as well as in the international arena. The China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is being developed in this coastal region is considered to be the flagship project of the Belt-Road Initiative (BRI). The $46 billion project, now projected to be of $62 billion aims to connect the southwestern coastal city of Gwadar with the Chinese province Xinjiang, thus providing an alternative route to China for international trade. The territorial sketch of the project connects Asia, Europe and Africa, by linking China with Russia, Central Asia, Russia and Europe in the North. It then tends to link the sea routes by connecting China with Persian Gulf, Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and Indian Ocean in the South.

As mentioned above tracing the maritime route of BRI, starts from China’s coast ending in Western Europe, with Indian Ocean and South China Sea on one side and South Pacific on the other. According to an estimate, CPEC wouldcover$ 2.1 trillion Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with a population of 4.4 billion. This would account for 63 percent of world Gross Domestic Population (GDP) and 29 percent of the world’s population.9

The initiative would be developed through a railway network from Kashgar to Gwadar and other projects-such as dry ports and the development of special economic zones. CPEC as a project is divided into a few phases, including

a. The first one is projected to be achieved by With CPEC being connected with the economic situation of the country, the early harvest projects are aimed to be achieved by 2020.

b. By 2025, the visions of 2025 and other industrial projects would be achieved.

c. By 2030, CPEC would be complete. Functional, it would connect Central and South Asia.

CPEC therefore is the transformative project that is crucial for Pakistan in aspects that range from economic to strategic. It is the basis that would provide and provides Pakistan with the necessary leverage against its arch-rival India. The project, with China’s support holds immense importance for the IOR.

Gwadar – Strategic Significance

The emphasis on Gwadar, or primarily, in its development stems from the fact that Gwadar lies in close proximity to the world’s busiest choke points-Strait of Hormuz. It lies 605 km east to the strait. The strategic importance of Gwadar lies because of its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz (connecting Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman). More than twenty percent of world’s oil passes through it every day. And more than seventy-seven percent of world trade towards Asia-Pacific passes through the Strait of Hormuz every day. Gwadar’s location provides for an alternate route for China, and thus once developed and fully functional it would also account for an increased power showdown in South Asia, or more precisely the Indian Ocean Region. Shortening China’s distance in comparison to the Strait of Malacca, from 21 to 24 days for Middle East and 21 days for Europe. Also, the cost calculated states that a $1450 decrease is estimated for cargos in the Middle East and $1350 for those in Europe. 11

According to a very famous statement made by the former president General Musharraf in 2002, Gwadar is “economic funnel of the whole region.” Another advantage that Gwadar gets is that it is a deep sea port. This rivalry was seen during the cold war-when Soviet Union wanted to get to the Strait of Hormuz, through Gwadar port.

Gwadar is located near the most important Sea Line of Communication (Strait of Homuz). By providing an alternate route to China, for trade and energy-Gwadar and the Indian Ocean dominate much of the international debate. Moreover, its location away from Pakistan’s eastern border makes it an even more suitable option for trade and energy transit. Therefore, it requires a closer look at the maritimesecurity and its pertinence to the Indian Ocean region.

a. Gwadar-China’s Strategic Gambit: China’s BRI is one of its primary interest in the Indian With its growing economy and energy needs-its trade travels through the choke points in the ocean. Strait of Malacca constitutes to be one of the crucial gateways that provides China the passage to reach Middle East and subsequently North Africa and Europe. About a quarter of world’s energy consumption is accounted under China’s figures. Malacca Strait is a water body that connects the Indian and the Pacific Ocean. Located between the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia’s Sumatra Island-this strait becomes an arc from Southeast Asia to the Red Sea. Giving it the name of the ‘Arc of Islam.’

China post-Cold War-since the early 2000s is being considered as a contender to US’s hegemony in international politics. This idea put forward by many Western scholars, due to its economic development posits to be a serious threat to the American order. Although China’s economy does not bear the characteristic marks of its (agrarian) communism-its distinct features, do not hinder the international mode of trade. It being an eastern and an old Asian civilization certainly makes a shift from the western control over international politics.

b. China’s Malacca Dilemma: As many scholars have contributed to the Malacca Dilemma faced by China in the Indian Ocean, its policies have always been matched with the US and looked at Almost a quarter of world’s oil is consumed by China. And the heavy vessels have to go through the Malacca Strait. Malacca strait comes under relative influence of India (due to its geographical proximity). And with US already having established bases near the choke points, accounts for a different Chinese strategy to safeguard its interests in the Indian Ocean region. China’s fears regarding Malacca derive from the presence of India (with whom it shares a hostile relation) and US’s presence in the region. An American researcher claimed at US’s National Defence University that if China’s poses a detrimental threat to the US-it could block off the Malacca Strait. Such an action would automatically impose an embargo on China, cutting of its energy supply and trade.

The researcher focused on establishing dominance through sea control, by sending off 13-15 Marine Corps which could control around 800 Chinese ships/vessels carrying its trade. Furthermore, China’s fears arise due to India’s “Look East policy”-which has a substantial chunk concentrated on developing economic and strategic ties with the nations in Southeast Asia. This naturally would counterbalance, the Chinese threat that India’s faces in the Indian Ocean. India in this regard, while interacting with the nations in Southeast Asia does not consider it be an inherent part of China. It nonetheless asserts a historic, traditional and Indian characteristic and perspective to the use and domination of the Indian Ocean by India.

Exacerbating the threat is the constant presence of US in the Indian Ocean. The alliance that India-US have formed over the years, and with US’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy, its Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) signed in 2016, continue to affect China’s Indian Ocean policy. The agreement resides on the use of each other’s (US and India) military facilities to contain and counter China’s growing influence in the region. Along with this India under Modi administration has charted off in a new direction to develop and strengthen its ties with US’s allies-including Australia and Japan.

Known as the Quad alliance, the security dialogue which was disbanded in 2008 has been revived under Trump administration. But developments as these do not seem to ‘obstruct’ China. According to an article published in the Foreign Policy magazine, Trump should engage Southeast nations to ward off Chinese influence.

China with the above mentioned realities requires to revamp its strategy in the Indian Ocean. China has come at the forefront of the world politics due to its economic size. The Malacca dilemma, along with a hostile neighbourhood would affect its influence. For this very purpose, the much discussed BRI’s primordial project CPEC.

Since CPEC starts to project Chinese trade through Gwadar port, it would also reduce the time and cost required for Chinese shipment. Providing an alternative route is the key to reduce the danger that Malacca Strait poses for China. Another danger that the Malacca strait poses is its narrowness, which has been the cause of sinking of the Chinese ships. According to the figures, Indian Ocean constitutes to be the most crucial of shipping lanes for China the other being (Eastern Pacific, Arctic and the Atlantic). With 40 percent of Chinese trade passing through Indian Ocean and more than 80 percent of imports coming to China, Indian Ocean remains as a top priority for China.

c. Traditional Threats to Gwadar – US-India Partnership: US- India in a bid to counter China in the IOR have developed a strong India in its rivalry with China has developed a formidable alliance with the US. Although, China does not consider India as its rival or a competitor. But US and India are cooperating in the region to contain China’s rise.

Geographically, US is the only country in the Indian Ocean region that does not have a presence in the region, as a country. But continues to deter, dominate, influence and control the affairs of the area. International pundits have prophesied that its hegemonic status and established order would be challenged by a Chinese one. Surpassing the tag of world’s biggest economy by 2030, wouldmake US the second biggest and India third largest.

US’s biggest gambit in the region is being challenged by China’s emergence. Indian Ocean being a region comprising of both land and water, includes some of the most crucial Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) or choke points. Being functional all year round, the global trade and energy transits hold a significant position for states especially US.

US’s presence in South Asia and then subsequently in the Indian Ocean is not a 21st century phenomena. During the Cold War, it characterized the region into South, Central and East Asia. But this is now a crucial part of US’s policy.

For over a decade, US had no adversary in international politics. But China’s rise has made it divert its Asia policy. With Obama’s Pivot to Asia, and joint oped penned by Obama and Modi in 2014 outlining the importance of their ties and core areas-US under the Trump administration has renewed its shift and focus in the region by assigning the name of Indo-Pacific to the region. It under its new National Security Strategy defines the Indo-Pacific region as “from the western shores of India to the western shores of US.”

Thus, defining the present US strategy for the Indian Ocean can be traced back to 1986. During the last years of the cold war- US marked sixteen crucial shipping lanes in the world, and decided to control them. The pattern devised includes six in Indian Ocean. The order of this mechanism is, Hormuz, Suez Canal, Malacca, Bab-el-Mandab, Persian Gulf and those of South Africa. Militarily, the western side of the ocean comprises of Arabian Sea, Red Sea, Gulf waters, and the eastern waters of Africa-which constitute as US Fifth Fleet’s operational area. Whilst, the remaining waters comeunder US Seventh Fleet.

US’s Indian Ocean strategy is part of its Indo-Pacific approach. And according to the Council on Foreign Relations US’s Indo- Pacific strategy has more Pacific and less Indo. US in this matter only has one key ally against China, in the Indian Ocean region and that turns out to be India.

In the new great game, that is the easiest connotation to describe the situation of the region-US’s alliance with India is pitted against China. In a much similar manner, Pakistan’s alliance with China is to influence India in South Asia. India’s aspirations to become the regional hegemon, would only be in line with the US, till it does not challenge its hegemony in global politics.

US on the other hand, prefers India since it is not a threat to American domination in the region. US as mentioned above also seeks Indian partnership, as it perceives India’s Look East policy is compatiblewith US’s Balancing Asia strategy.

Although Indo-US history during the cold war has been somewhat ambivalent. India developed a quasi-Monroe doctrine under Nehru’s leadership. That adhered to non-interfernce by external powers in the region. The posture only changed under an Indira Doctrine, which was further developed under Gujral (also known as Gujral Doctrine). These have started a tradition of allowing external powers in the region, as long as they do not challenge Indian dominance.

US in this regard has been an unequivocal supporter of India in the region. Its control over the shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean, along with its naval stations has been challenged by China’s String of Pearls strategy. To contain a rising China and to follow Mahan’s words-American primacy has extended to include India, along with Japan, Australia and other Southeastern nations. This also has led to the development of Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) on the lines of BRI, LEMOA and Quad among many other initiatives.

The security concerns arise because of the speculation that US-India consider China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy as a threat to ‘encircle’ India. Though based on speculations, it has resulted in above mentioned agreements like LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement. The agreement, according to a newspaper report provides the basis for

“The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) allows the two allies to use each other’s military facilities for checking China’s growinginfluencein Asiaandin the fight against terrorists.”12

Furthermore, the American focus on CPEC can be seen through the statement given by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson that termed the launch of CPEC as an ‘unfolding phase.’ America has also expressed its disapproval and supported India’s stance over CPEC’s route through Gilgit-Baltistan.

Non-traditional Threats Some emerging challenges, studied as non- traditional threats to the development of Gwadar and CPEC are appended below:

a. Baloch Insurgency: Pakistan faces the threat of Baloch insurgency in its Southwestern province. This threat has been exacerbated by the involvement of foreign actors in the regions including Iran and India. Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) is one of the most active groups in Balochistan. It formidably attacks the military and defense force of Pakistan. The activities that take place in Balochistan under the guise of grievances are often linked with the involvement of India. According to a report, BLA and other insurgent groups in Balochistan have expressed their disapproval over the ‘Western’ route of CPEC. Incidents like these, governmental neglect and foreign intrusion all have constituted to the dire state of Balochistan. In this aspect, CPEC though is crucially located in Gwadar. It nonetheless, is not seen as an opportunity for Balochs. Although the national leaders of the province have offered their support for the project, the insurgents on the other hand present a much bigger problem.

With these problems-Balochistan is also engulfed in hybrid warfare. Hybrid Warfare is an amalgamation of conventional, non-conventional and technological resources. Employed through fake news and now through social media, it makes an extensive use of both state and non-state actors.

Hybrid Warfare’s sole purpose is to destabilize a state internally without any clear involvement by a state. India in this respect has been a conventional enemy. Now deploying its reach through non-state actors, CPEC has been at the target of this hybrid warfare.13

Pakistan to develop Gwadar and to protect the project has deployed a Special Security Divisions (SSD). To counter such threats the army has employed nine army infantry battalions and six civil armed forceswings, with 12,000 troops.14

b. Extremism: Another potent threat to CPEC is the growing radicalization both in Pakistan and China has been facing the problem of Uighur minority in North-Western Xinjiang province. The Muslim minority is said to have connections with the Tehreek-e-Taliban in Afghanistan and the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement.

Both these issues are serious apprehensions for China. In matters of pursuing the BRI and CPEC in this respect.

c. Afghanistan Instability: Afghanistan is crucial to China’s peace process. Since as mentioned above, Uighur extremists are directly supported by the Afghan Taliban. China in order to make a much focused approach towards the implementation of BRI, engaging with Afghanistan is a stable 15 The Afghan peace process requires China on the table, for a stable South Asia.

Since Afghanistan is a land-locked country. Chabahar cannot provide it with the assistance and connection that CPEC can. Also China on the other hand historically and according to its recent White papers does not want to establish hegemonic control over any state in the world. It is this idea that can largely build Afghanistan and develop its infrastructure.

d. Military Component: India being a state with a huge territory and population has always projected itself to be the regional hegemon of not only South Asia, but of the Indian Ocean IOR is the new chess board for the new great game, where both the regional and external actors are involved. Stating in regard with the hegemonic aspirations of China and India, James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, associate professors at US Naval War College, were of the view that both states, to achieve this have “redirected their gazes from land to the seas.”

India purports to be a nation that is contributing towards normal ties with its neighbouring countries. Its criteria and approach towards ‘panscheel’ and peaceful coexistence from the cold war era, has been revamped recently. In a new and changed approach, India defence sector especially its navy has transformed its guard and delivered a new strategy in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy that talks about its navy’s aim to extend its control to the choke points of the Indian Ocean, by maintaining a robust navy. The Indian interests, thus rely heavily on its aspiration to become a regional Hegemon, consequently making it an influential state in the international arena.

US and India have been cooperating in this regard. One of the most important agreements seen recently is Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) signed between US and India. The agreement allows India to recheck its supply at US naval stations providing US with the same facilities. Agreements such as these show US-Indian alliance in regard to the growing Chinese influence.

Prior to this a prominent shift in the Indo-US alliance was seen during Obama’s tenure. Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ delivers US’s strategic interests in South Asia. And thus working upon Mahan’s heartland theory-US’s focus to the Indo-Pacific region (as characterized by Trump’s Asia strategy) is to maintain its hegemonic status and also to deter.

India in the military dimension has become the only state in South Asia increasing its military budget. This can be seen in the form of continuous up gradation in India’s military buildup. US supported India in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Along with this a renewal in US’s posture towards India has altered the dynamics of regional politics in the Indian Ocean.

India’s continuous military buildup includes the development of Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) Airhant which can target up to 2000 km. It has made India capable of second strike and also has increased

Pakistan’s fears. India’s naval buildup in the Indian Ocean gives rise to concern to the nuclearization.16 According to sources India is also developing its nuclear enrichment facilities to provide for its nuclear equipped submarines. The reports presented by Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), India is working towards developing Multiple Independent Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV). Such capacities will greatly increase India’s potential and strength in the region. US-India have been cooperating in this realm.

Ashley J. Tellis a senior associate Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has termed the Indo-US partnership as strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific region. The areas of cooperation include missile, technology, nuclear technology, environmental challenges, defence cooperation,

Furthermore, the Indo-US Nuclear deal has also lobbied and supported India’s nuclear arsenal. This aspect has increased the likelihood of increased defence competition. China, on the other hand has been working to develop and build its nay-PLA Navy to dominate the Indian Ocean region. This includes the development of Anti-ship Ballistic Missile (ASBMs), Anti-ship Cruise Missile (ASCMs), submarines, the C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance).

Chinese Navy on the other hand, has also been dealing with piracy. Piracy has grown on to become an international threat. China since 2011 in Libya also protected its 35,000 workers from an international piracy ring.

As US-India have been cooperating in the IOR, China-Pakistan on the other hand have been simultaneously increasing their naval capacities. A deal of us $600 million construction and development of four frigates between China and Pakistan was signed, which now has joined the PN naval fleet. The recent strategic defence collaboration between Pakistan and China is considered to be the largest between two countries.

PLA Navy aims to develop itself as a blue-water navy. That is wants to develop its focus towards maintain the strength to conduct global operations especially deep sea-ports. This aim of PLA Navy, along with China’s String of Pearls strategy is considered as a threat to encircle India, by some of the Indian analysts.

Though China does not want consider India as its enemy-India’s approach to become the regional hegemon under US’s umbrella will see contestation in IOR. US’s off-shore balancing strategy 17has given India a free hand and an unprecedented level of domination over smaller neighbouring littoral states.

Pakistan Navy and Gwadar

Pakistan Navy post 9/11 has been part of various operation. Some operations were launched from Northern Arabian Sea which led to the downfall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan Navy which is also part of Task Force-151 to combat the threat of piracy. Also Pakistan Navy has conducted several other exercises with other nations-titled AMAN. Furthermore, its local production of Zulfiqar class F-22P frigate has added to the potential of Pakistan Navy.

Also, it has deployed the Special Security Division (SSD)-secured by SSD Task Force 88 includes aircraft carriers, drones, fast attack craft, surveillance vehicles to counter conventional and non-conventional threats to CPEC including the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Various Initiatives as Regional Responses to CPEC (BRI)

a. Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor: The term Indo-Pacific has been almost everywhere in US policy. Started off by Hilary Clinton in 2011 as an answer to a burgeoning threat by China- IPEC that is the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor aims to connect South and Southeast India’s Look East policy is supported by Modi’s Link East policy.

Though the corridor has been stressed under the Trump administration, its work is not yet completed to compete with the BRI. Its main focus is to counter the growing Chinese influence. US though not geographically located or bordered by the Indian Ocean. It still considers itself a part of the Indo-Pacific region. As is evident from the words of David N. Rosenblum (Deputy Assistant Secretary in US’s State Department’s Bureau for South and Central Asia) “stretching from the US West Coast to the Bay of Bengal” show the shift in its policy towards the IOR.

b. Chabahar Port: India, along with Iran and Afghanistan has vouched to invest and develop the sister port of Gwadar- Chabahar located in Iran’s Baluchestan-Sistan India’s bet on Chabahar is to undermine Pakistan, and also to influence Afghanistan. Chabahar lies 80 km from Gwadar. It still does not give India the same advantage as China gets from Gwadar.

c. Naval Bases: Maritime security incorporates economic, oceanic, recreational and security It thus is another word in the twenty-first century that defines a state’s progress. With the increasing possibility of nations to develop themselves as a Blue Economy, it crucially depends on managing their maritime security. But the concept of maritime security for major powers engaged in competition also depends on establishing and controlling the SLOCs. Indian Ocean constitutes to be an important part in this. With US already being a major naval power, having a strong presence in the region. China’s String of Pearls strategy that aims to connect the mainland China, to the Port of Sudan, through military and economic initiatives-is eyed as a threat to US’s dominance in the IOR. Djibouti (an African state) is the latest example of this competition. With India having gained access to the Japanese base in the French-African hub makes it an evident assertion of the rising competition between these powers.

Another concern for the US-Indian relationship in IOR is CPEC. The apprehension of it being used as naval base has been reiterated many a times by the Western and Indian media. It significantly has been denied by China.

d. Gulf Countries and the Indian Ocean: Further competition is seen in the Indian Ocean between Jebel Ali and The silent competition between the two according to analysts is considered will take away Dubai’s position. Gwadar is touted to be the next Dubai. This has led to the brewing of an increasing war between the two ports.

Other competition in the Middle East and Gwadar includes Bab-el-Mandeb, Suez Canal, Gulf of Aden, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman collectively known as the Western Indian Ocean are also seeing a regional and external competition. Due to China’s rise and engagement with ports in this region- Gwadar due to its geostrategic location seems to be the most plausible option for China.

Other geopolitical concern includes the Quad dialogue. Including US, Japan, Australia and India-Quad is not an official forum. Though it has been referred to be an alliance to guard against China’s rising influence. It is considered to be an unofficial announcement of targeting China and its interests in the Indo-Pacific. Surrounded by Pacific and the Indian Oceans- Australia turns out to be a strong share holder in the alliance formed against China. Its shift in policy is caused by paying more attention to the Indian Ocean-as it is the arena of great power contest.

Conclusion

Robert Kaplan has emphasized on the importance that the Indian Ocean will play in the twenty-first century. Considering the fact that Indian Ocean has many focal points -Gwadar is one of them.

The need for maritime security includes the changing face of geopolitics and geo-economics in the region. Being part of CPEC-China’s most prominent BRI projects, the region accounts for a more nuanced approach. Since Gwadar in the bigger picture is an essential component of China’s Maritime Silk Road-it is considered to be a source of threat for US hegemony in IOR. As Kaplan has argued in his book Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, he talks about how America considers “the gradual loss of Indian and western Pacific

Oceans as veritable American lakes” signifies America’s concern over the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, owing to its renewed shift towards Asia. The Indian Ocean is an arena of conflict for major as well as regional powers. The struggle to contain and counter China holds great significance and implications for Pakistan. Therefore, a robust strategy over maritime security is key in defending our interests (both strategic and economic).

Bibliography

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ser. Retrieved April 3, 2019, from http://issi.org.pk/wp- content/uploads/2018/08/IP_Farooq_Rashid_No_37_2018.pdf

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References

1 Robert D. Kalpan, The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. (New York, NY: Random House, 2010.)

2 Sourendra Nath Kohli., Sea Power and the Indian Ocean: with special reference to India, (New Delhi, 1987).

3 Li Jiachaeng, “Developing China’s Indian Ocean Strategy: Rationale and Prospects”, China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, 3, no.4, (2017): 481-497, https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S2377740017500270.

4 Satish Chandra, B. Arunchalam, and V Suryanaryan, The Indian Ocean and its Islands Strategic, Scientific and Historical Perspectives. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993).

5 Sohail A. Azmie, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: The Region Centric Multilateral Approach”, Center for International Strategic Studies Insight ,5, no.3, http://ciss.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Article-01-MaritimeSecurity-in-the-Indian-Ocean.pdf.

6 Indian Navy, “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy”, (2015).

7 Azmie, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: The Region Centric Multilateral Approach”, n.d.

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9 Khalid Mehmood Alam, Xuimei Li, and Saranjam Baig, “Impact of Transport Cost and Travel Time on Trade under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)”,Journal of Advanced Transportation, (2019), https://www.hindawi.com/journals/jat/2019/7178507/ .

10 Vice Admiral ® Farooq Rashid,“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Emerging Maritime Security Environment,” Islamabad Papers, no. 37th, (2018), http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/IP_Farooq_Rashid 37_18.pdf

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16 Qadeer, M. A. India’s Military Build-up: Intent and Purpose. The Diplomat, April 12, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/the-afghan-national-unitygovernments-china-card-approach-to-pakistan-part-2/

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MARITIME TOURISM: GLOBAL SUCCESS STORIES AND THE CASE OF PAKISTAN

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Naureen Fatima
Muhammad Akhtar

Abstract

The coastal / maritime tourism is an important segment in a multi-trillion dollars and multivariate global tourism industry. It offers one of the new avenues and fastest growing areas for significant role in global economies. Various countries such as Maldives, Indian State of Kerala, Singapore and Thailand etc. have focused on maritime tourism with good governance practices evolved over period of time to earn substantial revenues from it. Pakistan has also immense maritime tourism potential with diversified natural, religious, and cultural tourism resources. But Pakistan’s maritime tourism is considered very weak due to various issues. With qualitative research, this paper attempts to explore and suggest solutions for the development of maritime tourism sector of Pakistan by analysing the tourism governance of global success stories and evaluating the nationwide potential and challenges. Arguments are developed that the factors behind the success stories of Maldives & Kerala state in India can act as guidance for taking initiatives on the proposed potential sites in order to uplift the maritime tourism sector in Pakistan. It is anticipated that the effective implementation of this paper’s recommendations would be instrumental in gearing up Pakistan’s Maritime economy.

Keywords:    Coastal,    Maritime,    Maldives,   Kerala,   Tourism governance, Success stories, Potential sites

Introduction

In this modern era, tourism has now grown to a multi-trillion dollars and multivariate trade activity across the globe. The International Year of Tourism 2017 has acknowledged the significance of this sector to a country’s economic activities and employment generation worldwide. Around 1,323 million international tourists’ arrivals were reported at different destinations across the globe during the year 2017 (UNWTO, 2017)3. But in Pakistan, the tourism sector seems to be dismal despite having diversified natural, historical, and cultural attractions in place. Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index report ranked Pakistan to 122nd number out of 140 nations4. Last 6 years data from Office of Integrated Border Management System (IBMS) of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) in Islamabad has revealed very surprising facts about foreign visitors who visited Pakistan on tourist visa. According to which, 10,560, 5,575, 6,475, 9161, 10,476 and 17,823 foreign tourists have been reported  in years 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively. According to Baloch (2007)5, the annual foreign tourist arrival in Pakistan was observed less than its regional countries i.e., Maldives, India, and Iran during the year 2007. The 42 million domestic tourists travelled in the country in the year 20056.Out of which, almost 90% of tourists travelled by road, 8.5% by railways and only 1.8% travelled by airways7.It is quite alarming that the previous   tourism   related   research  papers,  articles  and other reports have issues of authentic data. However, according to the World Travel & Tourism Council, Pakistan’s tourism contributed approximately 3.1% in the GDP in year 2013 which was subsequently observed higher by World Data Atlas in year 2017 i.e., 7.4%. Currently, Pakistan is ranked on a very low number i.e. 125  in terms of World Tourism Income.8

It is pertinent to mention that the coastal / maritime tourism is an important segment of global tourism industry. It has now become one of the new avenues and fastest growing areas for significant role in global economies. Various countries such as Maldives, Singapore, Thailand, and State of Kerala in India etc. have focused agenda on maritime tourism and have evolved good governance practices thus generating substantial revenues from it. The role of maritime tourism is well integrated into contemporary economies that the economic impact is relevant even to the less important countries in terms of tourism-related activities. The experiences of Pakistan’s neighbouring countries show sustainable revenue generation from maritime tourism which is quite attractive not only for the domestic but also for the foreign tourists. Kerala’s tourism industry earns over US$ 5 billion per annum (Kerala Tourism Statistics, 2017)9 and Maldives’s economy primarily relies on maritime tourism with approximate 28.78% of its contribution towards national GDP10.

Pakistan has also immense maritime tourism potential with more   than   1000   km   long   coastline,   which   is   blessed  with diversified natural, religious, and cultural tourism resources11. The Government of Pakistan upgraded the tourism sector to the separate industry status in 1989. Under Pakistan  National Tourism Policy (1990), the Federal Government was advised to establish a Beach Development Authority for the development of beaches and to provide incentives on the equipment for water sports activities. The National Maritime Policy (NMP-2002) has also underlined the importance of maritime tourism as it proposed to the Ministry of Sports, Culture, Tourism & Youth Affairs, with the collaboration of Sindh and Balochistan provinces to devise a long-term effective policy for promotion of maritime tourism and water sports activities. However, despite all these measures, the case of Pakistan’s maritime tourism is considered weak due to uncertain influences such as political instability, lack of coordination among tourism departments and security issues over the last two decades.

In the context above, this paper aims to explore and suggest solutions for the development of maritime tourism sector of Pakistan by analysing and showcasing the tourism governance of global success stories and evaluating the nationwide potential and challenges.

Methodology

This paper employs qualitative research methodology and has scrutinized the relevant primary and secondary sources of data/ information with two case studies of global tourism success stories i.e. Tourism in Maldives and Thematic and content analysis was done for the Tourism Master Plans of -Maldives since 1983 to 2017, Maldives Tourism Act13, Kerala Tourism Policy 201214, Kerala Tourism Statistics 2017, Pakistan’s National Tourism Policy 1990 and Pakistan’s National Maritime  Policy 2002. A one-day stakeholders’ consultative workshop was organized on 4th April 2019 at Karachi, where key issues, challenges and solutions for maritime tourism in Pakistan were discussed, debated and concluded by the most relevant actors of tourism sector. Subsequently, the findings of the workshop were refined by sharing in a Maritime Tourism Panel Discussion that was organized during Pakistan Tourism Dialogue (PTD)  event held on 18 April 2019 at Pak-China Friendship Centre, Islamabad. A Key Informant Interview of Deputy Head Mission / First Secretary Maldives in Pakistan was carried out on 23rd May 2019 to validate the governance mechanism of Maldives tourism. Chronological Matrix was developed for the overall evaluation of Maldives tourism development and evolution of its governance mechanism over period of time. Graphs were developed by using Microsoft Excel 2013 to show tourist flux and earnings in Kerala and Maldives. A range of relevant previous analysis and opinions generated by experts, relevant national/ international documents, and academicians in peer reviewed publications were taken into account by expert analysis technique through an in-house session to deduce findings and conclusion, and to generate recommendations for practical actions including governance measures proposed for Pakistan’s maritime tourism.

Global Success Stories of Tourism Development

In the recent era, the global tourism market has reached to exponential growth and its diversification is making it one of the fastest growing economic sectors. The international tourist arrivals have grown continually from 25 million in the year 1950 to a total of 1.186 billion arrivals in 2015. This exponential growth has further projected to rise further. According to UNWTO forecast, the international tourist arrival will reach 1.8 billion by the end of 2030.  A  large  number  of  countries  comprising  of  Maldives, Sri Lanka, State of Kerala in India, Queensland state in Australia etc. had devised strategic tourism policies and plans and succeeded in this very important sector of the economy15. Following are the tourism policy reviews of some successful countries/provinces that succeeded and got benefitted from the maritime tourism sector of tourism industry

Review of Kerala Tourism Policy Success:

The Kerala Tourism Policy was periodically revised in 2012 and then in 2017 to promote responsible and sustainable tourism in Kerala State, India. Policy version of the year 2012 primarily focused on harnessing the unique products of Kerala such as Backwater Tourism & Ayurveda with the emerging innovations of sustainable development and was quite successful in attaining international appreciation. The rationales behind the revision of Policy in 2012 were the growing trends in foreign/domestic tourist arrivals, foreign exchange, and total earnings, which were significant due to taking good initiatives such as introduction of tourism development programme in 1976, declaring tourism as an industry in 1986 and realizing the importance of public-private partnership vide first policy document in 1995 by the Government of Kerala. Tourism statistics of the years 2001 and 2010 showed that the number of foreign tourist arrivals in Kerala increased to more than thrice i.e. from 208,830 to 659,265; the number of local tourist arrivals increased to about 64% i.e. fro m 5,239,692 to 8,595,075; foreign exchange earnings were increased more than 7 times i.e. from Indian Rs.5.35 billion to Rs.37.97 billion, and total earnings of Kerala quadrupled, from Indian Rs.45 billion to Rs.173.48 billion. These statistical figures clearly indicate the success of the first Tourism Policy of 1995. The revised Policy version 2012 reflects the inclusion of lessons learned, specialized incentives, visionary measures and commitment to  increase further the dominating factors of Kerala Tourism products. That is why, tourism statistics for the year 2017 depicts further remarkable increase as compared with the previous state of affairs for the year 2010. By the year 2017, the number of foreign tourist arrivals in Kerala increased to more than thrice i.e., from 659,265 to 1,091,870; the number of local tourist arrivals increased  to  about 70% i.e. from 8,595,075 to 14,673,520; foreign exchange earnings increased more than 2 times i.e. from Indian Rs.37.97 billion to Indian Rs.83.92 billion; and total earnings of Kerala got 92.4% incremental effect i.e. from Indian Rs.173.48 billion to Indian Rs.333.83 billion. Figure 1 shows revenue trends that is the total earnings from tourism sector in Kerala, while figure 2 shows foreign and domestic tourist arrivals in Kerala State during the years 2001,  2010 and 2017.

Figure 1: Revenue Trends in Kerala Tourism – 2001 to 2017. (Source: Kerala Statistics 2017)
Figure 2: Trends of Tourist Arrivals in Kerala – 2001 to 2017. (Source: Kerala Statistics 2017)

In this modern era of the consumer economy, Kerala Tourism Policy 2012 recognizes the importance of the level of satisfaction of visitors. Thus, its basic thrust was on infrastructure with four major precursors i.e., water supply system, road accessibility, streetlights, and proper waste-management system. Besides, some necessary auxiliary components such as wayside facilities including toilets and rest areas, Hop-on Hop-off services, parking bays, jetties, and boarding points were also taken into account. Development of 10 thematic museums to showcase the cultural heritage of Kerala is also an important policy step for value addition in existing tourism products.

For an effective and vibrant governance mechanism through overseeing, executing and monitoring the tourism affairs; the policy 2012 also introduced a tourism Cabinet Committee on Tourism chaired by the Chief Minister, a Task Force for Kerala Waste Free Destination (KWFD) campaign chaired by Minister of Tourism, fast track clearance mechanisms for tourism projects, banned plastic use at major tourist destinations, coordinated efforts with Kerala State Pollution Control Board, a new subsidy system and a Task Force to foster responsible tourism practices, a Task Force against Trafficking and Child Abuse, a Contingency Response Cell to tackle the emergency situation, a Life -Saving Volunteer scheme, Tourist Warden Scheme by employing local educated manpower particularly women cadre, Entrepreneurship Development Programme to enable Local Level Entrepreneurs (LLE) for the promotion of community-based tourism, system of exclusive tourist profile to strengthen market research, marketing strategies including the applications of social marketing tools and a systematic periodic review system and grading system by employing a feedback survey mechanism at major tourist destinations in Kerala State in order to ensure the quality of their tourism products.

Maldives Tourism – A Success Story of Good Maritime Governance

The tourism industry in Maldives took off in the early 1970s, initially linked with the myth that no substantial tourism can be developed due to its geographical location and hardships towards basic facilities. In 1960, it was believed by the United Nations that the Maldives was not a suitable destination for tourism16. Today, the United Nations theory has been proven wrong as the success story of Maldives’ global tourism was achieved through its national determination, strategic planning and its effective execution along- with good governance norms and product-based approach evolving from its 1st Master Plan (1983-1992) to 4th Master Plan (2013- 2017). First two Tourism Master Plans were developed on a 10- year span basis. However, the duration of succeeding plans was reduced to five-year period due to the reasons of the overwhelming success of first two master plans, major tsunami  incident in the year 2004 and effective management review for continual improvement by strengthening the grey areas through planning and  best practices.

In 1972, tourism started with only two island resorts having capacity of 280 beds. By the end of the 1970s and middle of 1980s, the increasing interest of Europe’s international tourists made this important sector an important income source for the Maldives. Approximately 64% of tourists come to the Maldives for relaxation, approximate 20% for Honeymoon purpose and rest for other purposes including water sports, and entertainment. So far, key tourism products developed include snorkelling, scuba diving, jet skiing, night fishing, sailing, windsurfing, kayaking, Kitesurfing, one island: one hotel, spa, cruising, underwater restaurants etc. Comparing other islands of its size, the growth of Maldives tourism trajectory shows a great success story in the whole region.

After the expansion of infrastructure facilities and effective execution of the Maldives Tourism Plans, the tourist arrivals grew to   an   unbelievable   number   of   1,389,542  by  the   end  of 2017 compared to the starting point of 1097 arrivals in 1972 and Fourth Tourism Master Plan (4TMP) aspires to further rise to 2.5 million in 2021. During 2002- 2017, the tourism sector contributed an average of 27.5% towards Maldives’s GDP (minimum 22.7% in the year 2005 and a maximum of 32.7% in the year 2003)17. The tourist accommodation has also (resorts, marinas, hotels, safari-boats, etc.) increased to 41,255 beds by the end of 2017. The Maldives has a unique feature of a high degree of repeat visitation. Sustainable tourism development has been considered the key to success of Maldives as a favourite tourist destination in the region. Therefore, the World Tourism Organization (WTO) has marked the Maldives a model for sustainable tourism development. Figure 3 shows tourist arrivals in the Maldives during the year 1972 to 2017, Figure 4 shows percentage share of tourism contribution trend in Maldives economy, while Table 1 provided the chronology of Maldives Tourism development viz-a-viz Tourism Master Plans.

The First Tourism Master Plan (1983-1992) employed sustainable tourism development approach and was primarily based on the inclusion of socioeconomic, cultural & physical geography with proper zoning models and specific tourist cen ters. It ensured environmentally sustainable tourism by reducing island congestion, maintaining building heights compatible with natural vegetation and reef protection. The mandate of the Department of Tourism & Foreign Investment was upgraded to a Ministry in 1988  for the purpose of institutional strengthening.

The outstanding issues for the attraction of private investments were addressed as part of the Second Tourism Master Plan 1995 (1996-2005), which encouraged Public-Private partnerships; and strengthened institutional effectiveness, human resource development, marketing, and promotion. The 2TMP encouraged the Spatial Development Policy to enable easy and fast expansion of industry for tourism infrastructure development. Promulgation of Tourism Law in 1998 provided incentives for selling shares of resorts to the public for longer lease periods. Introduction of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), proper solid waste management   systems   and   compliance   to   ISO  standards have practically evolved sustainable tourism development in the Maldives.

The Third Tourism Master Plan (2007-2011) was developed by the Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation (MoTCA) focused on sustainable growth with the inclusion of public share investment, infrastructure development, environmental sustainability, branding Maldives tourist destination, and strengthening the legal framework & institutional capacities.18

The Fourth Tourism Master Plan 4TMP (2013-2017) also focused on the inclusion of both public and private stakeholders and its strategies include ensuring enough supply of medium- range resorts, resolving political issues, disaster management, mega Maldives tourist route expansion plans, effective and sustained future marketing strategic tools application. An o verall marketing budget of US$ 4,132,000 was allocated in the year 2012. This ultimately increased the tourist bed nights in hotels and resorts from 5.3 million to 6.4 million with an increasing rate of 4.7%. The 4TMP projected to increase the tourist arrival to 2.5 million by the end of 2021. The effective execution of Maldives Tourism Plans has played a significant role in the uplift of the tourism sector of the Maldives economy.19

Just because of tourism, Maldives has graduated from one of  the poorest countries in the 1970s with stunted growth to upper middle-income group. Now, it has the best social indicators in South Asia and highest income of US $15,665.50 PPP rising from US. $100  in 1970s20.

Figure 3: Trends of Tourist Arrivals in Maldives – 1972 to 2017. (Source: Tourism Year Books (2007-2017),

Ministry of Tourism, Maldives)

 

Figure 4: % Share of Tourism contribution in the GDP (2002-2017) (Source: Tourism Year Books (2007 -2017),

Ministry of Tourism, Maldives)

Table 1: Chronology Matrix of Maldives Tourism Development  1983-2017

 

Timeline Tourism Products / Facilities

/ Support Developed

Policy, Legal, Institutional Measure Incentives for Private investment Periodic Average

%age share of Tourism in GDP

Tourist Arrivals
1972-1982 a. Tourism started No proper legal and institutional measure No incentive Data not available 1097 in

1972

1983-1992:

First Tourism Master Plan

b. Strategized Tourism Zoning model with 10,000 beds residence infrastructure per tourist zone with tourist centers

c. Started proper tourism with 2 island resorts and 280 beds capacity

d. Was primarily based on sea, sand and sun products approach.

e. Cruise product started in the 1970s.

a. The Department of Tourism & Foreign Investment became a Ministry for Tourism in 1988

b. The Ministry of Tourism took stringent actions to avoid congestion on island, construction of building heights compatible with natural vegetation and to ensure reef protection.

Data not available 42,000 in

1980

 

315,000 in

1995

 

650%

1996-2005:

Second Tourism Master Plan

a. 4000 beds

b.  Inclusion of human resource development.

c. 116 live-aboard vessels with 1,599 beds in 2006.

d.  Ecotourism resorts, Health Resorts, Luxury Island, Floating Resorts, Budget Resorts, Liveaboards, Luxury Yachts, and Training Resorts were identified for future infrastructure development.

a. Maldives Tourism Promotion Board (MPTD) was formed in 1998

b. The Maldives Tourism Act (Law No. 2/99) was enacted in 1999.

c. Spatial Development Policy developed a transparent and  formal    framework   for infrastructure projects financing by enhancing local investments

d. Maldives Tourism Department            Corporation (MTDC) formed in 2006 to provide avenues for investment in tourism.

e. Facilitation to Public- Private Sector investments.

f.  Tourism Emergency Operations Centre (TEOC) was proposed under the Disaster Management Strategy and Plan in 2005.

g. Ensured development of Disaster Preparedness Plans (DPP) by each resort (2005 onward).

h. Provision               of institutional support for products of diving and travel agencies.

i. Long leases on state- owned   islands  and   land  ear-marked for tourism development.

j. Provision of Joint- venture agreements with the Government for integrated developments and large-scale housing projects. (PPP)

a. Tourism Law 1998 provided incentives for selling shares of resorts to the public for a longer lease span.

b. Exemption of import duty on construction materials.

c. Duty exemption on capital goods for resort development.

29.65% 315,000 in

1995

 

395,320 in

2005

 

25%

Third Tourism Master Plan (2007-2011) a. 89 islands were developed for tourist resorts (2006).

b. Relaxation &Honeymoon facilities.

c. Underwater Diving, Cruising, ‘liveaboards’, diving safaris.

d. Others – health & spa.

e. Marinas on Dhonakulhi Island with the berthing of about 25 yachts and 50 guests capacity.

a. Developed an exclusive legal analysis framework under the Tourism Act.

b. The Maldives Tourism Act provided guidelines for leasing of islands for infrastructure development by investors.

c. Article 8 stated that islands and land must be leased for tourist resort development for a maximum period of 25 years.

a. Provision of long leases up to 99 years for housing developments. 28.78% 678,889 in

2007

 

931,333 in

2011

 

 

37.1%

Fourth Master Tourism Plan a. Fly-surfing, Luxury Safari boats, Cruise Operations.

b. 4 Airports operationalized

a. Maldives  Marketing  & Public Relations Corporation (MMPRC) established in March 24.18% 1,125,202

in 2013

4MTP (2013-

2017)

2010 with the inclusion of fisheries, agriculture, and public education along with the tourism sector.

b. Effective and sustained future marketing strategic tools application in order to attract private investors.

c. In 2012, an overall Maldives marketing budget of US$ 4,132,000 was allocated

1,389,542

in 2017

 

23.4%

increase

The Case of Pakistan’s Maritime Tourism –Analysing Pakistan’s Potential

While discussing the potential of maritime tourism in Pakistan as direct economic activities; Pakistan has miles of sandy beaches, coastal highways which connect coastal areas to other parts of country, Karachi, one of the mega cities of the world with middle class hungry for beach activities and warm waters. The  Balochistan coastline possesses muddy cliffs with rocky land and number of sandy beaches including Somiani, Gwadar, Pasni, Ormara, and Astola Island. Around 3,000 hectares of Mangroves forests covers the whole province2122. Miani Hor, Jiwani, Pasni, and Hingol are referred to as most vital sites for the migratory birds including waterfowls by ornithologists23. The Hingol National Park & Buzi Makola, Wildlife Sanctuary24 are marked as Protected Areas of the region. Astola Island, Miani Hor, Jiwani and Ormara are marked as Ramsar Sites25. Architectural resources include tombs, forts, mosques, graves, and other historical monuments in Balochistan (BCS, 2000)26. This rich biological diversity  and historic and cultural diversity provides great opportunities for ecotourism development.

Sindh’s potential coastal tourism resources include rich biodiversity, protected areas, serene sandy beaches, mangrove forests, and internationally renowned Indus Delta. Mangroves provide ideal conditions for marine & terrestrial wildlife. Like other countries, ecotourism can play a significant role in ensuring the conservation of natural beauty spread over hundreds of miles of sandy beaches and economic growth of Pakistan27.

Ideal temperature for tourism in coastal areas is from October to March especially for surfing and snorkelling activities. The 6th largest Mangroves in the world in the Indus Delta have great ecotourism attraction for tourists across the globe. There are a number of activities, which can be linked with the Lagoons, Diving sites, Dolphins and Crocodiles watching and other attractions in Hingol National Park which includes: Wildlife and Bird watching, Turtle watching, Mud volcanoes and many more undiscovered areas so far.

A tourist destination can bring important revenues to the state budget in the form of taxes and fee paid by companies, who operate around such attractions. This provides a source of income for local communities and creates an interesting shopping experience for tourists. Another very important aspect of Maritime tourism is Eco-tourism, which is defined as “Responsible travel to natural areas, which conserves the environment and improves the welfare of local people”. The purpose behind the Eco-tourism is to develop awareness among the general public to build environmental and cultural awareness and respect. It economically benefits the local communities and provides direct financial benefits for conservation.

Figure 5 and Table 2 provide information on identified tourism sites for different kinds of maritime tourism activities and products, which can be introduced by applying the cluster development approach for nearby sites.

 
Figure 5: Map showing Coastal Areas of Pakistan for the Potential of Maritime Tourism Development

Table 2: Potential Sites and Products for Maritime Tourism in Pakistan

S

No

Proposed Locations Tourism  Products/Activities Type of Tourism Product
1. Indus River
estuary near
Keti Bandar,
Sindh.
Dolphin watching, Backwater
Tourism by introducing
houseboats, cruise activities,
parking bays, boarding points.
Recreational &
Eco-tourism
2. Karachi City Shopping centers, restaurants,
Mazar-e-Quaid, Residence of
Quaid-e-Azam
Cultural,
Religious &
Recreational
Tourism
3. Seaview
Beach Karachi
Water sports activities,
Restaurant Cruises
Adventure &
Recreational
Tourism
4. Hawksbay/
Sandspit
Beach,
Karachi
Water sports activities, Green
Turtle Watching, Guest houses
Adventure,
Recreational/ Ecotourism
5. Manora Island
Beach
Famous Picnic Spot with Sandy
Beach and the attraction of 28m
Lighthouse, water sports
activities, Guest houses.
Recreational
Tourism
6. Beach near
Mubarak
village
Water sports activities, Guest
Houses, Model village.
Adventure,
Recreational
Tourism
7. Churna Island Scuba diving, Live aboard boats. Adventure, Recreational, Eco- tourism
8. Gadani, Lasbela district Balochistan Gadani ship-breaking yard, Paradise Point, Fish Harbour, Beach activities, Guest Houses. Recreational/ Cultural/ Educational Tourism
9. Somiani Somiani Spaceport,

Famous Beach for Recreation and variety of Fish, Guest Houses.

Recreational, Eco- tourism
10. Chandar Gup Mud Volcano site, Hingol National Park, Balochistan Hindus worship site, scenic beauty – Hot Air Balloon and other hospitality services Religious/ Eco- tourism
11. Hingol National Park, Balochistan (including nearby Jhal Jao) Camping sites, hiking trails, Ibex, Urial, Chinkara watching spots Recreational, Eco- tourism
12. Hingol River estuary area, Balochistan Backwater tourism by introducing houseboats, cruise activities, parking bays, boarding points. Hot air ballooning joy rides, Crocodile watching spots, Guest Houses. Recreational & Eco-tourism
13. Nani Mandir, Hinglaj town, Lasbela Hindu temple, historical site, Hot Air Balloon, Guest Houses. Religious / Cultural Tourism
14. Kund Malir (Sandy beach), including Ormara Area (Ramsar Site)28 Leisure activities, Water Sports, Scuba Diving, Parasailing, Hotels, Restaurants, Model Tourist Village. Recreational Tourism / Eco-tourism
15. Princess of Hope (near Buzipass) Hot Air Balloon – Fascinating Natural Rock formations, Paragliding. Eco-tourism
16. Astola Island Scuba diving, Green turtles and Birds watching sites, Guest Houses. Adventure, Eco- tourism
17. Gwadar, Balochistan Hot Air Balloon, Paragliding, Parasailing, and Historical Fort. Recreational / Cultural Tourism, Eco-tourism
18. Jiwani A historical site that includes historical airport used in World War II and Victoria Hut with a scenic viewpoint, Guest Houses. Cultural Tourism, Eco-tourism
19. Makran Coast, Balochistan Parasailing, Surfing, Sailing, speed boating/water scooter riding/Banana boat riding/sea kayaking, etc all along the coastal highway. Recreational / Adventure Tourism

Challenges to Maritime Tourism in Pakistan

Historically, Karachi had a lot of Maritime tourism until the 1970s in comparison to contemporary times. There were dozens of “Bunder” sailing boats playing in the Harbour, where families as well as foreigners used to spend their evenings. The Kemari Boat Basin and Clifton Beaches were unpolluted and clean, where the general public were frequent visitors for picnics and swimming. There were numerous huts on Sandspit, Hawksbay and Paradise point. All this is history and there are no bunder boats or weekly regattas, majority of huts are dilapidated with few well- maintained beach properties belonging to the elite or large organizations only.

The major challenges have been faced by Pakistan in maritime tourism development include lack of stakeholders’ collaboration, strategic   management   &   planning,   biodiversity  loss, political conflicts, and national level interest for the coastal tourism development29. During consultative workshop on maritime tourism by NIMA, it was highlighted that there are certain impediments in Pakistan’s maritime tourism which have  been  confronted including: Lack of infrastructure and facilities for domestic tourists, training facilities for large number of hospitality staff, no infrastructure development for roadside restaurants and tourist facilities & poor hygiene standards of present facilities ,difficulties in land acquisition for the construction of motels, poor visitors’ orientation, no arrangement for solid waste disposal and lack of awareness among local communities about tourism business, NOC required for foreigners to visit coastal areas in Balochistan, no Provincial Government facilitation for tourism, no land or areas marked for tourism, no decent public transportation for middle class families, conflict between Federal and Provincial Governments, no enabling environment, non-existence of fiscal incentives, poor marketing in the tourism sector for private investors, costly coastal infrastructure development  as  well as long lead time, lack of potable water and desalination plants, no co-ordination between various government or security agencies for the facilitation of maritime tourism.

Security agencies at Ormara, Pasni prohibit the locals to visit coastal areas and are marked as No-Go Areas for recreational and water sports activities. The equipment and products for water sports activities is not manufactured in Pakistan and are mainly imported from different parts of the world. The prices of this imported equipment for water sports activities are very high. The entrepreneurs like Scuba Diving Clubs, snorkelling service providers have been facing severe challenges  of acquiring NOC and security issues in the maritime tourism sector. In the month of monsoon season, District Authorities under Section 144 prohibit the local tourists from going out to sea for Surfing, Scuba Diving etc. despite the waves being ideal for these sports.

An Overview of National Policies and their relevance Maritime Tourism

The National Tourism Policy-1990 was quite an attractive document as it accorded industry status to the tourism sector and guaranteed same industrial benefits, monetary incentives, concessions and treatments to all tourism-related facilities with an additional incentive of an 8-year tax holiday for the tourism projects launched during July 1990 to June 1995. The geographic scope of concessionary loan financing was also extended to all over Pakistan including the coastal areas (except Karachi cosmopolitan jurisdiction), which were earlier limited to northern areas only. The charter flights, tourist helicopters/small planes were also allowed for private sector operations. Provisions were made for 72 – hour transit to multiple entry visas for 4-5 years’ work permits. Leasing of government-owned facilities was allowed for private sector operations. Under Part VII Clause 45, import of special equipment for adventure tourism activities like water sports, hang gliding, trekking, mountaineering, angling, golf, indoor sports equipment, power boats, water rafts, canoes, water and snow skilling equipment were allowed free of custom duty and sales tax in order to keep the cost of operation low and enable active engagement of private sector at large. These incentives were critically important for materializing coastal tourism potential over a period of time. However, 5% customs duty was imposed in 2007 on this kind of special equipment during the revision of Pakistan National Tourism Policy, which was a discouraging factor considering various challenges to the maritime tourism segment.

In a parallel development under Section–VI of National Maritime Policy 2002, the importance of maritime tourism, water sports, and infrastructure development along the coast was also emphasized by the Federal Government. Under the same section, the National Maritime Policy 2002 augmented the agenda of National Tourism Policy 1990 by justifying the need to evolve long term provincial policies for the promotion of tourism and water sports by the Ministry of Sports, Culture, Tourism and Youth Affairs in consultation with the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan. However, the federal context of the tourism segment was changed particularly after the 18th Amendment in the Constitution   of  Pakistan   after   that  tourism  became  purely  a provincial subject with no clarity on the responsible institution for maritime tourism and all other incentives as were guaranteed vide National Tourism Policy 1990. Due to these bottlenecks and for some other reasons such as prevailing security situation after 9/11, things could not move in the right direction to put into practice any improved version of policies in Balochistan and Sindh to address outstanding issues and harness the true potential of maritime tourism in Pakistan.

Latest Federal Developments

In order to revive tourism sector in Pakistan, the Federal Cabinet under case no.123/06/2019 revised the Visa Policy on 31.01.2019 and granted 3 months validity visit/tourist and double stay entries to foreigners of 190 countries. 50 countries were also granted Visa-on-arrival for individual tourist or group tourists (PTDC, 2019)30. Indeed, it is a positive step in the promotion of the tourism sector in Pakistan. On 12th March 2019, the Federal Government devised the National Tourism Coordination Board (NTCB) in order to facilitate tourism in coordination and consultation with all concerned provinces. It’s also a great step towards tourism development and it is hoped that NTCB will be able to produce tangible outcomes particularly by realizing the  true potential of maritime tourism in Pakistan. This board comprises Chairman Board of Investment (BOI), Secretary Inter- provincial Coordination, Joint Secretaries of Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), Foreign Office, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Information, Secretaries of provincial tourism departments, representatives of private sector trade bodies such as PATO, TAAP (Travel Agents Association of Pakistan) and PHA (Parks and Horticulture Authority). Initially, there were 9 working groups created in NTCB by Prime Minister of Pakistan. Whereas, maritime tourism component was still missing31. On 4th  April 2019, a need for the creation of maritime tourism was rationalized as  one  of the  outcomes of stakeholder’s  consultative  seminar on

Potential of Maritime Tourism Development in Pakistan organized by National Institute of Maritime Affairs (NIMA) at Karachi. The TORs for the same Working Group on Maritime Tourism is under the approval process by the Federal Government of Pakistan.

The NTCB has the mandate to coordinate with different national and international Private investors to boost this very sector of Pakistan economy. It will also focus on the exclusive marketing and promotion strategies along with the provision of technical assistance to the provinces in order to uplift the tourism sector in the Pakistan economy32. Apart from that, Sindh Tourism Policy is awaiting approval since 2014. The policy though covers some aspects of coastal tourism. However, it is needed to be reviewed  before approval/implementation.

Findings and Conclusion

Pakistan is blessed with more than 1000km serene coastline of sandy beaches, which has huge potential for maritime tourism. However, it still ranks very low i.e., 125 in terms of world tourism income. Pakistan is facing many challenges in tourism sector of economy. The gravity of issues is more severe in case of coastal tourism. The National Tourism Policy-1990 is no more effective after the 18th amendment in the constitution, where the role of provinces i.e., Sindh & Balochistan in order to materialize infrastructure development and allied facilities along the coast. Also, Sindh Tourism Policy has been waiting for approval since 2014. Although, it covers some maritime tourism sector in  the draft, which also needs to revisit it prior to its requirement. It is also the fact that Pakistan has been actively engaged in a war on terrorism. Due to which, the tourism sector remained disturbed over the last two decades. There are many tourist attractions along the Balochistan coast which are affected due to security and mobility issues of foreign tourists.

It is generally opined that maritime tourism would be quite challenging  or  near  to  impossible  in Pakistan, given the various reasons of security, safety, confusion in the ownership of coastal areas, NOC requirement, infrastructure development, climatic conditions, policy and governance issues, confused status of incentives to private sector after 18th amendment in the constitution of Pakistan, absence of proper planning mechanism and clear road map, low level of importance prior to devise marketing strategy, poor coordination among various departments and  federal vs provincial governments etc.

But the true potential has a tale in itself, which can be a success story like Maldives where tourism was considered impossible. There is a need to understand the measures and overall governance behind the success stories. Various countries such as Maldives, Singapore, Thailand and Kerala state in India etc. have focused agenda on maritime tourism and have evolved good governance practices thus generating substantial revenues from it.

The early phase of tourism in Kerala was quite low which, now has grown to an impressive level of earnings over US$ 5 billion per annum. It is pertinent to notice that it has an upward and exponential growth trends with reported figures of foreign tourist arrivals more than 1 million and domestic tourists around 15 million in the year 2017. The success story of Kerala was achieved due to the dynamic, effective and continual mode of policy processes and instruments, which have boosted up this sector of maritime economy. Pakistan’s coast, particularly at Keti Bunder in Sindh, can also be explored to replicate the good experiences of backwater tourism product of Kerala.

Maldives’s economy primarily relies on maritime tourism with approximate 28.78% of its contribution towards national GDP (the average figures during the implementation of Third Tourism Master Plan, 2007 – 2011,). Tourism in Maldives started with only 280 beds capacity on 2 resorts with 1097 tourists in 1972. Maldives has achieved global tourism success through its national determination, strategic planning and its effective execution with good governance norms and product-based approach evolved from 1st Master Plan (1983-1992) to 4th Master Plan (2013-2017). The early phase Master Plans were of 10 years-time span which, are now reduced up-to 5 years. This reduction in review period of Master Plans is seemed rationale considering the increased manifold operations of tourism in Maldives and to address various requirements from frequent visits of tourists which is critically important in the context of consumer economy and customer satisfaction.

To conclude, experiences of Maldives on maritime tourism activities may be equally replicated on many places of Pakistani coast. The establishment of National Tourism Coordination Board (NTCB) in March 2019 with different working groups including Maritime Tourism working group is a good step for the revival of tourism in Pakistan. The factors behind the success stories of Maldives and Kerala state in India can act as guidance fo r taking initiatives on the proposed potential coastal tourism sites in order to uplift the maritime tourism sector in Pakistan. With the effective implementation of appropriate actions for the facilitatio n of coastal tourism, Pakistan Maritime tourism economy will reach to greater heights.

Recommendations – The Way  Forward

In order to promote maritime tourism in Pakistan and to get the maximum potential from this sector of the economy, the fo llowing recommendations are devised by analyzing the success factors behind global experiences and shortcomings of Pakistan’s tourism sector viz-a-viz potential and challenges.

  1. A comprehensive Maritime Tourism Strategic Plan and Road Map needs to be developed by National Tourism Coordination Board (NTCB) at federal level, in consultation with provincial governments of Sindh and Balochistan as well as all relevant Maldives also developed Tourism Master Plans on periodic basis, which played an instrumental role in their success story.
  2. Prior to finalizing Maritime Tourism Strategic Plan based on the principles of sustainable tourism development, there is a need to carry out tourism site specific studies and land-use plan which is important for development of infrastructure, facilities and products such as motels, guest houses, tourism villages, , including recreational water- sports/diving /snorkelling sites. Potential tourism sites and products in Table 2 under section 4.1 of this paper may be used for   detailed   analysis/feasibility   and   declare  them accordingly (for motels, guest houses, tourism villages, recreational water sport/diving /snorkelling sites, eco-tourism etc.).
  3. Since National Tourism Policy-1990 is no more effective after the 18th Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan, there is an utmost requirement to revisit existing Policies, Legal and Institutional Framework by identifying the gaps in National/Provincial regulations, laws and policies which hamper the development of maritime
  4. For an effective and vibrant mechanism, establish a Maritime Tourism Agency / Board as a Regulatory and Coordination Body among various stakeholders, and prepare its rules and regulations for one-window
  5. There is a need to establish a Contingency Response Cell to tackle any emergency / or crisis situation to the tourists in the coastal areas, like in State of This cell needs to be adequately equipped with staff and infrastructure.
  6. In order to develop and promote coastal tourism in Pakistan, the Federal Government of Pakistan should take – up initiatives similar to Kerala Tourism development with primary focus on infrastructure development including water-supply system, road accessibility, electricity & streetlights and efficient waste management
  7. There is a need to devise an effective marketing strategy and a Task Force for it, with proper budget allocation for small and medium investors for motels, guest houses, tourism villages, water sports activities, beach games,
  8. An entrepreneurship development programme needs to be developed to enable Local Level Entrepreneurs (LLE) for the uplift of community-based
  9. Duties should be exempted on the import of equipment related to water sports activities and incentives should be provided to attract the investment in this very important sector of Pakistan’s blue
  10. In order to attract foreign tourists and quality assurance, the hotel and hospitality management capacity needs to be enhanced through specialized programme and short It will also help in utilization of local human resource capital in a best way and alleviation of poverty by improving their livelihood. To serve the purpose at large, a capacity mapping followed by Capacity building of requisite manpower and relevant stakeholders is strongly recommended.
  11. There is a need to develop a model Live-aboard Safari boats based on traditional designs to uplift livelihood of local
  12. There is a need to develop at-least one or two model tourism site (s). One site can be developed at Kund Malir area in Balochistan and the other at Keti Bandar in Sindh. Keti Bandar area can be developed on the model of While, Hingol River may be used for water supply purpose at Kund Malir area in initial phase thus the cost of sea water utilization may be managed in initial phase.
  13. Identify job opportunities for poverty alleviation of coastal
  14. Preserve and promote cultural heritage of coastal community by establishment of culture
  15. Suggest measures to prevent pollution and protecting the environment, particularly important for the major issue of plastic waste. A Coastal Areas Pollution Control Board may be constituted under Ministry of Maritime Affairs (MoMA).
  16. Identify feasibility for high-end tourist resorts under CPEC.
  17. Take measures to de-conflict various Government Security Agencies and allied
  18. Develop supplementary facilities which would aid in promoting maritime tourism such as roads, fuel stations, mobile/internet coverage, service stations along coastal highways

References

3 UNWTO Annual Report 2017, accessed on July, 9, 2012, https://www.eunwto.org/doi/book/10.18111/9789284419807

4 Rana Ejaz Ali Khan, and Muhammad Kamran Rasheed,“Political economy of tourism in Pakistan: The role of terrorism and infrastructure development,” Asian Development Policy Review, 4, no. 2, (2016): 47–50.

5 Qadar Baksh Baloch, “Managing tourism in Pakistan: A case study of Chitral valley,” Journal of Managerial Sciences, 2, no.2, (2017): 169-190.

6 Baloch, “Managing tourism in Pakistan”, 176.

7 Samina Khalil, Mehmood Khan Kakkar, and Waliullah, “Role of tourism in economic growth: empirical evidence from Pakistan economy,” Pakistan Development Review, 46, no. 4, (2007): 985-995.

8 World Travel & Tourism Council Report, (2018), https://www.wttc.org/- /media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/archived/countries2018/pakistan2018.pdf.

9 Kerala Tourism Statics, (2017), accessed on April 24, 2019, https://www.keralatourism.org/tourismstatistics/tourist_statistics_2017201803141 22614.pdf.

10 It is based on reported tourism figures during the implementation phase of Third Tourism Master Plan, Quoted in Malives Economy by Global Edge, Michigan State University, (2007-2011), accessed on August, 20, 2019, https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/maldives/economy.

11 Ziaullah, Jehangir Khan, and Zahoor Ul Haq, “Coastal Tourism & CPEC: Opportunities and Challenges in Pakistan”, Journal of Political Studies, 25, no. 2, (2018): 261-272. Zia Ullah, Prof. David Johnson, Prof. Allan T. Williams, Dr Anthony Gallagher, and Muhammad Qasim, “Strategic Analysis of Coastal Tourism in Pakistan (A Case Study of Sindh Province). Journal of Applied Environmental and Biological Sciences, 4(7S), (2014): 107-112.

12 Razzaq Ahmed, and Khalida Mahmood, “Tourism potential and constraints: An analysis of tourist spatial attributes in Pakistan”, Pakistan Perspectives, 22, no.2, (2017).

13 Maldives Tourism Act (Law No. 2/99), Government of Maldives

14 Kerala Tourism Policy, 2012, Government of Kerala, India.

15 Dirk Glaesser, John Kester, Hanna Paulose, Abbas Alizadeh, and Birka Valentin, “Global travel patterns: An overview,” Journal of travel medicine, 24, no.4, (2017).

16 Suresh Kumar Kundur, “Development of Tourism in Maldives,” Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 2. No. 4, (2012), 1.

17 Tourism Year Books (2007-2017), Ministry of Tourism, Maldives.

18 Third Tourism Master Plan (200-2001).

19 Fourth Tourism Master Plan (2013-2017)

20 Maldives GDP per capita PPP, accessed on August 26, 2019, ://tradingeconomics.com/maldives/gdp-per-capita-ppp.

21 Endangered Mangroves forest of Pakistan, Technology Times.PK, September 15, 2017, https://www.technology times.pk/endangered-mangrove-forest-pakistan/.

22 Mirza, M. I., Hasan, M. Z., Akhtar, S., Ali, J., & Sanjrani, M. A. , “Remote sensing su rvey of mangrove forest along the coast of Balochistan,” Marine science of the Arabian Sea, (1988): 339-348.

23 Ahmed, M.F., Ghalib, S.A. and Hasnain, S.A. (1991) The Waterflowof Makran Coast. In Proceedings of three days National Conference on Problems and Resources of Makran Coast and Plan of Action for its Development. Karachi Zoological Survey Department.

24 What is Wildlife Sanctuary, Performing Animal Welfare Society, Accessed on August 26, 2019, https://www.pawsweb.org/what_is_a_wildlife_sanctuary.html.

25 Ramsar Convention Bureau, Pakistan designated eight new Ramsar Sites. (2001), Accessed on June 12, 2019, http://www.ramsar.org/wn/w.n.pakistan_eightnew.html.

26 BCS -Balochistan Conservation Strategy, The Strategy prepared by the Planning and Development Department, Government of Balochistan, (2000), Accessed on June 12, 2019, http://www.bcs.iucnp.org.

27 Himayatullah Khan, “Demand for eco-tourism: Estimating recreational benefits from the Margalla hills national park in northern Pakistan”, (2004).

28 “A Ramsar site is a wetland site designated to be of international importance under the Ramsar Convention. The Convention on Wetlands, known as the Ramsar *Convention, is an intergovernmental environmental treaty established in 1971 by UNESCO, which came into force in 1975.

29 Ullah, and Haq. “Coastal Tourism & CPEC: Opportunities and Challenges in Pakistan”.

30 Revision of Visa Regime (2019). Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior.

31 Government of Pakistan (2019). Constitution of National Tourism Coordination Board (NTCB). Notification F.No.10-7/2019-Org-III(i) (2019) dated 12.03.2019, published in Gazette of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Cabinet Division).

32 “PM Imran Khan Approves National Tourism Coordination Board”, Pakistan Today, March 13, 2019, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/03/13/pm-imranapproves-national-tourism-coordination-board/

 

Maritime Security Cooperation: From Mistrust to Trust in the Indian Ocean Region

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Bhagya Senaratne

Abstract

Home to one fifth of the world’s waterbody, the Indian Ocean is abundant with a variety of mineral and biological resources. As the ocean space housing one of the world’s busiest shipping routes, it is crucial that its natural resources and its environment are safeguarded. In ancient times, this ocean space has been an area of great cooperation, however, in present times the Indian Ocean has been largely confounded by distrust. The problem under study in this research was: even though the Indian Ocean Region is an extremely important and highly utilised ocean space that a vast majority of the world relies on, there is inadequate cooperation between the littoral states as well as the extra-regional states in ensuring the waterbody is safe. As such, the objectives of this research were to analyse why there  is inadequate cooperation within the Indian Ocean Region; and to analyse how the Indian Ocean littoral countries and its users can cooperate with one another in ensuring maritime security cooperation. Primary sources for the qualitative research included policy documents and correspondence whilst secondary data included newspaper articles, reputed journals and websites. The data gathered from these sources were coded to derive the analysis in this research. As present challenges are diverse and dynamic, countries are singularly unable to ensure ocean spaces are safe unless they have shared intelligence and information from a variety of stakeholders. The paper argues that Maritime Domain Awareness enables intelligence sharing, as well as in exchanging capabilities and resources. In conclusion, there are  many avenues for maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean such as by sharing capabilities, resources and skills. It can also cooperate to eliminate non-traditional security threats, which affects both the littoral states as well as the users of the Indian Ocean.

Keywords: Indian Ocean, Maritime Domain  Awareness, Maritime Security Cooperation, Non-Traditional Security Threats

Introduction

As the third largest ocean in the world, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has a considerable area to be monitored and protected. Its dimensions and resources make it all the more important to be safeguarded. The Indian Ocean region has two types of users, i.e. the countries that are its littoral states, and those external; that use the Indian Ocean for purposes of transportation of goods, people and raw material. As the ocean space is vast and is used for purposes of transportation, it becomes important that this area is protected from being especially used for illegal activities. Illegal activities, which would ultimately cause problems to the security of the littoral states and the users of the Indian Ocean. In this context, this paper identifies Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as a possible solution to the problems experienced in the IOR and suggests measures both the littoral states as well as its external users together could take to safeguard the ocean along with its users.

Towards this end, this initial section is further sub-divided into two sections in order to provide definitio ns for the two main concepts – i.e. Maritime Domain Awareness and the Indian Ocean Region – that provides the foundation for the discussion in this paper.

Maritime Domain Awareness

The U.S. Department of Defense defines Maritime Domain Awareness as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation”1. As such, MDA discusses about providing safety and security to a wide spectrum of issues such as the environment, economy and a country’s traditional security to name a few. According to the National Concept of Operations for Maritime Domain Awareness, a maritime domain can be defined as areas related to or bordering a “sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities,  infrastructure,  people,  cargo,  and  vessels  and   other conveyances”. Therefore, it can be understood that awareness or monitoring of the maritime domain requires a lot of attention and resources, as it refers to and is relevant to any waterbody that can be navigated.

Further, MDA aims to “collect the maximum information and intelligence about any ship or vessel in the country’s waters” in order to ensure the safety of its borders. Information such as this facilitates a country to prepare for security threats as well as implement pre-emptive measures. It further details MDA is about “deterring and preventing hostile or illegal acts within the maritime domain”2. It therefore intends to implement measures to safeguard its maritime boundaries by ensuring that there are less threats entering it. Whilst MDA is focused mainly on the USA and ensuring its safety, it can also be broadly used and exercised for the betterment of the world’s oceanic regions as the concept discusses about collecting and sharing information and intelligence.

Maritime Domain Awareness entails “creating a collaborative information environment in which partners can monitor risks to their maritime interests while promoting the freedoms of navigation, civil liberties and maritime commerce”3. This showcases the potential and the ability for countries to collaborate and cooperate in sharing information on ocean spaces such as the Indian Ocean, which are available to them with other states. Sharing of vital information via initiatives such as MDA, would also improve the levels of trust between states.

The Indian Ocean Region

The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean covering one-fifth of the planet’s salt water-body. This ocean space is abundant with a variety of mineral and biological resources4. This space also comprises of 38 littoral states, 24 ocean territories and 17 landlocked countries covering the continents of Africa, Asia, Australia and Antarctica. The Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean connects with the Indian Ocean along with the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, covering an area of 169,000 square miles5. It is also plentiful with natural resources such as petroleum and natural gas reserves as  well as many rich natural minerals, such as manganese nodules, ilmenite, tin etcetera and approximately five percent of the total Indian Ocean area consists of continental shelves. In addition to the above, this ocean space possesses a portion of the world’s largest fishing grounds, providing approximately a quarter of the total world’s fish catch.

Home to more than half of the world’s known offshore oil reserves; the Indian Ocean is also an artery for the transportation of unfinished goods and cargoes, such as crude oil, iron, coal, rubber and tea.6Nearly 50 percent of the world’s container traffic passes through the Indian Ocean with a third of the world’s trade being handled in its ports7. Furthermore, it is estimated that over 60,000 ships continue to sail from east to west and vice versa annually, carrying two thirds of oil and half of all container shipments. It is estimated that 70% of seaborne oil travels through the Indian Ocean8. It must be noted that a majority of China’s energy shipments are imported through the Indian Ocean region, which showcases that there is an inherent interest by China towards safeguarding these routes – the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) – as well as engaging with the region to ensure its imports are safe. India, as the resident power in the Indian Ocean also utilises this ocean space to transport approximately 60% of its exports and imports9. Therefore, as one of the world’s busiest shipping routes, it is crucial that this ocean space, its natural resources and its environment at large are safeguarded for the future generations to come.

It must be noted that in ancient times, this ocean space has been an area of immense cooperation. Therefore, it is imperative that combined measures are taken to ensure that sustainable principles are practiced in order to make it a liveable environment for the future. For that reason, this paper illustrates the possibilities for cooperation in the Indian Ocean region among its littoral states as well as its users, such as extra regional powers.

Research Problem

Even though the Indian Ocean region is an extremely important and highly utilised ocean space that a vast majority of the world relies on, there is inadequate cooperation between the littoral states as well as its users, the extra-regional states. In this backdrop, cooperation via various mechanisms would enable Maritime Domain Awareness, a vital component in ensuring maritime security cooperation and in safeguarding the Indian Ocean for future generations.

As such this research paper endeavours to provide answers to three questions in unpacking the research problem stated above. The questions are: a) why is there inadequate cooperation within the Indian Ocean Region; b) how can the Indian Ocean littoral countries cooperate to ensure maritime security; c) how can users of the Indian Ocean cooperate via Maritime Domain Awareness in ensuring maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Answers to these questions are discussed in detail in a subsequent section of this paper.

Objectives and Research Methods

The principal objective of this research was to analyse  why there is inadequate cooperation within the Indian Ocean Region, thereby discussing how the Indian Ocean littoral countries can cooperate via Maritime Domain Awareness in ensuring their countries’ physical borders and the environment of the Indian Ocean at large can be safe and secure. The secondary objective was to analyse how the Indian Ocean littoral countries and its users  can cooperate with one another in ensuring maritime security cooperation, thereby identifying the role to be played by extra- regional powers in ensuring the safety of this ocean space.

Accordingly, the study utilised a combination of primary and secondary sources of information. Primary sources such as conducting focus group discussions and interviews with naval personnel, accessing policy documents and correspondence were gathered to obtain qualitative data for the research study. The research also utilised secondary sources of data such as newspaper articles, reputed journal articles and websites. The data gathered from these sources were thematically coded to derive the analysis in this research.

Discussion and Analysis

There are various reasons as to why the Indian Ocean requires greater cooperation and sharing of resources. This  section attempts to highlight a few significant reasons as to why cooperation via Maritime Domain Awareness is not only required, but almost overdue. In doing so, this section also attempts to provide answers to the three research questions, i.e. a) why is there inadequate cooperation within the Indian Ocean Region; b) how can the Indian Ocean littoral countries cooperate via Maritime Domain Awareness; c) how can users of the Indian  Ocean cooperate via Maritime Domain Awareness in safeguarding the Indian Ocean.

a. Inadequate cooperation within the Indian Ocean Region. In ancient times, this ocean space has  been an area of immense Ships laden with raw material, commodities and products have traversed the Indian Ocean from east to west and vice versa. In fact, trade would have been the unifying factor which permitted friendly relations between the Indian Ocean littoral states and the extra-regional states. As such, concepts such as the ‘Ancient Maritime Silk Road’ are references to the Indian Ocean which was the “main trade route or ocean highway”10. Historical records indicate that the littoral states of the Indian Ocean have in fact cooperated with merchant ships from distant lands in exchanging spices, herbs and commodities for ceramics, silks and other important items of trade. Furthermore, the seaborne route was the preferred route in transporting large volumes of goods, thus, also encouraging a sense of kinship in protecting this precious area.

However, over the centuries, this kinship in protecting the Indian Ocean faded away into competition, with certain littoral states wanting to retain this area for themselves or regarding it as their own, and various extra-regional states wanting to dominate it and retain it as an ‘enclosed area’11. This competition was  further intensified by the numerous extra-regional powers such as the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British, that dominated the Indian Ocean and colonised its littoral states. Due to the power struggle among these states prior to the 20th Century, the Indian Ocean became an area for conflict, rather than cooperation. However, the two World Wars and the Cold War thereafter, put a spotlight on the Indian Ocean for various reasons such as its locational significance, geographical features and resources. This power struggle, thus witnessed more extra-regional powers such as the United States of America, the Soviet Union and France, to name a few, enter into the discourse pertaining to the Indian Ocean. Due to these power dynamics, Sri Lanka proposed the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP), a concept which was to assist in limiting the power play in the region and neutralising the effect of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) being utilised and transported.

Retrospectively, in the 20th century too, the dynamics in the Indian Ocean proved to be intense and challenging. However, even though the epicentres for global events changed over the decades, scholars and professionals have once again regarded the Indian Ocean as the “heart of the world” in the 21st Century, with many powers, both littoral and extra-regional, vying to have a  large stake in this power play.

Furthermore, insecurities and rivalries among powers such as China, India and the United States of America have  heightened the need for maritime cooperation in this ocean space. These insecurities, competition and distrust are as a result of the increasing naval activity in the IOR as well as the competition for resources. Following a component of the national interest of their countries such as trade, the Indian Ocean is once again witnessing an increase in the world’s navies. This is because state navies are seen following their commercial vessels, i.e. ‘flags following ships’, to ensure their commodities are secure. In addition to the increase in the naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the world is also witnessing an upsurge in the competition for resources.

At the 2018 Indian Ocean Conference held in Vietnam, Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe pointed out that there appears to be a weakening of multilateral systems13. This is especially true when considering the Indian Ocean Region where there is a lack of cooperation and consensus among littoral states on what needs to be done in the region, which is further heightened by the involvement of the region’s users. The region is also confounded with the problem of not having one single organisation with members from all the Indian Ocean littoral states. This region currently boasts of various regional fora on maritime security such as the Indian Ocean Regional Organisation (IORA), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the Indian Ocean MOU (IOMOU) on Port State Control, the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), and the UNESCO IOC Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System  (ICG/IOTWS)14.  All these regional groupings have their own agendas. IORA, for example, which was formed in 1997 is an intergovernmental organisation that annually hosts a Foreign Ministers’ meeting (Indian Ocean Rim Association15. It is also the only regional organisation that links most of the Indian Ocean states. Whilst the organisation was originally established to promote economic cooperation, it has since widened its agenda to eight priority areas, amongst which are maritime safety & security, disaster risk management, academic, science & technology. However, the undesirable factor of this organisation is that it is not inclusive, as littoral states such as Pakistan are not giving membership. IONS, for instance, convenes the Naval Chiefs of the Indian Ocean  littoral states and its users16. It has three working groups on humanitarian assistance & disaster relief (HADR), maritime security and information sharing & interoperability (Indian Ocean Naval Symposium17. This forum provides a much required opportunity for the navies of this region to interact and deliberate on issues that are of importance. This differs from the norm where only the bureaucrats meet and discuss on mutual matters. Even though the IOR enjoys these organisations and fora, they do not provide membership to all of the Indian Ocean’s littoral states or its users. Incidents such as this, increases or sharpens the distrust harboured among states, thereby leading to insecurities in the maritime domain.

In addition to the above, the Indian Ocean is ripe with distrust. Both the littoral states and the extra-regional states do not place absolute trust in one another to cooperate, to find solutions to the problems the region faces or to safeguard the region. Thus, even though the region has received adequate attention, there is still inadequate cooperation within the IOR to solve the region’s challenges in the maritime sphere.

b. Cooperation between Indian Ocean littoral states to ensure maritime security. As present challenges are diverse and multifaceted, countries are singularly unable to ensure their maritime borders are safe unless they have shared intelligence and information from a variety of In roughly a decade between 1992 and 2002, shipping traffic in the Indian Ocean has increased by approximately 300 per cent18. The reaction by extra- regional powers to the energy flows in the Indian Ocean region largely determines how the region’s trade occurs19. Further, the “stability and security” of the region determines how energy shipments traverse externally. The increase and the diversity of trade and commerce too have made it crucial for MDA to occur. In this context, Maritime Domain Awareness has a large part to play in intelligence sharing,  as  well  as  in  shared  capabilities  and resources.

This is important as the oceans are too vast a frontier for any one country to be able to monitor  alone.

Non-Traditional Security Threats are diverse and difficult for a single country to counter. It needs the collective involvement of stakeholders to ensure there is cooperation in ensuring state actors have information about the perpetrators, the material that is being illegally smuggled – be it humans, drugs, gold, arms and ammunition etcetera. Towards this end, Maritime Domain Awareness is useful as the Indian Ocean littoral states can share intelligence on vessels carrying illegal products or are engaging in illegal activities, thereby creating avenues to intercept such activities. Regional cooperation by way of shared intelligence would pave the way for littoral states to work together as a team, as oppose to working in silos or individually. Accordingly, demonstrating good neighbourly relations in the IOR, India has assisted island-states such as Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius improve their maritime domain awareness by installing coastal radars and conducting surveillance in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). India has also assisted Maldives and Sri Lanka by sharing information through its maritime security trilateral20. Success stories such as the above are important in improving and encouraging cooperation and interaction between the littoral states of the Indian Ocean.

An increase in maritime security cooperation would also permit states to be more networked, similar to these transnational organised crime (TOC) groups, thereby having an advantage in dismantling such illegal networks. Therefore, Maritime Domain Awareness would pave the way for the Indian Ocean littoral states to cooperate with one another. Australia – Sri Lanka can be cited as a useful example towards the successful bilateral information and intelligence sharing between two states. Sharing of vital intelligence between the navies and border security agencies of the two states enabled them to thwart many illegal networks, that were smuggling ship loads of people from post-conflict Sri Lanka to Australia. The cooperation between the navies of the two countries, the information they also received from third countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, were also imperative in eliminating these TOC networks. Furthermore, the public awareness campaigns carried out by Australia in Sri Lanka were also extremely important. Accordingly, these showcases  the success states can derive from maritime domain awareness towards enabling maritime security in the Indian Ocean region by building trust.

Another area, in which there can be greater cooperation in the Indian Ocean, is in tackling oceanic pollution. Currently there are five offshore plastic accumulation zones in the world with the second largest being in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean garbage patch which was discovered in 2010 constitutes a wide area of at least five million square kilometres and has no specific or clearly recognisable boundaries21. Therefore, conducting surveys on the second largest oceanic plastic accumulation and understanding  the damage it is doing to the marine environment  is crucial in ensuring the Indian Ocean region is an environmentally clean space. Curtailing oceanic pollution is an area where the IOR countries can partake in to implement measures that need to be taken to instil practices of sustainable consumption within the citizens of the littoral states, especially the youth population.

A further avenue for cooperation between the Indian Ocean littoral states is to share information on the Automatic Identification System (AIS) of vessels. An AIS is “an automated, autonomous tracking system which is extensively used in the maritime world for the exchange of navigational information between AIS-equipped terminals”

c. Collaboration between users of the Indian Ocean Region to ensure maritime security.

MDA is important in this instance as it can generate actionable intelligence23. Cooperation between the Indian Ocean countries can include the interception of vessels carrying illegal goods as well as flora and fauna, before they cross the Indian Ocean either to transit or to reach their final destination. As much as the littoral states’ maritime intelligence is superior along its immediate periphery, it requires additional support from the likes of the Unites States and China, in curtailing various non-traditional security threats in the greater Indian Ocean region. Collective efforts by both the Indian Ocean states and its users would be an added advantage to ensure there is  global cooperation in safeguarding this ocean space. Therefore, sharing of information and intelligence can be useful in formulating a Common Operating Picture (COP), which will also benefit the users of the ocean to be safeguarded against illegal activities. In this instance, satellite imagery can be obtained for deep sea surveillance, navigation and to gather information about the greater Indian Ocean Region to help monitor the area. In addition, utilising the submarine capability which is possessed by countries such as Australia, India and Pakistan as well as extra-regional states such as China, United States, Russia would be useful in sharing any vital information its vessels intercept of subsurface illegal activities such as pollution, harming coral reefs, that are detrimental to the oceanic environment.

A further area wherein the Indian Ocean littoral states and its users can cooperate is in tracking oil spills in this ocean space. At present, is it difficult for a single country or for countries to monitor such oil spills without proper satellite imagery. For example, Sri Lanka, which is centrally located in the Indian Ocean Region, does not have adequate technology to monitor such situations. Even though Sri Lanka Coast Guard (SLCG) is trained and equipped to contain any oil spill that could occur, the lack of adequate technological infrastructure and support hamper its ability to be a useful institution to the region. In such an instance sharing of technology, skills and information by countries that possess such capabilities such as India, China and the United States would be helpful to a littoral state such as Sri Lanka, which has a large ocean space to monitor and secure. Although there is no immediate threat, a threat of this nature could be a possibility in the future. Being situated astride the busiest shipping lane in the Indian Ocean, it is important for Sri Lanka to have the necessary mechanisms to monitor oil spills. In addition, sharing of information and capabilities also enables these countries to ensure there is maritime security in the Indian Ocean region and also to reduce their trust deficit. Thus, this is another mechanism for the littoral states and the users of the Indian Ocean to implement in building their confidence and trust in one another to make the ocean space more safe and secure.

Alongside the increase in trade and commerce, communication and technology too has enabled the spiralling of challenges and threats to security. This has led to an increasing number of diverse and fluid networks, cutting across society whilst remaining untraceable. These networks and tools have also led to the permeation of non-traditional security threats and a greater difficulty in them being traced due to their clandestine nature. Improved communication technology and access to  social media has also proliferated the number of non-state actors who are involved in illegal activities and also how they engage in them. Therefore, sharing intelligence of these clandestine groups and their activities would enable the states authorities to curtail their physical and virtual activities. Sharing intelligence of this nature and ensuring countries utilise the intelligence shared fo r genuine and legal purposes will also guarantee an increase in trust in the Indian Ocean region.

An additional area wherein Sri Lanka requires assistance is in tracking oil spills in the Indian Ocean. At present, Sri Lanka does not have adequate technology to monitor such situations, even though Sri Lanka Coast Guard is trained and equipped to contain any oil spill that could occur. Although there is no immediate threat, this could be a possibility at any given moment or in the future. Being situated astride the busiest shipping lane in the Indian Ocean, it is important for Sri Lanka to have the necessary mechanisms to monitor oil spills. On similar lines, Sri Lanka does not have a system to monitor whether ships are by  chance releasing burnt fuel into the Indian Ocean. Regardless of their being international laws prohibiting such activity, it is still very important to be able to monitor the activities of the ships sailing past the country. This can be two-fold in terms of monitoring the release of burnt fuel as well as in being aware of the kind of ships sailing by. It can be a further advantage as it will enable navies to also know the kind of cargo that is on-board the vessel. Additionally, it would be useful for countries such as Sri Lanka to obtain information on ships that do not switch on their Automatic Identification System (AIS) when sailing past Sri Lanka.  Currently, Sri Lanka has no way to track ships that disable their AIS and know what kind of activities these vessels are involved in, in Sri Lanka’s periphery. Towards this end, actionable intelligence from littoral states such as Australia, India and Pakistan as well  as extra-regional states such as China and the United States  would be vastly advantageous to Sri Lanka. However, it would be ideal for Sri Lanka to possess drones and surveillance systems to monitor vessels traversing the Southern coast of the island. Therefore, establishing a hub in Sri Lanka to coordinate maritime security requirements in the Indian Ocean region would be a subsequent measure the Indian Ocean countries could strive to establish to ensure there is an increase in trust.

As mentioned earlier on in sub-section one of this paper, the Indian Ocean has several multilateral institutions to safeguard its waters. However, these fora and organisations do not provide membership to all the littoral states of the Indian Ocean as well as its    users.    Therefore,    these    organisations’    usefulness   and operational capabilities can be contested as they do not create a common platform for consensus among these powers. In this backdrop, Sri Lanka called for a multi-layered system, at the 2018 Indian Ocean Conference held in Vietnam, which does not take countries’ geographical constraints into consideration and is inclusive25. As important as it is for countries to individually support and initiate programmes to improve maritime security in the Indian Ocean, it is equally important for countries to work together under a common understanding and on a common platform. Hence, it is important to have multinational organisations that are inclusive in nature. Therefore, it would be appropriate to incorporate the functions of all the aforeme ntioned fora and organisations and create one common entity that will provide membership status to all the littoral states and the users of the Indian Ocean. Whilst being inclusive in nature, a common platform to coordinate activities in the IOR would also be useful in carrying out relief measures during natural disasters. For that reason, it would be practical to have the foreign ministers and the naval chiefs of countries working together within a single organisation to enable prompt action. Thus, it can be considered that a common, inclusive multinational organisation for the Indian Ocean Region is important to dispel mistrust and to attract countries to one another.

Conclusion

There are many avenues for Indian Ocean littoral countries to cooperate on, especially in ensuring there is maritime security in their common neighbour, i.e. the Indian Ocean. Ensuring there is cooperation for the ocean’s well-being assures that it is held in trusteeship for the future generations to also consume. As the Indian Ocean is a public good, it needs to be taken care of by all its inhabitants as well as its users. The third-largest ocean body can only be protected for future generations, if there is a high degree of collaboration between states. Therefore, MDA, where there is sharing of information and intelligence would be in the best interest    bilaterally    between    specific    states, as well as multilaterally, for the betterment of the entire world. Accordingly, a multilateral involvement or the need to have an inclusive multilateral engagement in the Indian Ocean region needs to be emphasised. This is because only a multilateral engagement everyone believes in would be able to ensure there is a shift in perspective from mistrust to trust and countries would be confident in cooperating with one another in the maritime domain. Therefore, a multinational organisation which provides membership to all the littoral states of the Indian Ocean and its users as well as function as an umbrella organisation would be the call of the day in improving maritime cooperation.

Even though there is an inherent distrust between the littoral states in sharing vital intelligence, it needs to be noted that cooperation by way of sharing resources, intelligence, skills and manpower amongst each other would also benefit the littoral states overcome this mistrust. Thereby, enhancing cooperation between the states.

Therefore, if cooperation between the littoral states and the users of the Indian Ocean could focus on immediate areas such as non-traditional security threats, environmental degradation, pollution, monitoring of vessels and oil spills, insecurities in the region could be curtailed to a larger extent. There are many avenues for Indian Ocean littoral countries to cooperate on, for instance by way of sharing information and intelligence between countries such as China, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the United States, especially in ensuring there is greater cooperation in maritime security and the Indian Ocean is safeguard ed for the future generations.

References

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2 National Concept of Operations for Maritime Domain Awareness, 2007, http://nmio.ise.gov/Portals/16/Docs/071213mdaconops.pdf?ver= 2015-12-04- 123515-657

3 George Vance, and Paulo Vicente, “ Maritime Domain Awareness”, Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council, 63, no.3, (2006).

4 Indian Ocean, Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/place/Indian-Ocean

5 Bhagya Senaratne,“The importance of public diplomacy in formulating a maritime policy for the Indian Ocean Region,” Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, (2016),10.1080/09733159.2016.1181393

6 Indian Ocean. 2016.

7 Dinusha Panditaratne, “The Role of Sri Lanka in South Asia and Beyond: Emerging New Contours,” Research and Information System for Developing Countries. (January 19, 2018), https://www.lki.lk/wp-content/uploads/ 2018/02/LKI%E2%80%99s-Dinusha-Panditaratne-on-the-Role-of-Sri-Lanka-inSouth-Asia-and-Beyond-at-RIS-in-India.pdf

8 Panditaratne, The Role of Sri Lanka in South Asia and Beyond.

9 “India” World Trade Organization, 2017, http://stat.wto.org/ CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=IN&Language=F

10 Bandaranayake, S. “Introductory Note: Sri Lanka and the ‘Silk Road’ of the Sea,” In Sri Lanka and the ‘Silk Road’ of the Sea, Eds., S. Bandaranayake, L. Dewaraja, R. Silva and K.D.G. Wimalaratne, (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Central Cultural Fund, 2007), 9-10.

11 David Brewster, “Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of China’s New Pathways in the Indian Ocean,” Geopolitics, (2016), DOI: 10.1080/ 14650045.2016.1223631

12 Robert D. Kalpan., Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. (New York, USA: Random House, 2011)

13 “PM floats new platform by SL for Indian Ocean maritime cooperation,” Daily FT, August 29, 2018, http://www.ft.lk/front-page/PM-floats-new-platform-bySL-for-Indian-Ocean-maritime-cooperation/44-661794

14 “Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia,” Indian Ocean regional forums.( n.d. ), https://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/ regionalarchitecture/indian-ocean/Pages/indian-ocean-regional-forums.aspx

15 “About IORA”, Indian Ocean Rim Association, 2017, https://www.iora.int/en

16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (2016).

17 “IONS Working Group” Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, (2018), http://www.ions.global/

18 Panditaratne, D. “The Role of Sri Lanka in South Asia and Beyond: Emerging New Contours,” Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 19 January, (2018), https://www.lki.lk/wp-content/ uploads/ 2018/02/LKI%E2%80%99s-DinushaPanditaratne-on-the-Role-of-Sri-Lanka-in-South-Asia-and-Beyond-at-RIS-inIndia.pdf

19 Cordesman, Burke, Berntsen, Dewit, Toukan, “The Indian Ocean Region: A Strategic Net Assessment”, Centre for strategic and international studies, (2014): 55.

20 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Views from India’s Smaller Maritime Neighbors”, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, June 18, (2015), https://amti.csis.org/views-from-indias-smaller-maritime-neighbors/

21 Laura Parker, “Plane Search Shows World’s Oceans Are Full of Trash”, National Geographic, (April 4, 2014), https://news.Nationalgeogra phic.com/news/2014/04/140404-garbage-patch-indian-ocean-debris-malaysianplane/

22 Maritime Traffic (n.d.). What is the Automatic Identification System (AIS)? , https://help.marinetraffic.com/hc/en-us/articles/204581828-What-is-theAutomatic-Identification-System-AIS-

23 Marine Insight, (2016, July 21). A General Overview of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). ( July 21, 2016), https://www.marineinsight.com/maritimelaw/a-general-overview-of-maritime-domain-awareness-mda/

24 Grooten M. and Almond, Living Planet Report – 2018: Aiming Higher, WWF, (Gland, Switzerland, 2018).

25 “PM floats new platform by SL for Indian Ocean maritime cooperation”, Daily FT, August 29, (2018), http://www.ft.lk/front-page/PM-floats-new-platform-bySL-for-Indian-Ocean-maritime-cooperation/44-661794

Geo-political and Geo-economic Dynamics of the Region in Developing the Sea-based Economy of the IOR Countries

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Kanwar Muhammad Javed Iqbal, Baber Bilal Haider

 

Abstract

The geo-politics and geo-economics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) littoral are interconnected to each-other with a large scale of Afro-Asian population and a tremendous maritime economic potential. Welfare interests of the populations of IOR littoral states demand tapping of the Sea-based economic potential, but the geo- political dynamics of the region are not conducive due to diverse dimensions of multiplayers in the region and gradual Sino-Asian power shift, where philosophy of enhanced cooperation for peace and sustainability is highly needed. The addition of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has provided new avenues to harness the true potential and uplift the poverty by improving existing socio – economic ties. The BRI has many challenges, and its opportunities can be exploited by China, Pakistan and Iran, through an extra efforts on diplomatic front. Based on qualitative research and content analysis method, this paper aims to analyse the various aspects of the geo-politics and geo-economics of the IOR viz-a-viz Sea-based economic potential and rationalizes the need of enhanced cooperation for peace and sustainability in order to promote socio- economic uplift and prosperity across Afro-Asian region.

Keywords: Indian Ocean, Geo-political, Geo-economic, IOR Littoral, Afro-Asian region, Sea-based economy, Welfare interests, SLOC, CPEC, OBOR, Chahbahar Port, Gwadar Port, enhanced cooperation, socio-economic uplift.

1. Introduction

Indian Ocean is one of the busiest and most important ocean worldwide. Covering an area of 73,556,000 sq kms, this ocean consists of some of the most critical sea lanes and choke points. Indian Ocean region connects three continents (Asia, Africa & Australia) and two Oceans (Pacific and Atlantic) with each other. This means that the security of this region is absolutely vital for economic activities on more than 50% of the globe. Moreover, the Indian Ocean is the battleground for some of the key sea lanes in the world including Strait of Hormuz and Malacca Strait. Almost 90,000 commercial vessels annually transport 9.84 billion tonnes through Indian Ocean. It’s strategic position crossing global trade connecting the major international economic hubs in the Asia- Pacific & Northern Atlantic implies the dominance in the Indian Ocean, which is pivotal to influence the trade of major economies of the world.

The Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) in IOR region got more significance in late 90s, when the forces of globalisation stimulated huge economic growth resulting in enlarged consumption & competitive trade and generating an increase in oil demand in both developed & developing countries. The significance of Indian Ocean is beyond comparison because the energy cargoes that flow through this ocean run majority of the world’s economies. The 36 million Barrels per day is around 40% of the global supply of oil & 64% of oil trade move through entryways of the Indian Ocean.The most important of these include the  Straits  of Malacca, Hormuz, & Bab-el-Mandeb1. It’s also richly blessed with fishing and aquaculture resources. Mineral resources in the seabed are present in abundant quantities with nodules containing iron, copper, zinc, cobalt, nickel, manganese, silver and gold present. Coastal sediments of Indian Ocean also have sources of zirconium, titanium, zinc, tin, & copper and various rare earth elements. Indian Ocean is also home to many island countries like, Maldives,  Seychelles,  Mauritius,  Madagascar  etc.  whose  entire economies are dependent on the ecosystem of the waters near them.”

The geo-politics and geo-economics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) littoral are interconnected to each-other due to large scale of Afro-Asian population, trade & cultural routes, sea-based economy, coastal tourism and other interests of leading global powers. Welfare interests of the populations of IOR littoral states demand tapping of the Sea-based economic potential, but the geo -political dynamics of the region are not conducive due to diverse dimensions of multiplayers in the region and gradual Sino-Asian power shift, where philosophy of enhanced cooperation for peace and sustainability is highly needed. The addition of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has provided new avenues to harness the true potential and uplift the poverty by improving existing socio – economic ties, but has many challenges.

Based on qualitative research and content analysis method, this paper aims to analyse the various aspects of the geo-politics and geo-economics of the IOR viz-a-viz Sea-based economic potential and rationalizes the need of enhanced cooperation for peace and sustainability in order to promote socio-economic uplift and prosperity across Afro-Asian region.

2. Outlook of the Geopolitics Of IOR

Asia has the world’s largest human resources and consequently natural markets, consumer markets, development scope, & connectivity potential. For better connectivity with the world through major channels present in Indian Ocean, it is called strategic conduit of commerce, which makes foundation for trading systems, that underpins Asia’s economic significance. At present, Asia is the centre ground of great power rivalries with Russia & China being taken as challengers by the U.S and its allies turning the region more competitive than cooperative. Afghanistan presents part of this picture with a devastating war since 17 years with no end in sight.

From Pakistan’s perspective, it’s important to ally itself with forces of regional progress, and for that it has to alter the region and turn itself into mega trade corridor. For this purpose, Pakistan has increasingly realized that its future lies in pursuing the common future of this region including Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, Iran and China and sometimes with Russia. Furthermore, it also realizes that perpetual hostility with India is not going to serve any purpose and the only way to solving the disputes in this region is through shared vision of prosperity for huge population deprived of the opportunities it deserves to materialize its potential.  The biggest and most important player  to carve out this constructive picture out of this troubled region is undoubtedly China; let us briefly see roles in the IOR.

2.1 Chinese Role in IOR

China’s emerging strategy for the maritime affairs in IOR has two interconnected building blocks i.e. a philosophy of a two Ocean’s Navy and initiative  on the maritime silk route for which an aggressive work is being done by China over the last 10 years  or so in order to achieve these two milestones in an influencing manner China is marching its way to pursue “two-ocean” strategy with a slow and steady mode, thus gradually expanding its maritime operations from Western Pacific and Southern Sea into the IOR. Endorsed since mid-2000s, China’s strategy of “Far-Seas Operations” is manifested by its vision of building placement with adequate berthing arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region. This arrangement would address the energy security challenges and imperatives with improved achievement on “far seas protection”. This will also provide an extra edge in projection of its naval power. Such a tectonic like transition i.e. shifting a “near sea policy” into a “far sea policy” can be considered a landmark conversion inside the intellectual maritime capacity as was reflected by the Chinese in the recent years. China’s naval force posturing is rooted in its evolved ocean-centric strategic thinking. It  may  be  considered  an  indicator  of  a  bigger  game  plan with strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean as manifested by the recent naval events with a shift from eastern to western IOR quadrants, which are observed on an ever increasing scale since 2017.

On February 2017, in the eastern part of the IOR, China fired its cruise missile3 and its Haikou and Changsha destroyers for the purpose of war readiness through the combated drills, and the exercise was also meant to meet any piracy related challenge with swift response mechanism. Now, sighting of Chinese naval surface ship and submarines is quite often in the eastern Indian Ocean quadrant. This Chinese presence includes surveillance vessels for tracking the tri-lateral Malabar exercises by the US, India and Japan, which were performed in the Bay of Bengal with an apparent intention, against China, to show a level of implicit balance in this maritime zone. At the same time, China’s posture was very smart with a mature expression in the form an extended invite to India, in August 2017 through Capt. Liang Tianjun4, for joint efforts towards enhanced maritime safety and security in IOR. In return for ensuring a multi-actors’ symbiotic relationship in IOR, China wants to safeguard its interests i.e. peaceful operations for energy / national security that can be ensured with no-hindrance from the presence of all other states in the region.

On the other hand, India is observed very sensitive for this Chinese presence, as it is considered its strategic backyard by India5, with its own ocean claim to an extent thus aspire to have pre-eminence over it. Contrary to it, emergence of Chinese role in the IOR renders an overall maritime encirclement when compared with the Indian land encirclement.

Another Chinese deployment activity occurred in August 2017 with Chinese naval formation / exercise6 in the waters of Western IOR. There was an unprecedented live fire drill in which strikes were made against an assumed enemy’s naval surface vessels. Though the assumed “enemy” was kept classified but the overall scenario made it obvious to the intelligentsia of the world that the Indian Navy was the rival in sight, as it was also highlighted  in the South China Morning Post where this Chinese drill was mentioned a clear warning for India. However, the Indian concerns were brushed off by the Chinese print media groups7. For the purpose of power show, China opened up a “logistics support facility” at Djibouti during September 2017 and also conducted a complete package of military exercises.

2.2 Chinese Maritime Agenda and the Silk Route

In October 2017, the 19th Congress of the ruling Party in China was held and led to important strategic decisions. The Congress for the first time, officially wrote the need and continuation of “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” into the Party Constitution. The “Belt” refers to overland road across Eurasia including the CPEC, while, the road corresponds to the Silk Route initiative by China; all were started in 2013.It is a first kind of a maritime project consisting geo-economic & geopolitical outcomes safeguarding maritime interests of China and power considerations significantly. However, in May 2017, an advanced BRI Forum was held in Beijing, attended by eleven IOR states which are part of the Silk Route project; included Bangladesh, Iran, Indonesia (by the President), Australia, Kenya (by the President), Malaysia (by the Prime Minister), Maldives, Singapore, Myanmar,  Sri  Lanka (by the Prime Minister), and Pakistan (by the Prime Minister). The major emphasis of the forum was maintained on the maritime and overland Silk Route projects.

Source: Chinese BRI documents and other material

On 20th June 2017, a white paper was revealed by the China and it was titled “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative”, and was prepared by the NDR Commission & SOA – the Oceanic Administration of China prepared this document. It was termed as an absolute and “pragmatic cooperation” including “shelving differences and building consensus for a win-win scenario towards the efforts of upholding the existing international ocean order.” However, the document didn’t mention the refusal of China to permit the tribunal adjudication of UNCLOS regarding its claim in the waters of Southern China Sea.

The concept of Silk Route’s BRI is developed with an excellent vision for interconnected ports & nodal points stretching across the IOR and beyond. It is very important and has a lot of significance for China’s three-fold connectivity in the IOR. Firstly, the infrastructure projects linking in formulation of nodal points and to promote active participation of Chinese enterprises. Secondly, to secure the interest of growing number of Chinese merchant ships; third and the last is to install its naval power in order to safeguard commercial aspects including the shipping business.

The Chinese BRI agenda with the provision of ports in or near the IOR would have a greater likelihood to shift the strategic geo- political agenda and relocate the geographical features / positions as were outlined in of U.S String of Pearls Framework 2005; and if happens so, it would be an ultimate outcome of the Chinese strategy behind  its bigger  game  play for which it is constructing bases as well as services in the IOR and beyond i.e. a chain stretching from Gwadar, Hambantota, Chittagong and Sittwe. However, whole Chinese advancement is very calm and perhaps classified that is why it has always denied the existence of any such policy. But, the situation is pretty clear as it has made continuous efforts during the last decade in order to develop a series ports usage agreements across the IOR and beyond that is why allied facilities are included at Mombassa & Djibouti.

The year 2017 observed a rapid penetration of China in the IOR ports. In September (2017), China and Myanmar reached to an agreement whereby China got 70% stakes, for its state owned company CITIC, in the running deep water Kyauk Pyu. This port is strategically located providing a very good entrance to the Myanmar-China O&G pipeline. Earlier in July 2017, Sri Lanka agreed to a similar agreement with 70% stakes for Chinese state owned company CMPH in development of port Hambantota with a lease arrangement over 99 year period. Given role to state owned companies signifies a deliberate strategy of China’s central government.

The Gwadar port located on Pakistan’s serene coastline is being considered a precious pearl towards Chinese agenda and strategy in the IOR. Its construction is being done under China’s financial assistance for CPEC, and it is owned and administered by another Chinese state owned company COPHC with a lease tenure of 40 years. The strategic significance of Gwadar for China includes energy supplies from the Middle East and the CPEC which is meant to have an improved infrastructure for  bilateral connectivity.

The strategic significance of Gwadar & Kyauk Pyu will  certainly help China in addressing its current vulnerability of the Malacca Dilemma; whereby energy imports of China sailing across eastern part of the IOR i.e. Malaccan Strait can potentially be cut off by the India or U.S.A. with their naval  presence.

2.3 Chahbahar Port

It is worth mentioning that Iran’s development of Chahbahar port, as a strategic port with Indian assistance, on the mouth of Strait of Hormuz has been apparently seen as a rival of Gwadar port in countering the increasing influence and economic bene fits for China and Pakistan in the region. However, China’s outlook of the port of Chahbahar is not marred by insecurity. In December 2017, China expressed its interest to Iran to establish a connection between Pakistan’s Gwadar port and Iran’s south-eastern port of Chabahar. China informed Iran that it was interested in using Chabahar to transit goods from Gwadar to regional and extra- regional destination points8. The Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Javad Zarif again visited Pakistan in March 2018 and asked Pakistan to participate in Chahbahar seaport project and its development for linkage with Gwadar Port. He wanted to allay concerns here over Indian involvement at Chahbahar port.9

While the Indian tactics of aligning with the US in Afghanistan against the interests of China and Pakistan to integrate the whole region for initiating a new chapter of regional and  global prosperity have added a negative tone to the regional development. However, it is a known fact that Gwadar has strong edge over Chahbahar port for its geographic location to rule maritime waters utility and its vicinity with China due to the road connectiviy. Chabahar is not located in the Indian Ocean region, where Indi a’s other functional ports: Mumbai, Nava Sheva, Goa, and Kolkata are situated having the shelter of the Indian Navy to protect their maritime operations. The vicinity of Gwadar to Chahbahar  port (72 km) covering a Pakistan Navy dominated area would always continue to a nuisance for India especially after China has gained administrative control of Gwadar since April 2017.

Moreover, China has already invited India to enter the joint venture of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) but the Indian side has  so far refrained from showing any interest in joining this game changing historic project. The absence of India at the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing on May 2017 was a clear message of disinterest or perhaps mistrust which is so deeply embedded in the Indian psychology for both Pakistan and China. The official explanation  for  this  Indian  boycott   was  China’s  linkage   of  the CPEC to the MSR initiative and since CPEC goes through the disputed area of Jammu & Kashmir, India wanted to register its dislike for the initiative. Since its inception, India is quite cautious about the whole MSR initiative as this initiative geographically surrounds the India. India perceives that it is another strategy of China to enclose India. However, China has officially denied any such strategy.

The geo-economics of the MSR presents China with interests to acquire, maintain, and defend if needed. And these interests can only be safe  guarded through a strong Navy.

2.4 China’s Improving Naval Power

The Chinese maritime strategy seems to further strengthen and is expected to manifest in China’s improvised capability to utilize more powerful assets into the Indian Ocean region. In the 19th Party Congress, a formal resolution approved President Xi Jinping’s call to build a powerful & modernized navy. In 2017, an unprecedented pace of Chinese naval capacity building was observed.

One   indicator   of   this   was   the   unveiling    of   the Type 055 destroyer in June. Which is Chinese Navy’s first 10,000 tons nationally created and domestically built surface warrior.10 Chinese official state media (XINHUA) considered this a milestone in refining the nation’s navy armament system and building a strong & modern navy. The Type 055 is the China’s first new generation destroyers.

Till now, China has not deployed its aircraft carrier in Indian Ocean. It converted an ex-Soviet carrier, the Varyag, installing it into the navy as the Liaoning in 2012. However, it is important to mention that China is already deploying towards the Indian Ocean, where in January 2017 saw the Liaoning leading a warship flotilla into the South China Sea including drills with advanced J- 15 aircraft making it the first Chinese aircraft carrier deployment into the South China Sea and established a strong policy to showcase maritime power. This projection was partially in context of signifying clear superiority over local rival beneficiaries in the South China Sea and partially to commence matching U.S. aircraft carrier dispositions into waters that China claims as its own. However, the U.S. claims it as international waters, in which it could commence freedom of navigation exercises.

A massive development for Chinese aircraft carrier power projection is the faster construction of its home-made aircraft carrier during 2017. China’s first indigenous aircraft carrier Type 001A was launched on April, 2017 at Shanghai with berth exercises conducted at Dalian in October. By 2018, this new aircraft carrier appears to join the Chinese Navy, which is two years earlier than initially expected. It’s projected to be  placed with the South China Sea fleet thereby reserved for regular distribution into the South China Sea & IOR. It’s expected to feature an electromagnetic launch system. The event creates a strategic acceleration of Chinese efforts for building a blue water navy to ensure its safe key maritime trade routes and to encounter America’s dominant position in the Asia Pacific region along with India’s position in the IOR.

2.5 Countervailing Responses

In response to China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative, India has started to pursue its own Mausam & Cotton route projects as an initiative for the Indian Ocean cooperation, deliberately leaving China out of this exercise. India alongside Japan is engaged in promoting the Africa Asia Growth Corridor (AAGC), which also does not include China. American advocacy of the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) for linking South Asia to  South-East  Asia  has  also  seen  in  link  with  the  Indian and Japanese proposals. As for the Chinese “two-ocean” naval strategy, the increased deployment in the Indian Ocean has led to India moving rapidly towards trilateral security cooperation with Japan and the US. Australia also beckons in this regional response to China manifested in recovery of “Quad” discussions between US, Australia, India, & Japan on 12th Nov,2017. This offset security development comprises the trilateral MALABAR exercises in June 2017 among American, Japanese, and Indian Naval forces  in  which these exercises in the Bay of Bengal exhibited a move of venues from the Western Pacific into the IOR. Australia is also most likely to join the MALABAR structure within this “Quad” development.

2.6 Maritime Threats and Pakistan’s Role in IOR

About 95% of Pakistan’s trade is carried out through the ports of Karachi, Port Qasim, and Gwadar with Pasni, Ormara, Jiwani, and Gadani and receiving small number of cargoes. These harbours, especially Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar have tremendous significance for Pakistan, landlocked Central Asian States and Afghanistan and now increasingly China in view of the CPEC project. Long serene coastline & significant harbours provide Pakistan with a strategic location, which is ideal for sea trade and other commercial activities conducted in mostly foreign ships. The role of Pakistan in international navigation,  the Gwadar port, and the EEZ is very important for its economic development.

However, the rise of non-conventional threats near coastal areas of Pakistan hamper its economic & security interests. Ignoring all these impacts will intentionally place Pakistan in an adverse position with land-locked countries to which, Pakistan wants to offer a pathway to IOR. Unless or until these sub- conventional & non-traditional threats are resolved, Pakistan wouldn’t be able to conquer its national security.

Therefore, it is important to stabilize the economy for acquiring defence modernization and to deal with non-traditional threats. In addition, Pakistan also needs to focus more on naval empowerment of its naval forces for ensuring security at its sea lane, international trade, and maritime interests in Indian Ocean region.

These uninterrupted threats of terrorism have transnational apprehensions for diplomatic interests of Pakistan in Indian Ocean region. Possible assaults by radical military factions with the assistance of regional powers opposing CPEC on seaports and coastlines along with dangers of weaponization, human trafficking and drugs smuggling could obstruct global trade activities on coastline of Pakistan.

These serious maritime security threats not only marginalize national security of Pakistan but also other coastal states of the Indian Ocean region. Collective cooperation and comprehensive maritime security strategy can be an effective way to safeguard national & regional interests. International ships & ports facilities meant to secure world maritime standards offer the guideline principles for safety and security of ports & sea lines. Under these rules & regulations, a joint intelligence system and a security plan can be shared focussing on maritime security agencies, customs, immigration, police, piracy, narcotics control and related issues.

3. Geo-Economic Capacity of The Indian Ocean Region

The world has dramatically changed during past 150 years or so, and with every decade passing by, new  technological heights are achieved, and new commercial avenues opened. Advancement in medical technology, pharmaceutical technology, transportation, and communication and literally every other field during the past century, and a half has increased the life expectancy of a child and has resulted in upsurge of population that is unprecedented in human history. According to United Nations report11 The current world’s population of 7.6 billion is projected to rise up to 8.6 billion in the 2030, 9.8 billion in year 2050, and 11.2 billion in the year 2100. Around 83 million people are being added to the world population each year with the rising trend in population size is anticipated to rise further. More than 60% of this population  (about 4.5 billion) lives in Asia. This means that the driving force of world’s economy lies in Asia.

Indian Ocean being the connecting channel for East Asia, South Asia, Australia, Middle East and Africa, bulk of this expected upsurge in trade will be seen in its waters. Apart from the huge oil supplies that move from Gulf to the Far East, major share of the rest of the items that constitute these 11.6 billion tons per annum seaborne trade also go through Indian Ocean. Looking at the world container port volumes by region, 64% of the trade goes to Asia. This shows the importance of the seaports in our area. Then if you look at the world’s ports rankings by volume, 9 out of the top 12 ports are located in China alone. So that indicates the direction of the world economy and signifies the importance of Indian Ocean in general and CPEC and Gwadar in particular for Pakistan.

With the rise of China, India and the newly developing ports in the Indian Ocean region such as Gwadar (Pakistan), Chahbahar (Iran), Kyauk Pyu (Myanmar) etc., along with the additional factor of OBOR and CPEC present a future picture of much higher trade volumes. China’s increasing demand for fuel from the Middle East and its pursuit to overcome United States as the largest economy of the world in the coming years, along with factors of demographically younger populations in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan and India means ever increasing demand for goods. This will be facilitated by enhanced regional connectivity through OBOR projects which aim to transport goods at a faste r pace due to shortening of time and distance (major aims of OBOR & CPEC) will result in tremendous commercial growth and job creation for the people of the not only the IOR region, but also for Central Asia and Europe.

3.1 OBOR & CPEC’S Significance for IOR Geo-Economics

China launched the ambitious, game changing the Belt  and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, a project which is intended to develop physical infrastructure across sixty-five countries in Asia, Europe, & Africa. China intends to invest around USD 150 billion in these projects every year till their completion, pledging more than $900 billion towards in total. This unprecedented initiative includes building of ports, power houses, bridges, railways and sea routes which will link East Africa and the Mediterranean region with the southern coast of China in two ways. One way is the ‘Maritime Silk Road, whereas the other is the Silk Road Economic Belt. The latter consists of a number of overland corridors, which will connect China to Europe via Central Asia and with Middle East via Pakistan. There are six economic corridors that China is building now, and all of these are interconnected to each other. These are China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC), the New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB); the China-Central & West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC); the China-Indo-China Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC); the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); and the Bangladesh-China-India- Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC). Looking at all of these corridors, CPEC’s overarching significance cannot be ignored as it occupies a central position in the whole OBOR project12.

 

Source:  BRI map by  Chinese Government

CPEC provides an alternate route for China’s imports of oil and gas from the gulf region, with Gwadar deep seaport located right at the mouth of Hormuz. It also provides an ideal location for a world class petrochemical complex. Going back to history, it’s important to note that before Suez Canal was established, the sea trade ships between Asia and Europe had to go all the way from Atlantic Ocean down to the Cape of Good Hope and then upwards in the Indian Ocean. Suez Canal made the sea route between the two continents shorter, consequently increasing the trade volume significantly. Similarly, Gwadar will help to dramatically increase the  trade  volumes  between  the  regional  countries  and  is   also expected to supplement the Suez Canal  in further  cutting down the time and costs for good transportation  between Asia, Africa and Europe.

CPEC has great potential in bringing down the quotient of hostility between Pakistan and its neighbours as it will also  benefit Afghanistan and India enormously. It can provide an alternative vision to start a new chapter in regional cooperation. Natural routes of trade between Kabul and East Punjab as well as Kandahar and Rajasthan can be facilitated by CPEC. The South Asian region populated by over 1.7 billion people, half of whom live under poverty line (less than 2$ per day), and whose potential has been held back by the regional proxy wars and conflicts can be unleashed, providing the much-needed economic upsurge in the region.

Pakistan being long standing strategic ally of China has special place in this whole initiative is injected with large investments for the CPEC, whereas Sri Lanka has leased out the Hambantota port project to China.

3.2 American Response To CPEC

As far as U.S is concerned, President George W. Bush was supportive of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was given final touches by President Obama to set rules for trade and investment in the Asia Pacific region13. That policy was reversed by Donald Trump as soon as he came into office. Had US stood by this agreement, it would have served its purpose better by supporting those countries, who want to be a part of OBOR and minimize their economic risks. US has also lost its influence to propose better terms of trade for countries, where China is the key exporter as it’s too pre-occupied with the military actions and post- cold war mentality and cannot present further a competitive and constructive investment plan to nations as opposite to BRI or TPP.

Russia on the other hand has returned as tremendous power in world politics. Although not as impactful as China in terms of economic  prowess  and  goodwill among the  poor nations, Russia has come up with strong policies under Vladimir Putin and smartly allied with China while the dragon rises to the top of the world. Russia has successfully signed agreements with individual states & bilateral security pacts including agreements with countries  sharing  borders with Russia including Belarus and Armenia. Russia-Pakistan relations have also improved significantly over the past few years. Pakistan’s offer to Russia to join CPEC and the positive response of Russians (Express Tribune, 2018), increased military ties between the two countries and Chinese apparent alliance with Russians to counter the US dollar’s dominance in the monetary system of the world all point towards a convergence of interest between Pakistan, China and Russia, which will facilitate their joint efforts to boost strategic and economic ties in the future.

As China, Russia and other global players gaining ground, the influence of the US is stagnating. Facing aggressive moves by Moscow and Beijing, the U.S may be enforced to accept influence of exclusionary regional spheres. World order is in a transformative mode where Pakistan’s bitter experience of US policies towards it and devastating effects of its aggressive military actions and negative self-centred policies has pushed Pakistan towards China.

In regard to the Indian Ocean, Pakistan’s interests to play effective role to ensure maritime security with the active assistance from its global and regional countries including China. The strong U.S and China military presence in the Indian Ocean needed to be monitored by concerned states. In this scenario, the fast development and increased Gwadar port operations may help for a better working relationship between Pakistan & china in helping to secure sea routes. It has a huge potential of deflecting the external power’s grouping within the region.

With the movement of world towards multi polar world, it is widely recognized by experts from the West and the East that the Indian Ocean region cannot be managed by one or two countries. The huge expanse of its area and the involvement of multiple players involving points out towards a collective responsibility of all stakeholders, with mutual respect and will to co-exist. This world cannot afford to have a war between nuclear armed states.

3.3 Fisheries  & Aquaculture

Fisheries have found to be one of the key resources of Indian Ocean region and provides food to millions of people around the globe. About one billion people largely in developing countries depend on fish as their chief energy source of animal protein, FAO. In the year 2010, fish provided more than 2.9 billion people with about 20 % of animal protein intake, and 4.3 billion people with 15% of fish protein14.U. N agency reports shows that in some countries specifically small island countries, fish contributes around 25% of animal protein intake. Its major role in poverty alleviation and increased employment and business opportunities is  vast. From annual production of 860,000 tons in 1950 to  almost 11.5 million tons in 2010, fisheries sector has shown a phenomenal growth. It’s expected that the demand is constant. A huge increase in fish production has been observed from 861,000 tons in 1950 to 11.5 million tons in 2010 and world total demand for fisheries products is expected to further rise from 50 million to 183 mi llion tons in the year 2015 with aquaculture activities predicted to 73% of this rise. Aquaculture offers vast potential for food provision and large number of livelihoods under the umbrella of Blue Economy will definitely add value in natural capital and its development while take care of ecological parameters during production activities and creating sustainable and decent employment opportunities and provides high quality goods for exports.

Natural fisheries resources have been facing the challenge of overexploitation due to growing public demand for seafood products. Therefore, there is a dire need to find balance between population demand & environmental health for the promotion of sustainable fishing & aquaculture. Sustainable fisheries can add value in billions and millions of tonnes of fish each year. While aquaculture has vast potential for continued growth to meet the food requirements at global level.

3.4 Renewable Ocean Energy

Rising awareness about the environmental degradation and global warming has resulted in an increased demand for renewable energy over the past two decades. Renewable sources of energy i.e., solar & wind are already being employed worldwide. In this regard, the potential of RE in Indian Ocean’s is tremendous. However, extra incentives in RE are in high demand to further reduce the fossil fuels burden. Now, time is appropriate to explore potential of RE sources obtained from the ocean. The ocean provides immense potential for blue RE from waves, tidal, wind, thermal, & biomass energy sources.

In the above-mentioned actions, it can also be proposed to bring all the offshore oil & gas communities together with the Renewable Ocean Energy community to carry out a gap analysis related to oil and gas exploration. In this scenario, the potential for offshore oil & gas sector development in the Indian Ocean region should also be considered.

3.5 Offshore Hydrocarbons & Sea-bed Minerals

With the decline in inland mineral deposits and  rising industrial demand, much attention has now been given on mineral exploration and seabed mining. The seabed covers minerals, which offer amazing economic development opportunities in both  the EEZ of maritime nations and beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Sea-bed exploration has already started in the Indian Ocean. However, major constraints in the commercialization of these resources face limited data availability of member states on resources of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), lack of exploration capacity, and mining & processing of these mineral resources. Thus, authentic information is required to gain the maximum deployment of these marine minerals across the region.

3.6 Marine Biotechnology

Marine Biotechnology is a fascinating and growing new area of scientific research. It has the potential for building an eco- sustainable and highly  efficient society. Important areas of research in this field are relevant to aquaculture; whereby new methodologies can assist in breeding of selected species; increasing sustainable production; and improvement in animal welfare, which includes rise in food supply, use of zero waste recirculation systems, and preventive therapeutic measures.

The quality of aquaculture products needs to be improved to gain optimal nutritional components for human health. Another important sector of marine biotechnology is the development of Renewable Energy (RE) products and sustainable practises of biogas production from marine algae. Furthermore, sea is blessed with large amount of untapped minerals, which can be used potentially as novel drugs, nutraceuticals, and beauty care products. Blue Biotechnology can also be utilized in addressing major environmental issues including bio-sensing technologies for in-situ marine monitoring & development of cost-effective and non- toxic antifouling technologies. Enzymes, Biopolymers, Bioluminescent materials can also be extracted through biotechnology, which can be used in many and important  industrial processes.

3.7 Coastal Tourism

Indian Ocean has some of the most exotic coastal sites to visit. South Africa, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, Maldives,  Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia etc. all have  beaches and resorts that attract millions of tourists per year. Coastal tourism is a fast-growing sector contributing 10% of the world’s GDP, creating 1 in 10 jobs globally. It has generated over US$ 1.4 trillion in export earnings15. In view of this expected growth, it is critical that multiple arenas are explored to grow sustainable tourism.

As the world’s largest country by population, China, is so close to Pakistani nation and its attachment with the CPEC project in particular and Pakistan in general ensures quite a substantial amount of tourism development not only in Pakistan’s but also in Iran’s   coastal   areas.  The   China  Outbound   Tourism Research Institute (COTRI) shows that the Chinese overseas tours will raise from 145 million in 2017 to more than 400 million by the end of 2030 (Smith, 2018). According to UNWTO, out of the 600 million additional trips in world tourism bringing the total from 1.2 billion in the year 2017 to 1.8 billion by the end of 2030, which is almost half of them, will originate in China16. The country will contribute a quarter of international tourism.

Moreover, with the Gwadar port development, the influx of traders and families from Central Asian Republics is also expected to grow phenomenally. Tourism expenditures, export & import of tourism related products, and services generate handsome income to the economy of host country. Tourism is considered as a key source of foreign exchange earnings of about 38% of all countries. Government revenues from tourism sector can be characterized as direct and indirect contributions. Direct contributions are generated by taxes on revenues from tourism businesses, tourism employment, and through direct charges on tourists i.e., Eco-tax or departure taxes. Indirect contributions develop from taxes and duties on supply of goods and services to tourists including tax on souvenirs restaurants, etc.

According to the World Travel & Tourism Council  (2011)17  alone, travel & tourism contributed 9% of the global GDP and provided 260 million jobs worldwide. Tourism can generate large number of jobs directly through restaurants, hotels, souvenir sales, taxis and indirectly through goods and supply services needed by tourism related businesses.

Tourism also has the power to induce local government to improve the infrastructure by modernizing water and sewage systems, roads, electricity, telephone and public transport networks. All this can improve the quality of life for residents as well as facilitate tourism.

In view of IORA’s decision not to include Pakistan primarily because of Indian attempt to isolate Pakistan in the region18, Pakistan needs to pursue the goals of emerging blue economy concept in collaboration with its regional partners through platforms such as SCO, OIC and bilaterally with countries of the ASEAN. Having picturesque coastal areas in Baluchistan and Sindh, Pakistan also needs to upgrade its own strategy to develop coastal tourism, as CPEC will result in lots of tourists from China and regional countries visiting Pakistan. The potential is worth billions of dollars, but the pre-requisites of manpower training, world class infra-structure and entertainment facilities along with better law and order situation needs to be provided to harness the upcoming opportunities in this area.

4. Conclusion and Recommendations

The geo-politics and geo-economics of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) littoral are interconnected to each-other due to large scale of population, trade & cultural routes, sea-based economy, coastal tourism and other interests of leading global powers. IOR has tremendous potential of geo-economic activities which are not only important for the Asian countries but also  equally important for the entire world. The addition of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has provided new avenues to harness the true potential and uplift the poverty by improving existing socio-economic ties in the Indian Ocean littoral countries. It is also important to notice that the geo – political aspects have diverse dimensions in the region where philosophy of enhanced cooperation for peace and sustainability would be highly needed to promote socio-economic uplift and ensure prosperity in the region. The new economic initiative by the Chinese Government is promising for the entire region where Pakistan and Iran would be the major beneficiaries from overall development. The role of major global powers needs to promote peace and cooperation for which China, Pakistan and Iran need to make extra efforts on diplomatic fronts.

Kanwar Muhammad Javed Iqbal is a Maritime Researcher, Islamabad-Pakistan, and Research Fellow at Center for Global & Strategic Studies, Islamabad – Pakistan reachable at kanwar.javediqbal@gmail.com Baber Bilal Haider is a PhD Scholar at National Defense University, Islamabad – Pakistan, reachable at cdrbaber@yahoo.com

References

1 Dhruva Jaishankar, “Indian Ocean Region: A Pivot for India’s Growth” , BROOKINGS, September 12, (2016).

2 Amy Derr, A. (2015, January 26,). “The Pursuit of Peaceful Expansion: China’s Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century through Offensive Realism and Complex Interdependence,” WORDPRESS, January 26, 2015, https://myoldresearchpapers.wordpress.com/2015/01/26/the-pursuit-of-peacefulexpansion-chinas-maritime-silk-road-of-the-21st-century-through-offensive-realismand-complex-interdependence/

3 David Scott, “Chinese Maritime Strategy for the Indian Ocean,” CIMSEC, (November 2 8 , 2017). 4 Deputy Chief of General Office of China’s South Sea Fleet 5 Aneja, A, “China Deploys Warships in Indian Ocean,” THE HINDU, February 21, 2018.

6 The formation included live show of guided-missile frigate, destroyer and supply vessel along-with a fire drill.

7 Yuandan and Yusha. “India should get used to China’s military drills: expert,” Global Times, August 27, 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/ 1063429.shtml

8 China wants link between Gwadar Chabahar ports. https://www.presstv.com/ Detail/2017/12/27/546973/China-wants-link-between-Gwadar-Chabahar-ports. Published: 27th December 2017. Accessed: 20th September 2018.

9 Sayyed, Baqir Sajjad.(2018, March 13). “Iran invites Pakistan to participate in Chahbahar Propject”. Dawn.com, Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/ 1394938.

10 Andrew Tate, A. (2018, July 3). China launches two Type 055 destroyers simultaneously in Dalian. Jane’s360 [London].

11 United Nations report, 21 June, 2017.

12 “Russia to become part of game changer CPEC,” The Express Tribune, March 23 , 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1667265/1-russia-become-part-game-changer-cpec.

13 McBride, James, “What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),” Council on Foreign Relations, May 15, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacificpartnership-tpp.15th May 2018. on 20th September 2018

14 “The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture – Opportunities & Challenges,” (2014) Accessed: 20th September 2018, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf. ISSN-

15 Rochelle Turner, “Travel & Tourism: Economic Impact 2017 World,” World Travel & Tourism Council, accessed on September 21, 2018, https://www.wttc.org/- /media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/regions-2017/world2017.pdf.

16 Oliver Smith, “The unstoppable rise of the Chinese traveller – where are they going and what does it mean for over tourism?” The Telegraph, April 11 , 2018.

17 “Travel & Tourism Economic Impact 2017 World, World Travel & Tourism Council, (March, 2017).

18 Asif Ezdi, A. “The rise of the Indian Ocean Rim,” THE NEWS, June 15, 2015.

Dhows in doldrums: a spotlight on an informal segment of Pakistan’s maritime economy

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Alifiya AunAli
Sajjad Ahmed Khrbey

Abstract

This paper elaborates upon the challenges faced by Dhow making industry in Pakistan, where dhows have always served as the traditional means of cargo transportation. Dhows have  also been useful in trade especially with secondary ports and war -torn countries of the Middle East and Africa. The decreasing trend in trade through dhows is affecting not only the maritime economy but also may lead to the extinction of traditional and customary knowledge of dhow making industry. Pakistan needs to ensure that policy gaps are filled to address the concerns of all stakeholders  and steps may be taken to identify it as a formal industry in the maritime economy.

Moreover, training and capacity building programs will also play an eminent role in generating relevant workforce for boosting the growth of the boat making industry. Active efforts are needed  for Public Private Partnership and incentivizing dhow trade also with the assurance of the availability  of required raw materials that would help in the revival of the industry. The utilization of modern technology, adequate facilities such as revision of port charges and availability of basic infrastructure are recommended to  excel the growth of this vital segment of maritime economy.

Keywords: Trade, wooden boats, traditional boats, sea-trade, flag- state, traditional art, voyage

1. INTRODUCTION

Boat-building is an ancient art that is as old as the period of Hazrat Nooh (Noah) (A.S); we all know over the rage, there has been a development in tools and technique, of course, but the process remains no less fascinating and enchanting.1 Approximately above 90% of international trade occurs via maritime transport by using either ocean transport, 2seaways or inland waterways, the role of maritime transportation is considered to be crucial in international trades.3 The maritime trade is undertaken through large, medium and small ships and boats/dhows. While talking about the maritime trade in the Indian Ocean the role of traditional wooden dhows cannot be overemphasized. These dhows sail throughout the year and especially are used with smaller secondary ports/anchorages. They have become a vital link with for trade with poor and war-torn countries like Somalia and Yemen.

In Pakistan, Dhows have been engaged in cargo transportation since historic times. The trade through dhows is operated by Trading Agents. These agents are listed with the local authorities and government agencies. Shippers’ complete paperwork and make payments in the agent’s office. These Trading Agents work on 3% of the freight value of the entire cargo as their commission. At present only three Trading Agents are engaged in the dhows trading business in Pakistan they are M/s Noor Sons, M/s Al- Faizan and Lateef Trading Company. Whereas there were more than twenty companies operating in the past in the said business, most companies have justify the business due to the downward trade trend. One of the dhow shipping agents stated that only 80 to 100 Dhows from different countries come to Pakistan annually for trading, whereas it was about 800 plus in the past (about 10 years back).

At present, not a single Pakistani Dhow is engaged in trading which means that all the Dhows engaged in the transportation of goods to and from Pakistan are not registered in Pakistan. They are mostly registered in Iran, UAE, Comoros, Togo, India etc. Registration of dhows in Pakistan was stopped in 2003 by the MMD department as quoted by one of the Trading Agents.4 Besides, there are many other challenges being faced by this very important economic activity. There is a growing fear and distress that the traditional knowledge of dhow making in Pakistan is in danger of becoming extinct. This segment of maritime economy plays a significant role thus it is considered very important to preserve the traditional knowledge, bring innovations and mainstream it at  parity with emergent international trends.

In mentioned context above, this paper suggests necessary measures to strengthen and uplift the status of traditional dhow making industry and its business in Pakistan by highlighting and underlining the importance of traditional knowledge and significance in overall maritime economy of Pakistan, Understanding various issues and modern international utilization trends.

The paper also employs qualitative research methodology and has scrutinized and examined the relevant primary and secondary sources of data / information by means of boat construction site visits and nine Key Informant Interviews of the relevant stakeholders of the industry i.e. Timber Merchants at Timber market, Boat Building Craftsman at Boat Building  Yard  at Machar Colony, Nakhodas (Captains) of Pakistani Dhows, the boat owner of biggest boat built in Pakistan, Dhows Trading Agents at Keamari, Nakhoda (Captain) of an Irani Dhow at Ghas Bandar Jetty KPT Karachi, Mercantile Marine Department Karachi, a Tour Operator at Marina Club DHA Karachi and a Trading Agent at Kharadar Karachi. Pictures were taken during the field visit of boat construction sites. Visits to the Boat construction sites’ were undertaken at Karachi and Gwadar for hands-on  observations.

Origin of Dhows: An Overview

The term ‘Dhows’ is derived from the 5 Arabic word dawa, these were traditional boats used in the Indian 6Ocean, Persian Gulf and Red Sea regions. These were originally sailing vessels which consisted of triangular sails. Conflicting theories also exist as to whether dhows originated in India, the 7Middle East or in 8East Africa; regardless of this, the dhow manufacturing industry had been traditionally one of the most vital manufacturing industries of the Persian Gulf region. 9The Chinese till date, uses traditional boats similar dhows, which go by the name of ‘Junks’. From as early as the 2nd century AD, junks were utilized to go to the sea, and they developed at a fast pace in the period of the Song dynasty, the Junk boats has been one of the major  inventions of the Song dynasty There are countless reasons why the junk boat is one of the most important inventions by the song dynasty but here are two main reasons first is its redesigned hull and rear rudders (960-1279). The dhows boat making has also been traditionally and customarily allied with the sub-continent region and was used for trade, this traditional art and skill has been a permanent part of the boat making industry of this region.

The wooden boats, that have become extinct in the global shipping arena, are still favourites in South Asia, which has an inconsiderable financial return for the builders and their customers. 10

Types of Dhows

Dhows are different from other traditional cargo ships in various aspects. One of these is due to their structure and shape. The Dhows are also simple in their design, which enables them to have more space for hull cargo. Dhows have been designed primarily for gulf-waters by enabling them to drift upon shallow waters and constructing them so that they are easily manoeuvrable. They also consist of triangular sails,  long  stems and sharp bows in order to make them seaworthy especially to the Monsoon season in the Indian Ocean. Over time, dhows have evolved. Engines have been incorporated including electric generators. Commercial cargoes today are transported via motorized dhows through the Indian Ocean. In few countries, dhows are also being partially constructed from fibre glass instead of wood; they are also getting bigger in size and some have also been custom-made as floating small luxury hotels/restaurants and even ferries.

There are numerous types of Dhows some for deep sea and some for shallow waters, which are used for all kinds of transportation and fishing. There are mainly 13 types of dhows with more than 200 distinctive designs.11 The Dhows are differentiated on the bases of their size and hull design as well as based on their  regional difference in both colours and ornamentation. The size of the largest boat being presently built has increased from 300-500 tons to 700-2000 tons or even more. Identification of Dhows according to their build, style or origin is not very simple thing. Each Dhow is unique with variation in size, shape, and colour. A Dhow’s wooden wheelhouse and other superstructures can be carved into traditional designs  and  customized  modifications which may be visible that vary from region to region. Traditional Dhows can be divided into 5 main categories i.e. Shu’ai Dhow (small or medium sized general purpose boat, range from 5 to 15 meters in length), Jalibut or Jelbut with square stern (advanced version of  the  Shu’ai  Dhow, ranging  up to 15 meters in   length),

Yemeni (small and medium sized boat, approximately 15 meters in length), Boum (large ‘ocean going’ Dhow, ranges from 15 to 35 meters or more in length) and Sambuq (other large Dhow). A boum in full sail is represented in the emblem of Kuwait emphasizing its traditional importance in the country, where it was used in the pearl industry, to carry fresh water and as a trading ship. Other dhows include Sambuk or Sambuq, Baghlah, Ghanjah or Kotiya, Jahazi or Jihazi, Battil, Barijah, Baqarah or baggarah (derived from the Arabic word for “cow”), Zaruq and Badan etc.

Basic Features of Different Types of Dhows

Few details of basic features of different types of Dhows as mentioned below:

a. Shu’ai A Shu’ai 12 Dhow is a small or medium sized general- purpose The sizes of these vessels range from 5 to 15 meters (18 – 50 feet) in length. It is used for cargo transportation and fishing. The boat has a particular curved profile, high and square at the stern, becomes low towards the bow and then ascends to a trademark extending pointed head. Shu’ai Dhow has a transom stern with decorative projections that stretch out beyond the hull as a continuation of the deck rail.

 

b. Yemeni This is a small and medium sized boat, approximately 15 meters (50 feet) in These boats are uniquely designed for fishing and are common along the Yemeni coastline. This Dhow has either a transom type or decreased high rising stern and a steep angled pointed bow.

 

c. Jalibut or Jelbut with square stern A   Jelbut   is   a  small to medium-sized Dhow, ranging up to 15 meters (50 feet) in It is the advanced version of the shu’ai with a shorter head stem piece. Most Jelbut Dhows are fitted with engines. The Jelbut is used in the trading and fishing industries and historically, was used extensively as a pearling vessel. The Jelbut Dhow fe atures a transom stern, with a short, rowed stem-piece rising vertically from the waterline, giving the vessel a rectangular bow profile. Pakistani boat builders make these types of boats.

d. Jalibut or jelbut with round stern This Dhow features a short-bow and a stern with a round shape. Except from the stern, the Dhow is similar to the Jelbut with the square

 

e. Boum or dhangi  The BOUM and the SAMBUQ are the two larges ‘ocean going’ The Boum is a large sized Dhow and ranges from 15 to 35 meters (50 – 115 feet) or more in length. These vessels are used as transport vessels for passengers and goods. A boum in full sail is represented in the emblem of Kuwait emphasizing its traditional importance in the country, where  it was used in the pearl industry, to carry fresh water and as a trading ship.

Divers often used to use this dhow as a diving boat as it has a tempered stern, The Boum had an imposing high bow on the original Arab style Boum which is trimmed in the latest version and the Indian version (known as Dhangi in India). It has an outboard rudder higher than the stern.

f. Sambuk or sambuq Being 38 meters  (124  feet),  the sambuq is one of the largest dhows and it can transport greater than 500 In the Middle East, these dhows are utilized for the transportation of passengers and cargo. They are also used in loading and unloading operations. The design of the sambuq originates from India and Europe; these dhows have a square or transom stern and previously consisted of detailed carvings.

Traditionally, a Sambuk had one or two masts, but nowadays they are motorized. It has been one of the most successful Dhows in history. It has a special keel design, with a sharp curve right below the top of the bow. The Sambuq either has a rounded or a squared stern.

Identification of Dhows by Origin

The different dhows can be identified by area where they have been built. 13Boat makers and designers are likely to build and decorate their Dhows in certain specific and distinctive patterns even though it is likely to fade with time as new materials, engines, size; cargo handling systems are also built-in in the modern built Dhows.

The Pakistani Dhows are often painted, and the designs done are more elaborate (blue or turquoise on the superstructure), and the hulls of the dhows are often shallower and slightly less rounded. Registration number is usually written on the hull under the superstructure and the name of the  vessel is also painted  at the same place.

Indian Dhows consist of a wide and rounded hull. These are plain boats, and the hull is not painted with a white superstructure. The registration number is painted white along with the side of the hull under the superstructure which, also incorporates the name of the vessel.

The Dhows of UAE are smaller than the Indian Dhows and are often more decorated. 14 These dhows are primarily used for recreation, for fishing and transportation of cargo transportation in the Middle Eastern region. They often have a noticeable “cutter” on the bow. Their hull is overextended and turns up sharply at the stern. However, few owners from UAE have started constructing their boats through Pakistani boat builders.

Yemeni Dhows are generally similar to UAE Dhows, a little smaller  than  the  Pakistan  and Indian Dhows and are often  less seagoing vessels. 15 These dhows usually take on to shorter trips to Djibouti, Somalia and the UAE. These boats are easy to manoeuvre and can be identified by the square hull at the stern with a low sweep towards the bow.

Traditional Boat Building in Pakistan – An Informal Industry

Wooden boats have been built in Pakistan traditionally since generations. It is an industry in the informal sector in which thousands of people are engaged. The sector employs boat designers, carpenters and vendors of various materials used in boat building. These boats are built in mostly in the cities like Karachi and Gwadar are used for the purpose of fishing and Cargo. The most popular area where Pakistani wooden boats are built in large number is the Boat Building Yard at the Karachi Fish Harbour Authority. In Karachi one will find the construction of various sizes of boats for the purpose of fishing and cargo transportation. In addition, these boats are also being built along the coastal belt of Karachi like Ibrahim Haideri, Younisabad and Machar Colony.

Pakistani craftsmen use various kinds of woods to build different sizes of boats for fishing and cargo transportation. 16Burma teak or teak from Indonesia is the ideal wood to use due to its longevity and sturdiness of the wooden dhows. Additionally, local wood types such as Keekar, Laachi and Saras are also used in the construction process. However, many of the workers in the yard expressed reservations that if deforestation in Pakistan continues with the same pace, the availability of wood for boats will become limited and more costly to procure.

The engines used in the wooden boats are imported from Singapore, China and some are smuggled from Afghanistan. Different woods apart from Burma Teak (local name Sagwan), Rosewood (local name Sheesham or Tali), Acacia Wood (commo nly known as Keekar), include Eucalyptus Wood (local name  Safeda), Balau Wood (grown in the Pacific-Asia region) and Bilinga Wood (alternate of Balau wood, imported from Africa).

Construction Process of Boats / Dhows

The Pakistani craftsmen make fishing boats and cargo  dhows for domestic and international clients. They also supply their products to Iran, 17Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Pakistani boat builders do not require any technical drawings, graphs, or any type of design. They also do not even use modern gadgets/frames to make a boat. It is an inherited profession, and the skill is transferred from generation to generation to the workers who are carpenters and have learnt the boat construction skills from their forefathers. While building a normal boat for fishing  purposes, they use a team of 7 members, including some ‘Waada’  (carpenters) and for making a large size cargo boats, they require at least 20 skilled men. The prices of these boats fluctuate depending upon the requirement of the size and the quality of the wood to be used in the construction. These craftsmen built these vessels in multiple stages.

First to lay the boat’s foundation, first the craftsmen cuts the selected trunk of the tree for the keel of the boat, they call it “Pathan” or “Tar”. Then they cut the Forefoot and Sternpost ‘Agla Mora’ and ‘Pichla Mora’ of the boat and join them with keel. After that they place the Ribs – the internal wooden structure of the boat, locally known as ‘Dhancha’. For this, they mostly use Pakistani wood ‘Taali/Sheesham (Rosewood) or Keekar (Acacia).

On the completion of the internal structure, they start attaching the outside wooden hull in a curved shape with wooden planks which are fixed with nuts and bolts. For the hull of the boat, they use the ‘Bilinga’ wood, which is imported from Malaysia and South Africa. When the outer hull is completed, they start fixing the pillars and beams for placing the deck (floor of the boat) on it. These pillars and beams are normally of wood, but iron girders are also used in medium and large boats. In the cargo boats (Dhows) they make two additional decks at the stern of the boat.

Subsequently, various compartments are then constructed  in the boat comprising of a galley, an Engine room, Control/Steering room, one or two Washrooms, Captain/ Nakoah room and Rest Room for the crew. The major space of the boat is utilized for the storage of cargo. Constructions of these compartments depend on the size and availability of the space on the boat. A small boat doesn’t have such luxuries, it only has a small space for a toilet and cooking.

They also apply fish fats (mixed with some chemicals) on the outer part of the boat’s hulls which remain in the water. These fish fats improve the durability of wood from adverse effects of the sea water and make it waterproof. To make the boat beautiful, paintwork, traditional carvings and other finishing work on the various parts of the boat is done. The boat is then lowered down into the sea water for the final touch ups and installation of engine, propellers, generators, electrical/ mechanical gear and accessories.

The hull of Dhows is constructed deeper for storing a maximum quantity of cargo, which make the dhows more stable and balanced as compared to other boats. The construction of these boats can take up from 06 months to 24 months on average depending on the size of the boat subject to availability of finances with the owner of the boat. Figures 1 to 3 show different steps of dhow construction in Pakistan.

Figure 1: Laying Keel of the Boat with Forefoot and Sternpost. (Source:  NCMPR Depository) Figure 2: Fixing Wooden Wall on the Ribs of the Boat.(Source: NCMPR Depository)

Financial Aspects and Various Economic Practices in Boat Building Business

The price of a small boat starts from one million and it can go  up to more than 15 million. The cost of the boat building is directly proportional to the size of the boat built, quality of wood being utilized, engines and other related materials, whereas the cost of a medium/large sized boat would be approx. Rs. 100-150 million or in some cases more. The largest boat recently built in Karachi is for 2000 tons. This cargo boat (Dhow) is 175 feet long, 25 feet deep and 55 feet wide and to date has cost Rs. 110 million, whereas 2 x engines, a generator, a crane and other related accessories of the boat are yet to be installed on which a further amount of approximately Rs.40 to 60 million will be required. Unfortunately, due to lack of any governmental / Institutional support, the large dhows are towed to Dubai for engine fittings.

It is imperative to mention that due to the non-availability of proper dhow building quays and lowering machinery/cranes, these owners have to bear substantial expenditure on the lowering of medium of large boats in the Sea. One of the craftsmen informed that they had recently had to pay approximately Rs.8 million on just lowering of a 2000 ton boat into the sea.

Working Practices for Boat Building Industry

There is no proper boat building company in Pakistan, mostly the boat building is undertaken by few artisans who are known by word of mouth and are well reputed due to their class of work and quality, and this is the reason that demands for Pakistani boats and Craftsmen is increasing especially in Dubai, Iran and other countries. The boat building crew in Pakistan professionally do not follow any blueprint or drawing while constructing the boats. 19They have learnt by heart their methods and do not need any graphs, pictures or drawings to guide their hand. Since drawings, charts, and layouts are unusual objects for these craftsmen, they usually ask the owner’s requirements in detail while booking their orders. Normally they ask about the material that is to be used, especially the wood, the size of the boat and other things related to the boat building. Regardless of the conventional system construction used by the labour, the Pakistani Boat Building is known for its skilled craftsmanship.

Currently, most of the builders are taking orders for cargo vessels since the demand for fishing boats have decreased; this is due to a range of reasons, including the continuous use of over- aged vessels. The life of wooden boats is also much longer usability than fibre glass boats as per the perception prevailing in Dhow owners. The average life of these boats is approximately 25 years and a large number of fishermen procure old vessels as most of them cannot afford the new ones. On average 30 to 40 boats for the purpose of fishing and cargo are built every year. This is over and above the repair work in the yard that rarely comes to an end. The Karachi Fish Harbour Authority (KFHA) charges Rs 100/- per boat (per day) from boat builders for providing space in the Boat Building Yard.

Crew Management & Payment Methods

The Number of crew members for a Dhow construction varies from 5-30 in number, depending on the size and usage of the Dhow. Smaller Dhows may require 5-10 members, average or standard sized dhows may have 12-18 crew members and large Dhows may have 20-30. Even today, the general crew is often comprised of individuals without formal seamanship or fishery training. A few of the captains/Nakhoda20, are the owners of the boats, and the crew is somewhat poorly paid.

In the past, Arabs have traditionally been part of the Arabian dhows crew, but today their participation has declined. Today most Dhows consist of Indian, Pakistani and Iranian crew. Dubai and Comoros dhows are fully manned by Pakistani crew, whereas Iranian dhows have 5-10% Pakistani crew. Indian and Pakistani Dhows are manned by the local crew.

The Pakistani Dhow crew is either paid on a daily or a weekly basis. Currently, they are getting paid Rs.1200 – 1500 per day and the captain of the dhow gets double of that amount. The other system of payment to the crew is to divide the income of the dhow into three parts; after deducting the entire expenditure of fuel, spares and provisions, the owner gets two parts while the rest is distributed amongst the crew and the Captain is paid double that of the crew.

Registration of Boats and Flag State

Dhows fly flags of those states in which they are registered; at present there have been an increasing number of owners who are registering their vessels in flag of convenience States, with mostly with the owner situated in other country than that of the flag state. However, the state flag is flown in international waters; while in the national waters of any country, the  Dhow flies the local flag of the country, the Dhow is in the country of. This is to primarily escape the local taxations and is a local practice which is not recognized under International law.

Pakistani boat builders despite having built so many dhows but not a single dhow is Pakistani flagged. All Pakistani Dhows are flagged in the state of convenience, mostly in Dubai, or few of them in Comoros and Togo.22 Some of the Pakistani dhow holders have tried in the past to get their dhows registered in Pakistan, but there is no well-defined and clear procedure with Mercantile Marine Department (MMD) for registration of cargo Dhows, however, the department is registering fishing boats. The MMD officials were approached with the query; they have indicated to resolve the said issue on priority.

Trade through Dhows in Pakistan

Commodities which are being imported to Pakistan through the Dhows include machinery, motor vehicles (reconditioned), electronic equipment/gadgetries, animals, general items and personal baggage from UAE, Muscat, Kuwait  and  Somalia. Limited export is being undertaken through Dhows which comprises of rice, flour, fruits etc. to, Somalia, Yemen, Iran, UAE and all the Gulf Countries. Previously, animals were also exported from Pakistan but now a ban has been imposed on animals’ import and export. Napier Mole Jetty (Ghas Bandar) is dedicated at KPT (Karachi Port Trust) for the Embarkation/Disembarkation of  cargo. Only 4 to 6 Dhows can be accommodated on this jetty depending on the size of the boats. The remaining can be adjusted alongside the boats. All cargo on the Dhows is manually handled by shore labour. The cargo of these boats generally carries smaller packages which can be manually loaded and discharged. The labourers at the dock physically carry the goods up and down the boat, for the heavier packages either the Dhow’s lifter or shore cranes are used to do the job.

 

Fig 5: Cargo arrived by a truck, for dhows at Ghas. Bandar
(Source:  NCMPR Depository)
Fig 6: Labourers loading cargo on
dhows at Ghas Bandar (Source:  NCMPR Depository)

The following shortcomings / problems regarding port facilitie s were highlighted during an interview with a Captain of a dhow. These issues need immediate attention for the improvement of trade through dhows:24  25

  1. Port charges are on the higher side and need to be
  2. Facilities especially bathrooms are in very poor
  3. No fresh water supply line is available at the
  4. Heavy amount is being charged by KPT for the permit to supply rations and fresh water through dedicated
  5. Large boats of 1800 tons and above cannot come at the Jetty due to less depth as dredging is required at Ghas26

Modern Utilization Trends of Dhows

Pakistani Dhows are commonly utilized either for fishing or Cargo transportation. Whereas Dhows are being used for many purposes internationally and are a good source of  earning including foreign exchange. For instance, Maldivian Dhows locally known as “Dhonis” are utilized for live aboard floating hotels and as ferries for excursion trips. These Dhows are constructed beautifully, having all modern luxuries required by the foreign tourists from all over the globe. During a visit to Marina Club DHA, Karachi, it has been noted that few Dhows stationed at anchor have been converted from fishing boats into excursion boats and have cabins, kitchens, washrooms and  other  required facilities. These boats (captured by Law enforcement agencies) were purchased in auction and were converted into recreational boats for family picnics by the private owners. It is worth mentioning here that these types of boats can be utilized and operated by the tourism department or it can be operated by private tour operators for locals and foreign tourists and can be a good source to generate revenue and income.

Recommendations

Pakistan is at the forefront of traditional Boat Building in the region, however other regional centres are emerging due to lack of support from the Government. In order to save Dhow businesses in Pakistan, the following recommendations are  mentioned:

  1. The government needs to revisit the existing governance gaps and make friendly policies to the boat constructors and tour operators in order to promote this sector and mainstream this neglected sector of maritime economy by declaring it as a mainstream
  2. The Karachi Fish Harbour Authority (KFHA) needs to provide better facilities to the boat builders at the Boat Building Yard. Apart from the provision of utilities and other basic services, the most important requirement is to establish a permanent launching machinery/ infrastructure for lowering down of the constructed boats into the Boat builders can pay some additional charges to avail this facility as presently they are paying a substantial amount for this aforementioned purpose, which increases the overall boat building cost.
  3. The government needs to provide consultancy facilities to the boat builders by hiring qualified experts in boat designing and building business and ensure availability of proper drawing/ layouts for building good quality boats using modern, Moreover, on long term basis courses may be introduced at technical colleges/ University level for producing Architectures/ Engineers with specialization in boat building.
  4. The government needs to encourage the private sector by providing them certain incentives to start ferry services and recreational facilities for the masses through
  5. The government also needs to be responsible for the motivations to the exporters to trade through dhows in the region as due to it being cost-effective in its nature their exports will be more
  6. Today, the wooden boat industry is not feasible and not much profitable due to the unavailability of good quality Initially, boats were made up of Burma teak, which is not affordable now; then our boat builders started using Sheesham wood which is also becoming non-existent; then they started using Balau wood which they imported from Malaysia, which is also not available now in the market. In the international market, the wooden boats are dominated by luxury yachts at the higher market end and  provide smooth sail and  high-performance boats at the lower end. People are using carbon fibre composites to reduce weight and drag and modern, efficient engines, and modern scientific techniques to improve performance. If Pakistan wants to increase her share in the market, it needs to come into the fibre boat industry and train and build capacity of its human resource and make them adaptable to use modern techniques and practises.
  7. There are some great opportunities for ships/boat and Dhows Building in Gwadar: as presently the city of Gwadar has a modest wooden boat building yard with top-notch skills and excellent manufacturing output 27
  8. Cargo Dhows coming to Karachi from various countries are stationed at the NMB Wharf (locally known as Ghass Bandar) for the loading and unloading of the cargo where insufficient facilities are available. The Port Authority has to make  improvements in the following areas to promote/increase the growth of this informal but  important segment of maritime

a. Port charges are considerably on the higher side and needs to be reduced from the current

b. The Water Supply is not available at the jetty. Dhow agents arrange water bowsers and ration from They pay additional wharfage to the Port Authorities for taking these water bowsers and ration trucks to the Port area, where the dhows are docked which makes the water and ration expensive. The Port Authority is required to arrange the water supply through pipe lines as it is being provided to the bigger ships.

References

1 Mehar-un-nisa, “Boat craftsmanship: A rising tide.” The Express Tribune, Sunday Magazine, August 16, 2015.

2 Peter Vine, Pearls in Arabian Waters: The Heritage of Bahrain. (London: Immel, 1986.)

3 Funda Yercan and Turkay Yildiz, “International Maritime and Trade logistics”, Maritime Logistics: A Complete Guide to Effective Shipping and Port Management, 3 (2012): 23-44.

4 Interview with the representatives of Irfan M. M/s Noor sons Trading Agent Comp any, 6 August, 2019.

5 Dhow native vessel used on the Arabian Sea. XIX. ult. orig. unkn.; in Marathi as d??wa in Arabic as d?wa.

6 Malcolm C. peck, Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa Peck, (2020)

7 Laith Ulaby, “On the Decks of Dhows: Musical Traditions of Oman and the Indian Ocean World.” The World of Music, 1,2 (2012): 43-62.

8 Poonam Bala, “Dhow Cultures of the Indian Ocean: Cosmopolitanism, Commerce and Islam.” African Historical Review, 44:1,(2012): 138-142.

9 The mariners’ museum and park, “Junk Ship” https://exploration.marinersmuseum.org/ watercraft/junk-ship/, accessed on 24.9.2019

10 Mansoor Hassan, “Wooden boats still alive in South Asia”. Dawn News, February 18, 2018.

11 “NATO Identification guide for Dhows, Skiffs and Whalers in the High Risk Area,” NATO Shipping Centre, accessed September 24, 2019, http://maritimeconnector.com/documents/NATO_Guidance.pdf

12 “ NATO Identification guide”

13 Carl Waldman, and Alan Wexler, Encyclopedia of Exploration, Vol. 1-2., (New York: Facts on File, 2004)

14 Shirley Kay, Bahrain: Island Heritage. Dubai, United Arab Emirates: Motivate Pub, 1989).

15 Dionisius A. Agius, John P. Cooper, and Chiara Zazzaro, “The Maritime Heritage of Yemen: A Focus on Traditional Wooden ‘Dhows’,” Archaeopress Archaeology, (2014): 143–157.

16 Mehar-un-nisa, “Boat craftsmanship: A rising tide.”

17 Alan Villiers, “Some Aspects of the Arab Dhow Trade”, Middle East Journal, 2, no.4, (1948), 399-416, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4322010.

18 Muhammad Usman, Boat Building Craftsman at Boat Building Yard, Machar Colony Karachi, July 2019.

19 Khurshid Ahmed, “Pakistan’s craftsmen build boats without layouts and sketches”, Arab News Pakistan, February 11, 2018, https://www.arabnews.pk/node/1244106/pakistan.

20 Nakhodi is a term originating from the Persian language which literally means Captain. … Derived from n?v boat (from Old Persian) + khud? master, from Middle Persian khut?i a ‘master of a native vessel’ or ‘Lord of the Ship’.

21 Younus M, and Buksh M, Nakoha (Captain), Dhow, July, 2019.

22, Anwar M of M/s Noor Sons, and Pervaiz M of M/s Al Faizan, Dhows Trading Agents Karachi, June, 2019.

23 Captain Shaheen A, Mercantile, Marine Department, Karachi July, 2019.

24 Anwar M of M/s Noor Sons and Pervaiz M of M/s Al Faizan Dhows Trading Agents Karachi, June, 2019.

25 Ghani A. a Nakoha (Captain) of a Irani Dhow at Ghas Bandar Jetty KPT Karachi, June, 2019/

27 Naghmana Zafar, “World Bank’s PROBLUE Plan and opportunities for Pakistan,” The Financial Daily, views and opinions, January 20, 2020.